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Iqbal "Plausibility" in Pharmaceutical and Medical
Device Litigation
William M Janssen*
Judicial opinions construing and interpreting the technicalities
of proper pleading may be bedside reading for the bench, the bar,
and civil procedure enthusiasts, but rarely for those outside the
legal circle. It is hardly the spice that energizes the cocktail party
circuit. Not true with the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which examined the federal pleader's burden
to avoid a dismissal.' In fact, few decisions in recent memory have
attracted as much popular attention, analysis, and angry debate as
this opinion and its predecessor from two years earlier that it had
sought to clarify, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.2 In tandem, these
two decisions represent the Court's resolve that speculation of
wrongdoing will not be sufficient to unlock the doors to civil
litigation in federal court. Instead, as Iqbal made firm, a plaintiff is
now required to plead a claim that is factually "plausible" to avoid
dismissal.
As the furious debate unleashed by Iqbal ricochets among the
courts, practitioners, academics, and elected officials, assessing its
impact has become a leading order of the day. One sector worthy
of special attention in this pursuit is pharmaceutical and medical
device litigation. It has been estimated that products regulated by
the federal Food and Drug Administration account for
approximately one-quarter of the entire consumer economy in the
United States,3 an economic valuation once pegged at $1.5
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1. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. See Richard Merrill, FDA Regulatory Requirements as Tort Standards,
12 J.L. & POL'Y 549, 557 (2004). Additionally, the federal government
estimates that, in 2009, the total national health expenditure (encompassing not
just pharmaceuticals and medical devices, but professional services as well) rose
to $2.5 trillion and represented a 17.3% share of the gross domestic product of
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trillion.4 The value of the world pharmaceutical marketplace alone
has been estimated to be $750 billion.5 Domestically, 18 of the
Fortune 500 companies in 2010 were in the pharmaceutical or
medical device industries, and 3 of the 30 companies comprising
the current Dow Jones Industrial Average were pharmaceutical
companies. Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing employs
hundreds of thousands of wage and salaried employees. By any
measure, the pharmaceutical and medical device marketplaces are
vast. What Iqbal means to this sector, therefore, may have a
relevance that far transcends the rarely dusty tomes of federal civil
procedure law. It may influence a very broad swath of federal
the United States. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., National Health Expenditure Projections 2009-2019,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2009.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
4. See Douglas A. Grimm, FDA, CLIA, or a "Reasonable Combination of
Both": Toward Increased Regulatory Oversight of Genetic Testing, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 107, 113-14 & n.54 (2006) (citing Eve E. Slater, Today's FDA, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2005)). Further discrimination within that regulatory
category is elusive. As the agency's authorizing statute confirms, the FDA's
regulatory net encompasses food, cosmetics, and biologics (and, now, tobacco),
in addition to pharmaceuticals and medical devices. See Federal Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a (2006 & Supp. 2009).
5. See IMS Health Lowers 2009 Global Pharmaceutical Market Forecast to
2.5-3.5 Percent Growth, Bus. WIRE (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com/
economy-economic-indicators/economic-conditions-recovery/12305880- 1.html.
6. The 12 pharmaceutical companies with this distinction (with their
Fortune 500 rank) were: Johnson & Johnson (33); Pfizer (40); Abbott
Laboratories (75); Merck (85); Eli Lilly (112); Bristol-Myers Squibb (114);
Amgen (159); Gilead Sciences (324); Mylan (412); Genzyme (458); Allergan
(459); and Biogen Idec (471). See FORTUNE, May 3, 2010, at F-39, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/201 0/industries/2 1/index.
html. The six medical device companies with this distinction (with their Fortune
500 rank) were: Medtronic (160); Baxter International (185); Boston Scientific
(279); Becton Dickinson (312); Stryker (333); and St. Jude Medical (445). See
FORTUNE, May 3, 2010, at F-38, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune500/2010/industries/195/index.html.
7. These companies were Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Pfizer. See Dow
Jones Industrial Average-Components, Dow JONES AVERAGES, http://www.
djaverages.com/?view=industrial&page=components (requires registration) (last
visited July 2, 2010).
8. In 2008, for example, the Department of Labor counted almost 300,000
such employees in the pharmaceutical and medicines manufacturing industries.
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Career Guide to Industries:
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturers, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.
bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs009.htm (last modified Dec. 17, 2009). Interestingly,
approximately 87% of these positions were "in establishments that employed
more than 100 workers." Id.
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litigation that encompasses an equally broad (and critical)
dimension of the nation's life.
It is not this Article's goal to condemn or applaud Iqbal or the
pleading choices the Supreme Court made in deciding it. That
effort has been undertaken by many others, and their formidable
scholarship has already ably crystallized that debate. Instead, this
Article's objective is narrower-to assess whether Iqbal matters in
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation and, if so, how and to
what degree.
This Article begins with context. Part I introduces the legal
landscape onto which Iqbal emerged. Part II retells the story of
Iqbal, describing the facts of the decision, followed by the
substance of the Supreme Court's ruling. Part III reviews the
message of Iqbal and the clarification it aspired to supply to
federal pleaders and the courts. Part IV discusses the legal and
non-legal reactions to the decision, including legislative proposals
to overturn Iqbal. Part V surveys a few of the existing analytical
and statistical studies seeking to divine the significance of lqbal
generally, over the full inventory of federal cases. Part VI probes
the meaning of Iqbal in the specific context of pharmaceutical and
medical device litigation, beginning with a description of the
methodology used in this Article to make that assessment,
proceeding to the results of this Article's analysis of Iqbal's effect
in the 264 pharmaceutical and device opinions released during a
period of more than 15 months since Iqbal was decided, and
closing with a sampling of noteworthy judicial uses of the decision
in this context. This Article finds that Iqbal has not had a
dramatically recalibrating effect throughout pharmaceutical and
medical device litigation: nearly 80% of the time, Iqbal did not
drive the outcome of dismissal motions. But this Article also finds
that summary pronouncements that brush Iqbal aside as entirely
inconsequential may be just as incorrect: 20% is still a big number.
However, a focused inspection of those cases where Iqbal seemed
to make a difference reveals a pattern of their reducing incidence,
no obviously explainable geographic concentrations, a frequent
grant of amendment opportunities, and the presence of a possible,
though modest, "information asymmetry." This Article also finds
that, in large measure, whatever Iqbal significance there seems to
be within this pharmaceutical and medical device cohort cannot be
verified; the apparent Iqbal difference might just be a new label for
the prevailing "no-conclusions" pleading paradigm that has long
reigned nationally among the lower federal courts.
2011] 543
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I. PRELUDE TO CONTROVERSY: THE FEDERAL RULES, CONLEY, AND
TWOMBLY
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codified a sea-change in
federal practice when they first took effect in 1938.9 Beginning
with the very first Rule, the new set of federal procedures aspired
to end the archaic formalism that had bedeviled earlier litigation.10
The incumbent, strict pleading regimes had produced a rigidity in
litigation procedure that the Rules' drafters concluded delayed the
search for truth, or defeated it altogether with highly technical
victories and losses." That formula was rejected for the federal
9. This liberalizing codification, while the broadest, most far-reaching, and
perhaps most familiar, was also certainly not the first. The federal equity rules
had pioneered a more austere pleading regime a quarter-century earlier in 1912.
See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S.
627, 655 (1912) (promulgating Equity Rule 25, which prescribed that "it shall be
sufficient that a bill in equity shall contain . . . a short and simple statement of
the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere
statement of evidence"); id. at 653 (promulgating Rule 18, which prescribed
that, generally, "technical forms of pleadings in equity are abolished"). A
number of states were tending in the same direction well before 1938. See
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 163 (1928)
(reporting that, by 1928, notice pleading "is in use in a few courts and has been
advocated for general adoption"). The tides of change had surely begun. See,
e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513,
518 (2006) (commenting that young Roscoe Pound's 1906 speech to the
American Bar Association decrying "mechanical jurisprudence" sparked "the
beginning of the reform movement that led directly to the creation of the gold
standard of modem procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 1938").
Informed and impressed by these more isolated currents, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure completed the transformation with their
national and universally applicable handiwork.
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (prescribing that the Rules "should be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (prescribing that
allegations "must be simple, concise, and direct," and that "[n]o technical form
is required"); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (prescribing that "[p]leadings must be
construed so as to do justice"); FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (supplying accompanying
forms to "illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate").
11. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 90 (3d ed. 2004) ("The whole grand
scheme was premised on the assumption that by proceeding through a maze of
rigid, and often numerous, stages of denial, avoidance, or demurrer, eventually
the dispute would be reduced to a single issue of law or fact that would dispose
of the case. The system was wonderfully scientific. It also proved to be
excruciatingly slow, expensive, and unworkable. The system was better




courts,12 and in its place the drafters envisioned a far more austere
role for pleadings-simple notice of the claim or defense being
asserted (with the newly-minted and broad-reaching discovery
rules inheriting the task of revealing the evidentiary facts to
support those claims and defenses).' 3
In an early case decided just six years after the new Rules took
effect, Judge Charles E. Clark examined a complaint prepared pro
se by a plaintiff who spoke and wrote only limited English and
who demanded relief in federal court for certain "bottles" of
"tonics" from Italy "of great value" that had since "disappeared."' 4
The defendant, the Port of New York Collector of Customs, had
won a dismissal at the trial court level, having argued that the
plaintiffs allegations failed to "state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action."' 5 Judge Clark arrived to this task with unique
qualifications-he not only had been the Dean of the Yale Law
School before assuming his judgeship but also had served as the
principal drafter of the new federal Rules.' 6 In reversing the
complaint's dismissal, Dean/Drafter/Judge Clark wrote: "Under
the new rules of civil procedure, there is no pleading requirement
of stating 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,' but only
that there be 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief."" 7 Though "inartistically" stated,
Judge Clark read the plaintiffs complaint to have successfully
alleged that a New York customs collector had somehow
improperly done away with property belonging to the plaintiff.'8
12. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose
of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."); see also Jay
Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases "On the Merits," 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 407, 413-14
(2010) ("Notice pleading sought to eliminate the technical rigor of common-law
and code pleading-a rigor that was thought to thwart the parties' ability to
obtain a decision based on substantive law.").
13. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1202, at 88-90; see also
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 (observing that the federal courts' "simplified 'notice
pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other
pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and
issues").
14. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
15. Id.
16. See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 297 (1973) (identifying
Judge Clark as "a principal architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure");
Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
58 MICH. L. REv. 6, 6 intro. n. (1959).
17. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775.
18. Id.
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"[A]s it stands," Judge Clark ended, "we do not see how the
plaintiff may properly be deprived of his day in court to show what
he obviously so firmly believes and what for present purposes
defendant must be taken as admitting."19
Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court had its opportunity to
pass on the precision of Judge Clark's construction of his new
Federal Rules in Conley v. Gibson,20 a lawsuit involving an
allegation by black railroad employees that their union had failed
to protect them against racially discriminatory employment
actions. The trial court granted the union's motion to dismiss,
finding that the employees' complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. A unanimous Supreme Court
reversed and, with a sweeping flourish, "follow[ed], of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."22 Because the employees' complaint pleaded an
allegation that, if proven, would establish a breach of the union's
duty, the Court ruled the dismissal to be improper. 23 The Court
also rejected the union's insistence that the employees had "failed
to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of
discrimination." 24 The Court responded curtly:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail
the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all
the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the
19. Id. at 775; see also Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules,
12 Wyo. L. REv. 177, 181 (1958) ("What we require is a general statement of
the case . . . . We do not require detail."), quoted in RICHARD D. FREER &
WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, &
QUESTIONS 297 (5th ed. 2008).
20. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
21. Id. at 43.
22. Id. at 45-46. As support for this "accepted rule," the Court cited three
court of appeals decisions, including Judge Clark's opinion for the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Dioguardi. See id. at 46 n.5.
23. Id. at 46 ("Here, the complaint alleged, in part, that petitioners were
discharged wrongfully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting according to
plan, refused to protect their jobs as it did those of white employees or to help
them with their grievances all because they were Negroes. If these allegations
are proven there has been a manifest breach of the Union's statutory duty to
represent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the employees in the
bargaining unit.").
24. Id. at 47.
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claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.25
And that is where the Supreme Court long left the matter. Year
after year, case after case, federal courts at every level repeated the
rote of beginning dismissal motion opinions by incanting the
Conley mantra of no dismissals for pleading inadequacies unless it
"appears beyond doubt" that the pleader could prove "no set of
facts" entitling the pleader to a remedy. 26
Occasionally, the Supreme Court would reinforce the message
of simplicity contemplated by the Federal Rules by repelling
challenges by defendants to the sufficiency of certain pleadings. In
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit,27 for example, the Court granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit split as to whether an "enhanced pleading
standard" ought to be imposed in civil rights cases against
municipalities. "Perhaps," explained the unanimous Court, if the
Rules "were rewritten today," that might well be the test.28 But, the
Court wrote, as currently drafted, Rule 8(a)(2) requires only
"notice pleading"-that is, "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."29 Although the
Rules do provide for pleading enhancement in a very few
instances,30 no such enhancement appears in the Rules for
municipal civil liability claims.31 If such claims are to be added to
the list of enhanced pleadings, noted the Court, that result "must be
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
. .. . ,,32judicial interpretation.3 2
Later, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,3 the Court rejected an
employer's argument that wrongful termination complaints
claiming national origin or age prejudice must allege specific
25. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
26. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1215, at 203-06 n.12 (citing
a sampling of the "wealth of judicial authority" supporting the proposition, and
adding that "complete citation to the case law is neither feasible nor useful").
27. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
28. Id. at 168.
29. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (to plead fraud and mistake, the
"circumstances" must be stated "with particularity"); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(g) (to
plead items of special damage, they must be "specifically stated").
31. Citing the settled interpretative tenet of "[elxpressio unius est exclusio
alterius," the Court rejected the invitation to judicially rewrite Rule 8(a) by adding
to the drafters' list of enhanced pleading claims. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
32. Id. Until such time, wrote the Court, federal judges and parties "must
rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious
claims sooner rather than later." Id. at 168-69.
33. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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factual circumstances to support an inference of discrimination.34
The Court held that such a view "conflicts" with Rule 8(a)(2)'s
"simplified notice pleading standard," which is designed merely to
"give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests."35 Guided by that standard, the
employee's complaint had "easily satisfie[d]" the federal pleading
rules: he alleged he was terminated on account of his national
origin and age, and he detailed the events surrounding the
termination, supplying both dates as well as the nationalities and
ages of his replacement.36 Whether the pleader appears likely (or
unlikely) to succeed ultimately at trial is not the dismissal test,
reminded the Court; instead, the "limited" task in ruling on a
dismissal motion is only "whether the claimant is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims." 37
Throughout this 70-year period following the adoption of the
Federal Rules, the Court's insistence on a simplified federal
pleading standard, unsupplemented by judicial fiat, remained
apparently steady. The large principles seemed fixed, and episodic
efforts to tighten the pleading regimen were resisted summarily.
But incantations of principles and tenets aside, among the lower
federal courts-charged daily with ruling on dismissal motions-
the notion of "simplified" federal pleading was evolving. Although
the Conley mantra continued to be repeated, it came to lose an
absolutist meaning.
Read literally, Conley would seem to forbid a court from ever
dismissing any federal lawsuit unless, "beyond doubt," there was
just plain no earthly way at all a plaintiff could supply, obtain,
develop, or discover facts to support the claim. 38 If that was truly
to be the toll-booth into federal court, the toll-takers might as well
34. Id. at 511-12. The Court reminded litigants that circumstantially
proving such discrimination in employment is only one way to prevail in such a
case and that direct evidence of discrimination would not obligate the pleader to
build the evidentiary foundation for circumstantial proof. "It thus seems
incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to
plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits
if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered." Id.
35. Id. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
36. Id. at 514.
37. Id. at 511 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974));
accord id. at 515.
38. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-62 (2007) ("On
such a focused and literal reading of Conley's 'no set of facts,' a wholly
conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the
pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 'set
of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery... .Mr. Micawber's optimism would
be enough.").
548 [Vol. 71
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go home. From this, the lower courts recoiled. Empathetic to the
burgeoning transactional costs of civil discovery, 39 troubled by the
specter of tolerating "shoot-first-and-let's-see-what-we-find"
pleadings,40 and perhaps also informed by the unpredictably
changeable trajector of Rule 11 as a sanctioning tool to ward off
improper pleading,4 the lower courts began to migrate-subtly
39. Id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 635, 638 (1989)) ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases . . . ."); see also McGovern v.
City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 121 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (remarking that the belief
that discovery should be permitted to marshal facts necessary to plead a theory
amounts to a "misguided" understanding of federal pleading). See generally
Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining In Abuse By
Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 39 (2006) (opining that, especially in class actions, an easier pleading
and proof burden "creates an incentive to settle the case-not because the
manufacturer has harmed the plaintiff, but because the case presents the risk of a
bankrupting judgment"). Cf Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)
("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").
40. See, e.g., Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that a
deferential federal pleading standard does not obligate a court "to swallow the
plaintiffs invective hook, line, and sinker; bald assertions, unsupportable
conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like need not be credited");
see also Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir. 1996) (observing that
federal pleading obligations, while low, are "real" and are "not entirely a
toothless tiger" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. Rule 11 was designed to achieve honesty in pleading by requiring
federal attorneys to certify that every pleading they file has good grounds for
support and is not filed simply to cause delay. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11. But the
rule, as originally adopted, contained no specific punishments for offending
behavior. See also 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note I, § 1331, at 459-60
(describing the original adoption history of Rule 11). In 1983, Rule 11 was
meaningfully strengthened by amendment in an effort to combat perceived
frivolous litigation and pretrial abuses that were weighing down the federal
courts. See id. at 462-63. The amendments "had a dramatic effect on federal
court practice and brought Rule 11, which previously had been virtually ignored,
to the forefront of the consciousness of almost everyone who engaged in civil
litigation in the federal courts. Its invocation and application were pervasive."
Id. at 473-74. Courts received the Rule enthusiastically and used it liberally. Id.
at 480-81. In the years that followed, concerns grew that the advent of extensive
collateral, "satellite" litigations-fighting over the application of Rule 11-
threatened to "negat[e] whatever gains against frivolous litigation the [1983]
amendment might have achieved through deterrence." Id. at 485. The Rule was
then amended again, in 1993, this time by modifying the perception that the
device was primarily a fee-shifting one and establishing a 21-day "safe harbor"
whereby offending attorneys were afforded the right to withdraw an improper
pleading without judicial intervention. See id at 495-96 (noting the drafters'
observation that, under the new Rule 11, sanctions "should not be used to
compensate one of the parties, but 'should ordinarily be paid into court as a
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and then expressly-away from Conley.42 By the 1980s, this
migration had become so settled and uncontroversial that the
highly influential Judge Richard Posner could blithely remark that,
though "the exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading
deficiencies that was expressed . . . in Conley v. Gibson . . .
continues to be quoted with approval, it has never been taken
literally." 43
Onto this reconfigured landscape the Supreme Court strode in
May 2007 with its opinion in Twombly. The case involved an
antitrust challenge to the behavior of four regional telephone
operating companies. Divested from AT&T in 1984, seven
penalty"'). Opponents decried the 1993 amendment as de-fanging the rule of its
core benefit. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 401, 507-09 (Apr. 22, 1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view, those
who file frivolous suits and pleadings should have no 'safe harbor,"' and the
"Rules should be solicitous of the abused (the courts and the opposing party),
and not of the abuser"; that "the likelihood and the severity of punishment for
those foolish enough not to seek refuge in the safe harbor" is decreased because
sanctions are now discretionary, not mandatory, because compensatory
sanctions should be reserved to "unusual circumstances," and because even
when awarded they are ordinarily "payable to the court."); see also id. at 509
("As seen from the viewpoint of the victim of an abusive litigator, these
revisions convert Rule 11 from a means of obtaining compensation to an
invitation to throw good money after bad. The net effect is to decrease the
incentive on the part of the person best situated to alert the court to perversion of
our civil justice system.").
42. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1216, at 220-27 (noting
Conley, Swierkiewicz, "and a host of other cases" discussing pleading liberality,
but acknowledging that the lower federal courts (in the years leading up to
Twombly and Iqbal) enforced a pleading practice that had come to require that a
complaint "contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to
sustain a recovery on any recognizable legal theory, even though that theory
may not be the one suggested or intended by the pleader, or the pleading must
contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn by the district
court that evidence on these material points will be available and introduced at
trial").
43. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted), overruled by Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33
F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994). Judge Posner's conclusion, while perhaps unique in its
flourish, was hardly unique in its substance. See, e.g., Mann v. Boatright, 477
F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007) (remarking that it is not the court's job "to
stitch together cognizable claims for relief from the wholly deficient pleading");
United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th
Cir. 2003) (stating that, in testing pleadings, it is not the task of judges and
litigants to "try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud"); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Liberal
construction has its limits," and "[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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regional companies had controlled, through authorized
monopolies, 90% or more of the Nation's local telephone service
in the 48 contiguous states; after mergers and acquisitions, four
companies remained.4 When Congress withdrew approval for
these regional monopolies in 1996, the companies were permitted
to compete with one another.45 But they didn't. The plaintiffs
brought a class action on behalf of local telephone and high speed
Internet customers alleging an illegal restraint of trade in violation
of the federal antitrust laws. However, under the antitrust laws,
parallel business conduct-even if consciously parallel-is not
necessarily unlawful; what the antitrust laws forbid, instead, are
"restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy."A7
The plaintiffs in Twombly contended that such a contract,
combination, or conspiracy could be fairly inferred from a few
facts, including the very fact of the "common failure" of the
regional companies to pursue "attractive business opportunit[ies]"
in their competitors' regions as well as a statement from one
company's senior executive that such competition "might be a
good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn't make it right." 48
The contest in Twombly centered on whether alleging such a
proffered inference satisfied the federal pleading standards. A
surprisingly united Court ruled that the pleading failed.49 The
majority accepted that the complaint's allegations were consistent
with an illegal conspiracy, but they were also just as consistent
with "a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy
unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market."5 0 As
far as inferences go, the Court found both inferences equally fairly
drawn. Determining what to do with a pleading in such a case
became one of the watershed decisions of 2007.
The Court in Twombly began by repeating Rule 8(a)(2)'s
admonition that all federal pleading requires is "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."5 Then it quoted Conley for the Rule's purpose-to "give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
44. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549-50 & n.1 (2007).
45. Id. at 549-50.
46. Id. at 550.
47. Id. at 553 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 775 (1984)).
48. Id. at 551.
49. The decision was 7-2. Justice David Souter wrote the majority opinion
in Twombly, in which six of his fellow Justices joined. Only Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 547.
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
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upon which it rests." 52 But the Court's embrace of Conley stopped
there. The Court turned to the other oft-quoted sentence from
Conley that a federal complaint should not be dismissed "unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."53 That
concept, mulled the Court, if "read in isolation" could mean that
"any statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the
pleadings." 54 The Court noted that such an outcome had caused "a
good many judges and commentators" to "balk[] at taking the
literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard."55
Evidently, the time had come for the Supreme Court to join the
balking: "Conley's 'no set of facts' language has been questioned,
criticized, and explained away long enough.. . . [A]fter puzzling
the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement."56
Mindful of this evolved view of the Conley "no-set-of-facts"
language, the motion to dismiss the Twombly plaintiffs' complaint
could not be denied cursorily simply because it was impossible to
say, "beyond doubt," that the plaintiffs could never unearth facts to
prove their claim. Consequently, a more searching inspection of
the allegations would be necessary.
The Court reemphasized that "detailed factual allegations" are
not required in federal pleadings.57 Yet nor would "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
52. Id (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)).
53. Id. at 561 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 562 (providing a sample of citations); see Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (commenting that Conley, "read
literally, set the bar too low").
56. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63. The Court did not discount the Conley
language as mistaken, just misunderstood:
To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should be understood in
light of the opinion's preceding summary of the complaint's concrete
allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood as amply
stating a claim for relief. . . . The phrase is best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. . . . Conley,
then, described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to
govern a complaint's survival.
Id.
57. Id. at 555. This liberality was expressly embraced in Conley, 355 U.S. at
47 ("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.").
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of action" suffice.58 Instead, to "show" the "grounds" for an
"entitle[ment] to relief," the pleader must supply "enough" factual
allegations "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,"
or, as the Court later casted it, the pleading must "possess enough
heft',60 to "nudge[] . . . claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible."61 This "plausibility" inquiry, cautioned the Court, is not
a judicial license to test for the probability or likelihood of success
of a claim or defense; that sort of qualitative assessment of a
pleader's potential ability to prove the allegations, the Court
admonished, is improper.62 Instead, the appropriate inquiry
"simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence" to prove the allegations.63 Drawing
on earlier precedent to make the point, the Court explained that
demanding "something beyond . . . mere possibility" is necessary
"lest a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless claim' be allowed to
'take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do
so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
58. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
59. Id. The requirements of a "showing" and an "entitle[ment] to relief' are
both found in the language of Rule 8(a)(2) itself See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("A
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" (emphasis
added)). But see Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 (2010)
(assailing "the Court's newly minted demand for a factual showing"). The
majority found the requirement of a "showing" corroborative of its conclusion
that an adequate factual presentation is essential. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3 ("Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard
to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair
notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests.").
The requirement of stating the "grounds" for a claim comes a bit more
indirectly. The drafters expressly required a statement of "grounds" for invoking
the court's jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring "a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction"). But, as the quotation
above confirms, that term is absent from the later obligation of pleading an
entitlement to relief. Nevertheless, the obligation was installed, curiously, by no
lesser an authority than the Conley Court itself See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47
("[AII the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests." (emphasis added)). The Conley Court's source for this
"grounds" obligation is not expressly identified in the Twombly opinion.
60. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
61. Id. at 570.
62. Id. at 556 ("[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is
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value."' The "plausibility" inquiry, ended the Court, was thus
squarely in line with its earlier federal pleading precedents.65
Applying this "plausibility" inquiry to the Twombly plaintiffs'
complaint, the Court found that the allegations had not been
"nudged" beyond the realm of the conceivable. Behavior by the
regional telephone operating companies that was consciously
parallel would, alone, not be enough to suggest an illegal
conspiracy; likewise, a pleaded allegation of such behavior would,
64. Id. at 557-58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)). The Court rejected the proffer that "a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery
process through 'careful case management."' Id at 559. Citing experience
among the lower federal courts (and, notably, the observations of Judge Posner),
the Court was unimpressed that the opportunity for "careful case management"
should allow a non-"plausible" claim to survive. See id at 560 n.6 ("Given the
system that we have, the hope of effective judicial supervision is slim: 'The
timing is all wrong. The plaintiff files a sketchy complaint (the Rules of Civil
Procedure discourage fulsome documents), and discovery is launched. A judicial
officer does not know the details of the case the parties will present and in
theory cannot know the details. Discovery is used to find the details. The
judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves
may not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find. A
magistrate supervising discovery does not-cannot-know the expected
productivity of a given request, because the nature of the requester's claim and
the contents of the files (or head) of the adverse party are unknown. Judicial
officers cannot measure the costs and benefits to the requester and so cannot
isolate impositional requests."' (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 638-
39)). That a litigation-costs-based concern prompted the Twombly result now
seems fairly well accepted. See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
405 (7th Cir. 2010) ("We realize that one powerful reason that lies behind the
Supreme Court's concern about pleading standards is the cost of the discovery that
will follow in any case that survives a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.. .. Too
much chaff was moving ahead with the wheat."); id. at 411 (Posner, J.,
dissenting in part) ("Behind both Twombly and Iqbal lurks a concern with
asymmetric discovery burdens and the potential for extortionate litigation.").
65. As discussed earlier, the Court found Conley not inconsistent with
"plausibility," but simply errantly (or too expansively) interpreted by the
precedents that followed it. See discussion supra note 56. "Plausibility" was not
inconsistent with Leatherman, reasoned the Court, because, unlike in
Leatherman, which rejected unpromulgated, common law enhancements to the
Rules' pleading standard, the complaint in Twombly failed the baseline
application of Rule 8(a)(2) "because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs'
entitlement to relief plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14. "Plausibility"
was not inconsistent with Swierkiewicz, explained the Court, because, unlike in
Swierkiewicz, which reversed the imposition of an enhanced requirement of
alleging "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state [a] claim," the
complaint in Twombly failed because it lacked enough facts to meet the same
baseline Rule 8(a)(2) requirement. Id. at 570.
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alone, not be enough to infer an illegal conspiracy.66 Nor could this
gap be bridged by a conclusory allegation of a conspiratorial
agreement: "when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in
order to make a § 1 [antitrust] claim, they must be placed in a
context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not
merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent
action.' Thus, absent "allegations plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with)" an antitrust agreement, the threshold
obligations of Rule 8(a)(2) had not been met.6 8 Having therefore
failed to meet the federal pleading threshold, the Twombly
plaintiffs' complaint should have been dismissed.
By the summer of 2007, the federal pleading rules (once a sea-
change themselves from prior pleading norms) seemed awash
again in change. That December 1, 2007, heralded the arrival of
the top-to-bottom "restyling" rewrite of every Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure only added to the sense of dramatic federal
procedural restructuring. 69 After Twombly, many questions seemed
to remain. Was the Twombly "plausibility" rule simply a vague
sentiment, or did it embody an actual, concrete test?7 Was the
Twombly "plausibility" rule limited to only antitrust cases, or
perhaps to only exceptionally complex cases, or maybe to only
66. Id. at 556-57; see also id. at 568 ("[A] natural explanation for the
noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned monopolists
were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.").
67. Id. at 557.
6 8. Id.
69. The Rules restyling project was designed to "make [the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] more easily understood and to make style and terminology
consistent throughout the rules." FED. R. CIv. P. 1, advisory committee's note 1
to 2007 amendments. "[N]o changes in substantive meaning" were intended. Id.
note 5. These reassurances were often small comfort to a Bench and Bar
confronting the first top-to-bottom revamping of federal practice since the Rules
were first promulgated during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's second term as
president. See generally Jeremy Counseller, Rooting for the Restyled Rules
(Even Though I Opposed Them), 78 Miss. L.J. 519, 538-42 (2009) (discussing
some of the fundamental concerns with the Restyling Project, including the
incumbent transactional costs at implementation and the significant risk of even
unintentional meaning changes).
70. See, e.g., Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Much confusion accompanied the lower courts' initial engagement with
Twombly."); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233-34 (3d Cir.
2008) (noting that whether Twombly "materially alters" the federal notice
pleading standard "is difficult to divine"); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (remarking that Twombly "impose[s] two




those with unique inference-laden allegations?7 ' How significant
would the "plausibility" test prove to be in practice, and how was it
to be applied? 72 The Court's decision in Iqbal two terms later
provided some of the answers.
II. ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
Javaid Iqbal is a Muslim man from Pakistan." Two months
following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Iqbal was
arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on charges of fraud
concerning his identification documents and conspiracy to defraud
the United States.74 The FBI included Iqbal among a group of 184
people deemed to be of "high interest" in the investigation into
identifying the assailants of the September 11, 2001 attacks and
preventing future attacks. This "high interest" group was
detained in a Brooklyn, New York facility under restrictive
conditions intended to deny them communication access to both
71. Early courts approached Twombly with some hesitation. See Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008) (cautioning care not to "over-
read" or "under-read" the Twombly opinion). And courts remained timid in their
predictions of Twombly's application at its outer boundaries. See Goldstein v.
Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that "we need not take this
occasion to contemplate the outer limits" of Twombly). But within the year,
courts seemed to have come to a firm consensus that the Twombly standard was
not limited to antitrust cases, but applied more broadly. See STEVEN BAICKER-
MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 431 n.230 (2009) (providing
a sample of cases).
72. See, e.g., Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630
(6th Cir. 2009) ("Exactly how implausible is 'implausible' remains to be seen
. . . ."); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (noting that Twombly raises issues "not easily
resolved" and is likely to be a source of controversy "for years to come");
Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776 (noting that Twombly "imposes two easy-to-clear
hurdles"-fair notice to defendants of claims and grounds, and plausible
allegations). Indeed, early indications from the Supreme Court suggested that
"plausibility" might not have altered very much. In Erickson v. Pardus, decided
shortly after Twombly, the Court summarily reversed the dismissal of a
prisoner's cruel and unusual punishment claim and the lower court's
characterization of the claim as "too conclusory" to satisfy Twombly: "Specific
facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice
of what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also id. at 93 ("It may in the
final analysis be shown that the District Court was correct to grant respondents'
motion to dismiss. That is not the issue here, however. It was error . . . to
conclude that the allegations in question .. . were too conclusory to establish for
pleading purposes" for the plaintiffs claim).
73. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).




fellow prisoners and the outside world.76 Iqbal was, two months
later, relocated to an even higher security portion of the facility
where he remained for six months before being returned to the
general population. During that period of special confinement,
Iqbal alleged that he was severely physically and psychologically
abused, by being kicked, punched, dragged, serially strip- and
cavity-searched; verbally abused; denied access to adequate
exercise, nutrition, and medical care; and denied prayer. He did
not contest his original arrest or his confinement among the general
prison population and ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal
charges, served jail time, and was removed back to Pakistan.80
Iqbal's federal lawsuit named 53 defendants, including
correctional officers, wardens, Bureau of Prison officials, and FBI
agents.8 ' The sufficiency of the lawsuit against 51 of these 53
defendants was not contested in the Supreme Court, and the
Justices had no occasion to consider or rule upon them.82
The issue in the Supreme Court was a "narrower" one,83
involving the two other named defendants. Iqbal had included in his
lawsuit claims against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert Mueller. 84 It was those allegations that were the
Court's focus. As summarized by the Court, Iqbal had alleged:
* that the FBI, under Mueller's direction, "arrested and
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its
investigation of the events of September 11";
76. Id.
77. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
78. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944; Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-
JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 (2d
Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009).
79. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943, 1952.
80. Id. at 1943. Following his guilty plea, Iqbal was sentenced to 16 months
incarceration. See Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 n. 1.
81. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1.
82. The majority volunteered, however, that those accusations, though not
before the Court for decision, had alleged "serious official misconduct" that
could "demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942; id
at 1952 ("It is important to note . . . that we express no opinion concerning the
sufficiency of [Iqbal's] complaint against the defendants who are not before us.
[His] account of his prison ordeal alleges serious official misconduct that we
need not address here.").
83. Id. at 1942-43.
84. Id at 1942.
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* that "[t]he policy of holding post-September- 11th detainees
in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they
were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants
[Ashcroft and Mueller] in discussions in the weeks after
September 11, 2001";
* that Ashcroft and Mueller "each knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" Iqbal "to harsh
conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy, solely on
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for
no legitimate penological interest"';
* that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the policy; and
* that Mueller was "instrumental in [its] adoption,
promulgation, and implementation."8 5
Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss these allegations
against them, contending that, as governmental officials, they were
entitled to qualified immunity 8 6 and that Iqbal's complaint failed to
plead the type of facts necessary to overcome that immunity-
namely, that they were personally involved in behavior that
violated clearly established constitutional rights.8 7 The trial court
denied the motion, and the court of appeals largely affirmed.89 In
a concurrence, one of the appellate court judges wrote of his
85. Id. at 1944. In the proceedings below, the Second Circuit noted a
threshold incongruity with these allegations, although that did not impede the
court's reasoning. As a literal matter, Iqbal's accusation that he was included in
a mistreatment policy targeted at "Arab Muslim men" was encumbered by the
evidently uncontested fact that, though a Muslim and a Pakistani, "he was not an
Arab." lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Construing the
allegations more broadly than written, the court reasoned that Iqbal's "claim is
fairly to be understood as alleging unlawful treatment based on his ethnicity,
even if not technically on a racial classification," and, as such, "his allegations
of what was done to Arab Muslims are fairly understood to mean that unlawful
actions were taken against him because officials believed, perhaps, because of
his appearance and his ethnicity, that he was an Arab." Id.
86. Qualified immunity, the Court explained, "shields Government officials
'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights,"' and, as formulated by the Court,
represents both "a defense to liability and a limited 'entitlement not to stand trial
or face the other burdens of litigation."' Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945-46 (quoting
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
87. Id. at 1944.
88. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL
2375202, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2007),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
89. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 147.
558 [Vol. 71
IQBAL "PLAUSIBILITY"
concern over exposing "high-ranking Government officials" to
"the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as
nonspecific as" Iqbal's, especially as those officials were
responding to "a national and international security emergenc
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic."
Commenting that existing precedent on the issue was "less than
crystal clear," the judge urged the Supreme Court to offer further
guidance to the nation's courts "at the earliest opportunity." 91
Embracing that suggestion, the Supreme Court accepted the case
for review and reversed.
The Supreme Court ruled that Iqbal's allegations against
defendants Ashcroft and Mueller failed to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which obligates pleaders to
set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."92 Iqbal's failure, reasoned the Court,
was that, as pleaded, his allegations had not "nudfed [his] claims ...
across the line from conceivable to plausible." 9 This obligation to
state a "plausible" claim in order to avoid dismissal was unfurled
by the Court two terms earlier in the Twombly decision, where the
Court distinguished pleadings that alleged facts merely "consistent
with" liability from pleadings that alleged facts that allow a
"reasonable inference" of liability.94 Only the latter are "plausible"
federal claims, and therefore only the latter can survive a motion to
dismiss.95
Applying these precepts to Iqbal's lawsuit, the Court turned to
his complaint. The Court began by discounting those allegations
that it found to be mere conclusions of law, because, in assessing a
motion to dismiss, only factual allegations are assumed to be true,
and thus bald legal conclusions would not help Iqbal satisfy his
90. Id. at 179 (Cabranes, J., concurring). The concurrence was not entirely
mollified by the potential for tailored discovery to abate the disruptive effect of
lawsuits directed against high government officials.
Even with the discovery safeguards carefully laid out in Judge Newman's
[lead] opinion, it seems that little would prevent other plaintiffs claiming
to be aggrieved by national security programs and policies of the federal
government from following the blueprint laid out by this lawsuit to
require officials charged with protecting our nation from future attacks to
submit to prolonged and vexatious discovery processes.
Id.
91. Id. at 178.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
93. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
94. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
95. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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Rule 8(a)(2) pleading duty.9 6 Allegations that fell within this
category, found the Court, were those pronouncing that Ashcroft
and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed" to subject him to abusive conditions "as a matter of
policy," solely for discriminatory reasons and not for penological
ones, as well as those listing Ashcroft as the policy's "principal
architect" and Mueller as "instrumental" in the policy's
execution. "These bare assertions," offered the Court, "amount to
nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a
constitutional discrimination claim," and were therefore
"conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true."98
What remained, then, was to search the complaint for those
allegations found to be factual and, therefore, entitled to a
presumption of truth. Allegations falling within this category,
reasoned the Court, were those describing the arrest and detention
of "thousands of Arab Muslim men" in the course of the FBI's
post-September 11 investigation, the confining of those detained in
"highly restrictive conditions" until cleared by the FBI and the
approval of this policy by Ashcroft and Mueller.49 Those
allegations were indeed consistent with constitutionally forbidden
behavior, wrote the Court, but were also equally consistent with
legitimate law enforcement efforts to detect those suspected of a
link to the Islamic fundamentalist organization responsible for the
96. Id. at 1949-50; see id. at 1950 ("While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.");
id. at 1949 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.").
97. Id at 1951.
98. Id. The Court added little further guidance to the task of divining the
boundary between factual allegations (entitled to a presumption of accuracy) and
legal conclusions (not entitled to that presumption). As the Court recounted,
Iqbal had alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully
and maliciously agreed" to detain him under especially harsh conditions; had
alleged that they did so "as a matter of policy"; had alleged that Ashcroft was
the policy's "principal architect" and Mueller its "instrumental" conduit for
execution; had alleged that the policy was implemented "solely" on account of
his "religion, race, and/or national origin"; and had alleged that, at least as
implemented against him, the policy had "no legitimate penological interest." Id.
Although it may well have been the Supreme Court's judgment that these
contestations against Ashcroft and Mueller were unlikely to be provably true
(though coming to such a conclusion was something the Court expressly denied
it was doing, see id. ("To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the
ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.")), it is not immediately apparent
why they fall to the side as "bare assertions" rather than receive credit as
"factual allegations." In the end, and for this reason at least, Judge Cabranes's





criminal attacks under investigation.' 00 In the course of that search,
the Court observed that "[i]t should come as no surprise" that those
efforts "would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target
neither Arabs nor Muslims." ' Confronted by two different
interpretations of what the Court found to be Iqbal's non-
conclusory allegations of fact-one interpretation that would be
unlawful and the other that would be lawful' 02-the Court
concluded that the inference that Ashcroft and Mueller had
engaged in unconstitutional misconduct was not one that could
plausibly be drawn from what Iqbal had pleaded.1 03 Ergo, because
Iqbal had failed to accomplish what Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) commanded of him (namely, a complaint
"showing" that he was "entitled to relief'), his pleading did not
state a cognizable federal claim.104 It was, therefore, dismissed.
III. How IQBAL MATTERS
Twenty years after his handiwork took effect, Judge Clark
wrote that pleadin* under the new Federal Rules was "a beautiful
nebulous thing."' 0 Though he may have had in mind a somewhat
different message, his words have proven prescient indeed. With
the benefit of two years' worth of lower court work guessing and
surmising about (in the course of interpreting and applying) the
Twombly decision, the Supreme Court likely had much in view
while crafting its Iqbal opinion.
On several fronts, the Court supplied a modicum of new
clarity. First, the Court endeavored to end the uncertainty whether
the "plausibility" approach announced in Twombly was to be
limited to the context of antitrust and similarly intricate
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1952 (So limited, all that these selected factual allegations
"plausibly suggest[] is that the nation's top law enforcement officers, in the
aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in
the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of
terrorist activity. [Iqbal] does not argue, nor can he, that such a motive would
violate [defendants Ashcroft and Mueller's] constitutional obligations.").
103. Id. at 1951-52 ("As between th[e] 'obvious alternative explanation' for
the arrests, . . . and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us
to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.").
104. See id. at 1954.




litigation.106 It was not. Because the Twombly ruling was premised
on an "interpretation and application of Rule 8," the "plausibility"
approach applied-just as Rule 8 itself did-to "all civil actions
and proceedings in the United States district courts."' 7 This
reinforcement eliminated the possibility of a recasting of the reach
of Twombly and verified that the Conley "no-set-of-facts" model
was, indeed, interred.'o A claimant' 09 can no longer expect that a
pleading inadequacy (whatever that may mean) will be rescued by
the notion that nothing ought to be dismissed in federal court
unless it is, "beyond doubt," simply and demonstrably impossible.
Second, the Court converted the Twombly principle into an
Iqbal equation. As set out by the Iqbal Court, the "plausibility"
inquiry progresses linearly through two steps, as a court examines
a motion to dismiss contesting the adequacy of a pleading's factual
allegations. The examining court must begin by first identifying
those pleaded allegations that are "no more than conclusions"; as
to those, the court will not defer to their truth."r0 Next, the court
must then identify the "well-pleaded" factual allegations; as to
those, the court will assume them to be true and will assess
whether they (and only they) plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief. 1
Third, the Court explicitly reaffirmed three legacy concepts
that had seemed to be bedrock tenets of federal pleading, each of
which is said to continue under the Iqbal regime. Federal pleaders
had long been assured they were free of the duty to plead detailed
factual allegations, and Iqbal declared this tenet unchanged.112
Federal pleaders were also assured that their allegations of fact will
106. See, e.g., Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
cases, pre-Iqbal, for the proposition that Twombly's holding "is likely limited to
expensive, complicated litigation").
107. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (clarifying that the Twombly ruling
"expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,"' and rejecting the
suggestion that it should be limited only to antitrust claims as "not supported by
Twombly and ... incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
108. See discussion supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
109. "Claimant" is the more precise term. Because Rule 8(a)(2) encompasses
any pleading that "states a claim for relief," see FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), there is
little reason to believe that this paradigm will not apply (at least) to complaints,
counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims alike.
110. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 1949; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
544 (2007); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The declaration may
prove far less reassuring in practice. Without more precise guidance from the
Court to enable litigants to confidently divine the line between uncredited "bare
assertions" and qualifying "factual allegations," more detailed federal pleadings
can hardly be unexpected.
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be assumed true, and Iqbal declared this tenet unchanged as
well.1 3 Finally, federal pleaders were assured that they need not
attempt to allege a case that seemed facially likely to win on the
merits, and here, too, Iqbal reaffirmed the tenet."14
Fourth, the Court offered some sharpening of the concept of
"plausibility." The standard will not be satisfied by what the Court
denominated as bald, non-factual conclusions of law-federal
pleading "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."" 5 That is not to say (we were
reminded earlier) that legal conclusions are out of place in federal
complaints: "a naked assertion . . . gets the complaint close to
stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitle[ment] to relief."' 1 6 Again, where this distinction draws
pivotal, and potentially decisive, importance is in isolating the
point of judicial deference to the pleading. A complaint's well-
pleaded facts will be assumed true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss; a complaint's legal conclusions will not be." 7 In other
words, the work a pleading needs to do to survive a motion to
dismiss is not work that can be done by its conclusions, but only by
its factual allegations."
Fifth, in gauging whether the standard is satisfied, the Court
added that the assessment of "plausibility" is a "context-specific
task" that obligates a reviewin court "to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." 19 This notion seems to validate
the impression that the demands of "plausibility" can mutate
depending on, among other factors, the precise allegations made
and the type of case in which they are offered. A "plausible" car
113. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (noting that "for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true"); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) ("We review . . . a decision
granting a motion to dismiss, and therefore must accept as true all the factual
allegations of the complaint."). Like the admonition that detailed facts are not
required, this reassurance is undermined by the same absence of reliability in
assessing the boundary between legal conclusions and factual allegations.
114. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Left unaffected, therefore, seems to be the
substantial body of pre-Iqbal and pre-Twombly federal case law that holds that
the reviewing judge's doubt or disbelief about the merits may not justify a
dismissal. See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES
HANDBOOK 434 n.217, 437 nn.245-46 (2010) (collecting cases).
115. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
116. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
117. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
118. See id. at 1949 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.").
119. Id. at 1950.
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wreck lawsuit may be very simply and concisely pleaded.120 Other
types of claims likely require more substance.
Sixth, the "plausibility" standard remains a facial one and is
defeated by a state of equipoise. A claimant's task in preparing the
complaint is to include "sufficient factual matter" so as to "state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face."l 2 1 The Iqbal definition
of "plausibility" is "factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."l 22 An inference of liability is unreasonable-
and therefore will not be made-if an inference of non-liability
would, on the facts alleged, be just as fairly drawn.123 In that
resulting equipoise, the allegations (without more) are not
120. The Federal Rules are supplemented with an Appendix of Forms, which,
according to Rule 84, "suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and
brevity that these rules contemplate." FED. R. CIV. P. 84. At the time of the
Twombly decision, Form 9 contained the text of a proper complaint for negligence.
See FED. R. CIv. P. Form 9 (pre-2007 text) ("2. On June 1, 1936, in a public
highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently
drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway. 3. As
a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken and was otherwise
injured, was prevented from transacting his business, suffered great pain of body
and mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the
sum of one thousand dollars."). The majority in Twombly, while jousting with the
dissenters, described why the Twombly complaint failed to meet the same federal
pleading prerequisites that this Form 9 evidently satisfied:
Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck the plaintiff
with his car while plaintiff was crossing a particular highway at a
specified date and time, the complaint here furnishes no clue as to
which of the [regional telephone operating companies] (much less
which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when and where the
illicit agreement took place. A defendant wishing to prepare an answer
in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to
answer; a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory
allegations ... would have little idea where to begin.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. Note that, with the restyling of the Rules in
December 2007, the forms, too, were altered; the restyled negligence complaint
language appears in new Form 11. See generally discussion supra note 69
(discussing restyling project). The new text is even more austere. See FED. R.
CIV. P. Form 11 ("2. On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff. 3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured,
lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical
expenses of $ .").
121. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
122. Id. at 1940 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
123. Id. at 1949 ("The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556)); id. ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief."' (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).
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plausible, and no "showing" of an "entitle[ment] to relief' will
have been made.' 24
Whether these six points of clarification from Iqbal have made
the "plausibility" standard more comprehensible and more
cogently applied is a question to be answered by those lower courts
now engaged in the process of trying to apply it. It is, however,
hard to dispute the conclusion that, at least when calibrated against
the Conley literal "no-set-of-facts" standard, the recasting seems
significant. In his Twombly dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens
remarked that "[u]nder the relaxed pleading standards of the
Federal Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but
rather to keep them in."l 25 His comment certainly seemed to mirror
the tenor of the Conley decision's "beyond doubt" threshold before
a case could be dismissed.126 Under the Iqbal paradigm, the point-
of-departure now appears to have inverted-from Conley's
"cannot-be-dismissed-unless" message to Iqbal's "cannot-avoid-
dismissal-unless" message.1 27 Whether, in practice, the Conley-to-
Iqbal shift is truly as theoretically seismic as that is difficult to
know for certain at this early stage, but as a comparison among
competing theories, it is difficult to view it otherwise:
It used to be that, abiding by Conley's lenient mandate,
courts might not have dismissed a complaint, even after
rejecting a pleader's asserted legal theory, if the court were
unable to positively confirm that there was no other
theoretically possible claim that the pleader could have. In
other words, unless the pleaded allegations actually denied
the pleader any possible avenue for recovery, the complaint
might not have been dismissed. After Twombly, the
required inquiry seems to be an inverted version of the
former one: now, a proper complaint must do more than
merely avoid foreclosing all possible bases for recovery; it
must instead affirmatively suggest an actual entitlement to
relief by supplying allegations that push the claim about the
level of mere speculation.128
124. Id. at 1950.
125. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
127. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (noting that "only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss").
128. BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 114, at 437-38 (footnotes and




IV. THE BATTLE FOR IQBAL
The Iqbal and Twombly decisions do not suffer from a scarcity
of critics. Criticism of the decisions has come from many corners,
including the lower judiciary, the elected government, public
interest groups, legal academia, and the popular press. For
example, federal courts of appeals have questioned the precision of
"implausibility" as a pleading test129 and predicted that the
standard is likely to be a source of controversy "for years to
come."o30 One United States Senator described Iqbal as evidence
of the United States Supreme Court's "well-documented disregard
of precedent."' 3 1 A senior National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) representative
denounced the decision as "nothing short of an assault on our
democratic principles" that imposes "a significant barrier that
operates to deny victims of discrimination their day in court." 32
One prominent law professor and federal procedure expert
commented that Iqbal challenges the "twin commitments to an
independent and accountable judiciary and to the institutions and
values of democracy,"' 33 and another distinguished constitutional
scholar opined that the classic junior high school message that
everyone has the right to a day in court "is becoming a myth." 34 A
New York Times editorial labeled the decision "lamentable,"
contending that it makes it "significantly harder for Americans to
assert their legal rights in federal court," "allow[s] wrongdoers to
avoid accountability," and "gives judges excessive latitude to bury
129. See Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th
Cir. 2009) ("Exactly how implausible is 'implausible' remains to be seen. . .
130. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,234 (3d Cir. 2008).
131. 155 CONG. REC. S 1l,219-21 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of
Senator Arlen Specter, including the Iqbal decision as among instances of the
Supreme Court's "well-documented disregard of precedent, which the Court
took to new levels during its 2008 Term").
132. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to Courts? Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Hearing] (prepared statement of John Payton, President and Director-
Counsel of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%2OPayton%2OTestimony.pdf, at 2.
133. Id. at 86 (prepared statement of University of Pennsylvania Law School
Professor Stephen B. Burbank), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-
02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf, at 2.
134. Kim Briggeman, Supreme Court's Ashcroft Ruling Will Be One of Most-
Cited Cases, UC-Irvine Law Dean Says, MISSOULIAN (Missoula, Mont.), Mar. 9,
2010, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/article f2c6bela
-2b3e-1ldf-827d-001cc4cG3286.html (quoting remarks by University of
California at Irvine School of Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky).
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cases based on their subjective views before the evidence emerges
and can be fairly weighed."135
Two congressional bills propose to legislatively overrule the
Iqbal decision. The United States Senate's Notice Pleading
Restoration Act of2009 proposes that, absent ensuing legislation or
Rule amendment, federal courts may not dismiss complaints under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 12(e) "except upon
the standards set forth . . . in Conley v. Gibson." 36 The United
States House of Representatives' Open Access to Courts Act of
2009 proposes that, absent ensuing legislation or Rule amendment,
federal courts may not dismiss complaints under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 12(e) "unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the
claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief," and that in
applying this standard, no dismissal may be based on the judge's
determination "that the factual contents of the complaint do not
show the plaintiffs claim to be plausible or are insufficient to
warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."l37 Still other proposals, both legislative and
Rule-based, continue to simmer. 138
This is not to say that Iqbal lacks for supporters. For example,
the former United States Solicitor General who argued Iqbal
before the Supreme Court insisted that the opinion fits
"comfortably within [a] deeply-rooted body of precedent,"
"represent[s] a natural application of existing law," and "provide[s]
important guidance to the lower courts in evaluating the
sufficiency of pleadings."l 39 A legal scholar mused that the
Supreme Court's "plausibility" test "is remarkable only for its
135. Editorial, Restoring Access to the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at
A40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/opinion/22tue3.html.
136. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced by Sen. Specter (D-Pa.)). As of
early July 2010, this Bill remained with the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
137. H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced by Rep. Nadler (D-N.Y.)).
As of early August 2010, this Bill remained with the House Subcommittee on
Courts and Competition Policy.
138. See Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do
We Go from Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/
-ilr/bulletin/ILRB 95_Hartnett.pdf (surveying other proposed reworkings of the
decisions). Professor Hartnett himself offers the thought-provoking addition of a
new Rule 12(j) that would install a procedure for expressly invoking Rule
11(b)(3) and pleading based on a likelihood that evidentiary support for
allegations would emerge from discovery. Id.
139. Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 132, at 194 (prepared statement of
Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP and former U.S. Solicitor




unremarkability," because it "actually did nothing to eviscerate,
much less affect, Rule 8's longstanding plading pronouncement,"
but, "[t]o the contrary, it reaffirmed it." 0 A lengthy white paper
assembled by leading representatives of the defense bar applauded
Iqbal as judicial recognition of "systemic abuses and distortions"
in a litigation system whose purpose "is the evaluation and
adjudication of known claims, not the unfettered search for
unknown claims," and, consequently, it should not be "an
unreasonable burden to require a plaintiff to know and identify
facts that state a plausible claim in order to initiate a legal
action."' 4 1 A broad coalition from the Defense Research Institute
earlier wrote that Iqbal "will have no effect on well-founded
cases," and attempting legislatively to dismantle the opinion
"would impose a hefty 'litigation tax' on the engines of our
economic growth, diverting scarce resources to litigation rather
than job creation and impeding economic recovery at the worst
possible time."1 42 A nationally prominent drug and device attorney
blogged that there is "nothing radical about requiring a plaintiff to
have sufficient facts to plead a prima facie case before the courts
will entertain the lawsuit," that "[I]itigation is expensive, after all,
especially discovery . .. [and] [m]ore should be required to set this
machine in motion than the rote and fact-free pleading of the
elements of any given cause of action." 43 A senior representative
from the support office from the Judicial Conference of the United
States commented that the decision appears to be having "little or
140. Daniel R. Karon, "'Twas Three Years After Twombly and All Through
the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled from Near or from Far"-The
Unremarkable Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's Re-Expressed Pleading
Standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 44 U.S.F. L. REv. 571, 572 (2010);
see also id. at 600 ("Things are no different today than they were before
Twombly, as Twombly merely reaffirmed Rule 8's liberal pleading standard.").
141. WHTTE PAPER: RESHAPING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 37-38 (2010) [hereinafter WHYTE PAPER], available at
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/V60N3_WhitePaper.pdf (submitted to
the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, Duke Law School, May 10-11, 2010,
by (among others) the Lawyers for Civil Justice, the Defense Research Institute,
the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, and the International
Association of Defense Counsel).
142. Letter from DRI Coal. to Subcomm. on Cts. & Competition Policy, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.dri.org/
DRI/webdocs/Iqbal%2OCoalition%20Letter%20House%20Courts%20Subcmte
%2012%2015%2009.pdf.
143. James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, A Twombly ofScholarship, DRUG &




no impact" on federal dismissal rates, and was "very skeptical"
that any problem exists.'"
Just as opponents press for a non-judicial un-making of the
Iqbal decision, proponents press for its non-judicial, permanent
codification. One proposal advocates replacing the current
language of Rule 8(a)(2)-which commands all pleadings that
state claims for relief to contain "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'-with new
language that would require, instead, that such claims contain "a
short and plain statement, made with particularity, of all material
facts known to the pleading party that support the claim, creating a
reasonable inference that the pleader is plausibly entitled to
relief." 4 5 And the battles rage on.
Perhaps the most intriguing opposition to Iqbal came in the
opinion written by the four dissenting Justices in the case itself.146
The dissent was written by Justice Souter, who had authored the
Twombly majority opinion two years earlier. Although faulting the
Iqbal majority for misapplying his Twombly standard, Justice
Souter reiterated the "plausibility" inquiry of Twombly and did so
without the slightest twinge of retreat: "Under Twombly, the
relevant question is whether, assuming the factual allegations are
true, the plaintiff has stated a ground for relief that is plausible.
That is, in Twombly's words, a plaintiff must 'allege facts' that,
taken as true, are 'suggestive of illegal conduct,"' and thus "'a
naked assertion ... stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility."'l 4 7 His recounting of Twombly complete, Justice
Souter concluded: "I do not understand the majority to disagree
144. Dave Lenckus, Congress Eyes Pleading Standard, Bus. INs., Nov. 9,
2009, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091108/ISSUE
03/311089984 (requires subscription) (quoting John Rabiej, Chief of the Support
Office for the Rules Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference).
145. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 141, at 26. The term "material fact" is
defined in the proposal as "one that is necessary to the claim and without which
it could not be supported. As to facts pleaded on information and belief, the
pleading party must set forth with particularity the factual information
supporting the pleading party's belief." Id.
146. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting,joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.).
147. Id. at 1959-60. Evidently, this Twombly recitation did not dismay his
fellow dissenting Justices, each of whom joined in the Souter dissent and only
one of whom wrote separately. In that one separate opinion, Justice Breyer
clarified his belief that it is "important to prevent unwarranted litigation from
interfering with 'the proper execution of the work of the Government,"' though
he was unconvinced that the trial court would be unable to achieve that goal
through structuring of discovery. See id. at 1961-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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with this understanding of 'plausibility' under Twombly." 148
Indeed, he agreed further with the majority that the two factual
allegations on which it focused its decision, "standing alone, do not
state a plausible entitlement to relief for unconstitutional
discrimination." 49 Thus, where Justice Souter (and, by apparent
extension, the other three dissenting justices who joined in his
opinion) parts company with the majority is not with its description
and embrace of the "plausibility" test, but only with the particular
result reached upon its application. In truth, there is a great deal of
agreement with, and reaffirmation of, the Twombly "plausibility"
standard in the Iqbal dissents.
The earlier dissent in Twombly had been far less timid. Justice
Stevens, writing for himself and fellow dissenter Justice Ginsburg,
offered that "[i]f Conley's 'no set of facts' language is to be
interred, let it not be without an eulogy." 50 Justice Stevens noted
the constancy with which the Supreme Court cited the Conley
language, the volume of States that borrowed the standard for their
dismissal motions, and the history of the development of
liberalized federal pleading.'s1 Although acknowledging the
majority's concern about the size of the possible discovery burden
the lawsuit might inflict, 152 he emphasized that this potential for
"'sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming' discovery ... is
no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater." 53 He would
have concluded that the panoply of weapons in "a district court's
148. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting). In fact, in one respect, Justice Souter
intimated even an extension to the "plausibility" standard he had crafted in
Twombly. After noting the familiar principle that, on a motion to dismiss, "a
court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may
be," id. at 1959, he acknowledged that this principle may, itself, not be an
absolute one. He wrote: "The sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that
are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green
men, or the plaintiff s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel." Id. The
notion that a claimant's well-pleaded allegations of fact (not legal conclusions)
could, under any circumstance, be subjectively disregarded by a court on a
motion to dismiss is a place to which the majority opinions in neither Iqbal nor
Twombly dared to go. Arguably, this suggestion-offered in the dissent-which
would empower a judge to weigh how "sufficiently fantastic" a pleader'sfactual
allegations are (even before conducting the "plausibility" inquiry), may actually
be a type of pleading heresy on which everyone might agree.
149. Id. at 1960.
150. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
151. Id. at 577-86.
152. Id. at 593 ("To be clear, if I had been the trial judge in this case, I would
not have permitted the plaintiffs to engage in massive discovery based solely on




case-management arsenal" could be effectively brought to bear to
minimize the discovery risk. 154 In concluding, Justice Stevens
wrote: "Even if there is abundant evidence that the [antitrust
conspiracy] allegation is untrue, directing that the case be
dismissed without even looking at any of that evidence marks a
fundamental-and unjustified-change in the character of pretrial
practice." 55
What remains to be explored, then, is whether such a
momentous change in federal pleading practice has truly been
signaled.
V. BROAD STUDIES OF THE IMPACT OF IQBAL ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS
That the Iqbal decision is being cited frequently in resolving
dismissal motions filed in pharmaceutical and medical device
litigation is hardly surprising-it is the Supreme Court's most
recent articulation of the test for examining motions to dismiss
against pleaders' Rule 8 obligations. It would be surprising if the
decision was not cited by lower courts as they rule on pending
motions to dismiss.'5 6
But volume of citation is not the core issue. The core issue is
dismissal behavior and tendency, and whether Iqbal has ushered in
change. Sadly, the prospects for an answer based on raw statistics
alone-at least one that is definitive, ultimately reliable, and
widely accepted-are not good. The task itself explains this
unencouraging outlook.
Any sound analysis would have to account for (and thus
control for) a great many variables, some of which may be
exceptionally difficult or frankly impossible to isolate, especially
across a broad, national decisional universe. For example, to
154. Id.
155. Id. at 597.
156. Ergo, the mere fact of citation is unlikely to be a sound barometer for
much. Because nearly all judicial opinions begin their analysis with a statement
of the controlling legal standards, and because the United States Supreme Court
has now, twice, offered recent statements concerning that standard, one would
expect that nearly every federal disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
will cite to Iqbal or Twombly, or both. Indeed, according to an Administrative
Office of the United States Courts study, as of late July 2010, the Iqbal decision
had been cited in approximately 11,000 cases. See Memorandum from Andrea
Kuperman to the Civil Rules Comm. & Standing Rules Comm. on Review of
Case Law Applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, at I
n.2 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Kuperman Memo], available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal memo_07261 0.pdf, infra
notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing this study in greater detail).
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reliably assess-at a statistical level-whether application of the
Iqbal standard is disposing of federal lawsuits at a greater pace
than before would require not only a macro (arithmetic)
understanding of the pre-"plausibility" and post-"plausibility"
dismissal motion volumes, but also a micro, case-level
understanding of the circumstances of each pre-"plausibility" and
post-"plausibility" dismissal motion treatment. This latter
examination would also need to consider the particulars of the
claimed basis for the dismissal motion, so as to properly code those
dismissals that are not Iqbal-prompted at all. For example, such
case-level coding would segregate dismissal motions that
challenge only the legal sufficiency (rather than factual
sufficiency) of a claim,' 5 7 or press a challenge that blends legal and
factual sufficiency in an omnibus motion, or that raise "built-in"
defenses that constitute inherent, bright-line bars to recovery.1 59
Also separated would be challenges that contest non-"entitlement-
to-relief'-based rationales under Rule 12(b)160 or that pursue
157. Such a legal challenge, premised on the actual unavailability of relief
for the category of claim that the party is asserting (such as a claim by
unmarried partners for loss of consortium (in a jurisdiction that requires
marriage as a predicate for such claims) or by parents for "wrongful life"
damages (in a jurisdiction that has refused to recognize such claims)), would
seem to be something that a Conley analysis would absolutely permit. See, e.g.,
Waguespack v. Plivia USA, Inc., No. 10-692, 2010 WL 2086882, at *3 (E.D.
La. May 24, 2010) (dismissing claims brought outside Louisiana's exclusive,
statutory products liability law); Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, No. 06-
CV-0688 (DMC), 2010 WL 1490927, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2010) (dismissing
certain state law claims as having been subsumed by the state's omnibus
Products Liability Act).
158. Such a blending would challenge the researcher to segment any
resulting ruling into the type of decision that Conley principles might tolerate,
separate from the type of ruling that "plausibility" alone would allow.
159. One would expect that factual sufficiency challenges (even of the sort
that fall squarely within the theoretical divide demarcated by Conley on the one
side and Iqbal on the other) ought to be excluded from any analysis if the basis
for the ruling (or, perhaps, even the motion filing itself) was premised on the
pleader's inclusion of gratuitous allegations or attached extrinsic materials that
conflict with, and conclusively negate, the pleader's stated allegations. See
Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 113-14 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting
that when the facts establishing affirmative defenses are obvious from the face
of the pleadings, the defenses may be raised by dismissal motion); Thompson v.
Ill. Dep't of Prof'I Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[Wihere a
plaintiff attaches documents and relies upon the documents to form the basis for
a claim or part of a claim, dismissal is appropriate if the document negates the
claim.").
160. Properly excluded from any such study should also be dismissal rulings
based on challenges other than Rule 8(a)(2) inadequacies, for example, contests
over other Rule 12(b) defenses, such as motions seeking jurisdictional
dismissals, dismissals for improperly laid (or inconvenient) venue, dismissals
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dismissal for unrelated procedural failings61 or as a sanction for
improper behavior.' 62 Dismissals entered for a litigant's failure to
contest the pending motion at all would be discounted, 163 as would
dismissals upon the pleader's consent.' 64 In short, designing a
genuinely reliable statistical analysis of the post-Iqbal effect that
controls for all likely confounding variables would be a tall order.
This is not to say that statistical study is not valuable, only that it is
likely to supply an obscured peek at the true answer.
As of the date this Article goes to press, four examinations of
Iqbal across the full spectrum of federal cases have been released,
for insufficient service or process, and dismissals for absent indispensable
parties.
161. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m) (dismissals for failure to serve within 120
days of filing).
162. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii), (v) (authorizing striking of
pleadings and dismissals for failure to obey discovery orders).
163. By local rule, various federal districts have embraced just such a
dismissal vehicle. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. Loc. R. CIV. P. 7-12 (failure to timely file
required motion papers "may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the
motion"); D.D.C. LOC. R. CIV. P. 7(b) (permitting court to treat motions as
"conceded" if they have not been timely opposed by a memorandum of points
and authorities); E.D. PA. LOC. R. CIv. P. 7.1(c) (permitting court to treat
motions as "uncontested" if they have not been timely opposed by a brief in
opposition). This Article's examination of the pharmaceutical and medical
device dismissal practice confirms that "consent"-based dismissals abound. See,
e.g., Sorrentino v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 5:09-CV-0591 (GTS/RFT), 2010 WL
2026135, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010) (dismissing complaint when plaintiff,
in eight months, never filed opposition, and under local rules such a litigant "is
deemed to have 'consented' to the legal arguments contained in that
memorandum of law"); King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F.
Supp. 2d 514, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (granting motions to dismiss claims that
plaintiffs failed to contest); Redinger v. Stryker Corp., No. 5:10-CV-104, 2010
WL 908675, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss
common law claims as "barred" and "abrogated" by Ohio's comprehensive
products liability statutory scheme, additionally noting that "Plaintiff has not
filed an opposition to the motion").
164. See Lewis v. Pfizer Pharm. Co., Civ. No. 09-0283, 2010 WL 2545195,
at *1 (W.D. La. June 18, 2010) (noting plaintiffs lack of opposition and
deeming motion unopposed); Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C-09-04124-
CW, 2010 WL 2465456, at *3, *6 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) (granting dismissal,
upon plaintiffs' consent, to certain counts and to punitive damages request);
King Drug Co., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (granting motions to dismiss claims that
plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew); Lemelle v. Stryker Orthopaedics, 698 F. Supp.
2d 668, 673 (W.D. La. 2010) (dismissing claims that plaintiff "acknowledged,"
in both briefing and oral argument, were federally preempted); In re Wellbutrin
XL Antitrust Litig., 260 F.R.D. 143, 149, 167-68 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (dismissing
claims under Pennsylvania and Texas law that plaintiffs "conceded"); Stoddard
v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 631-32 & n.1 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (dismissing
count, noting plaintiffs' lack of opposition).
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two statistical in nature and two otherwise. Each offers valuable
insights in supplying the Iqbal answer.
A. The Administrative Office's August 2010 Electronic Data
The Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts posted in early August 2010 a set of data that
tracked electronically collected statistical information from the
computerized docketing systems of the nation's federal district
courts.s65 The data show motion volumes and motion disposition
volumes, by month, from January 2007 (about four months before
the Twombly decision was released) through June 2010 (about 13
months after the Iqbal decision was released).166 The data
encompass all case and motion filing activity throughout the 94
federal district courts.
Upon isolating the raw totals for the four complete months
preceding Twombly and comparing those raw totals to the first four
complete months of data after Iqbal and then the 13 months of data
after Iqbal, the results show as follows:167
165. STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MOTIONS TO
DISMIss: INFORMATION ON COLLECTION OF DATA (2010) [hereinafter AO DATA
COLLECTION], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/MotionstoDismiss_081210.pdf. The compilers of this data volunteered a
number of caveats: (a) the data collection was electronic only, and the
underlying actual motions and orders were not read; (b) if transposition or other
errors were made in entering docket data, those errors were neither identified
nor corrected; (c) the data did not distinguish between the types of Rule 12
motions; (d) the data did not reflect whether dismissals were granted with or
without prejudice, and if amendments were permitted, whether the amendments
were successful in preserving the case; (e) the data did not exclude motions for
which rulings will never be made (for example, with settlements); and (0 the
data excludes Multi-District Litigation cases. Id. at 1.
166. The Administrative Office has been updating this posted data monthly;
the data through June 2010 (as posted in August 2010) was the most current
available as of the date this Article went to press.
167. The totals in this chart were assembled from the raw monthly data
posted by the Administrative Office; any errors in data transposition or
computation are the author's failings alone. The months used for this chart's
data averaging were: Column A = January, February, March, and April 2007;
Column B = June, July, August, and September 2009; Column C = June, July,
August, September, October, November, and December 2009 and January,
February, March, April, May, and June 2010. Three notations about this data are
appropriate. First, the reported data begins with January 2007; statistics
preceding that month are not included in the Administrative Office's
electronically posted data. Second, the Administrative Office has been updating
these data sets monthly. Those updates reveal that historical data has not
remained fixed over time, but changes slightly with each monthly update. For
example, comparing the historical data for two random months (September 2007
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Total No. of Cases Filed:
No. of Motions to Dismiss Filed
% of Total Cases Where MTD 34.38% 36.18% 37.00%
Filed
No. of Motions to Dismiss Granted 2,364 2,928 2,820
% of All Motions Where MTD 38.24% 38.32% 37.98%
Granted
No. of Motions to Dismiss Denied 916 1,097 1,029
% of All Motions Where MTD 14.80% 14.39% 13.86%
Denied
No. of Motions to Dismiss Mooted 271 398 382
% of All Motions Where MTD 4.38% 5.21% 5.14%
Mooted
No. of Motions to Dismiss 368 466 449
Partially Granted, Partially Denied
% of All Motions Where MTD 5.91% 6.12% 6.04%
Partially Granted, Partially Denied
and October 2007) between the August 2010 data set released by the
Administrative Office and the preceding July 2010 data set illustrates the point.
The August 2010 data set shows 21,104 cases filed in October 2007; 5,796
motions to dismiss filed in September 2007; 2,401 motions granted in
September 2007; and 787 motions denied in October 2007. The immediately
preceding July 2010 data set shows 21,103 cases filed in October 2007; 5,795
motions to dismiss filed in September 2007; 2,396 motions granted in
September 2007; and 786 motions denied in October 2007. Compare AO DATA
COLLECTION, supra note 165 (July 7, 2010 data set) (on file with author), with
id. (Aug. 12, 2010 data set) (on file with author). The monthly data used in
compiling this chart were those posted by the Administrative Office on August
12, 2010. Third, it is not apparent from the posted data that the motion volumes
are individually tracked to new cases filed, or that motion dispositions are
individually tracked to new motions filed; rather, it appears that the data simply
represent raw totals. This may impair the ability to draw sound conclusions
regarding individual data totals. Nevertheless, the Administrative Office has
used numerical comparisons from these data to measure the Iqbal effect on
particular case populations, see infra note 273, and for this reason at least, the




As presented in this chart, this data is not limited to any
particular category of case but encompasses the full universe of
federal docket activity in the United States district courts.
This data is amenable to a few observations. First, the raw
totals of newly filed motions to dismiss jumped meaningfully in
the four months following the Iqbal decision when compared to the
filing activity in the four months immediately preceding the
Twombly decision, but that growth in numbers has stopped and
begun to ebb through the 13 months after Iqbal. Second, the
volume of dismissal motions granted likewise jumped in the four
months following Iqbal when compared to the four months
preceding Twombly, but that growth, too, seems to have stalled and
begun to recede. Third, when measured against new-motion filing
activity, the percentage of motions to dismiss that were granted has
remained essentially level. In fact, when the data for the full last 13
months is considered, the percentage of motions granted has
actually fallen to a point lower now than it was during the pre-
Twombly period. Fourth, the number of motions to dismiss that
were denied also rose significantly in the period after Iqbal as
compared to the period before Twombly, but that growth has
likewise now ended and the numbers have begun to recede.
Whether these figures represent actual trends, or mere anomalies
influenced by the small volumes of data and the brief window of
time, remains unclear.' 6 8
168. On this point, the susceptibility of these early Iqbal-related conclusions
to change is demonstrated dramatically by the Administrative Office's tracking
of two case populations of particular concern, "Civil Rights Employment Cases"
and "Civil Rights Other Cases." Several months ago, the Administrative Office
released its tracking data for those two populations measured in only the four-
month windows pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal. That data showed no increase in
the rates of motions granted post-Iqbal and, in fact, reported a decrease during
that period. See AO DATA COLLECTION, supra note 165 (four-month version)
(on file with author) (Civil Rights Employment Cases: pre-Twombly motions
granted = 20% of cases and post-Iqbal motions granted = 16% of cases; Civil
Rights Other Cases: pre-Twombly motions granted = 26% of cases and post-
Iqbal motions granted = 25% of cases). However, when the Administrative
Office released the same tracking data for the same two populations, but now
measured in the 13-month windows pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal, the statistics
had grown significantly. See id. (13-month version) (on file with author) (Civil
Rights Employment Cases: pre-Twombly motions granted = 14% of cases and
post-Iqbal motions granted = 16% of cases; Civil Rights Other Cases: pre-
Twombly motions granted = 19% of cases and post-Iqbal motions granted =
25% of cases). Even here, though, making sense of the data still eludes us. As
Judge Mark R. Kravitz reported in his May 2010 summary as Civil Rules
Advisory Committee Chair: "These [civil rights] figures show a substantial
increase in the percent of motions granted. But they cannot show the
explanation-whether, for example, the increase is largely in types of pro se
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B. The Judicial Conference's July 2010 Case Law Survey Study
The United States Judicial Conference Standing Rules
Committee and its Civil Rules Committee has been tracking Iqbal
through a case analysis study, prepared by Andrea Kuperman.169
The 340-page study summarized the holdings and reasoning of cases
discussing and applying Iqbal through late July 20 10.170
Acknowledging the difficulty of drawing "generalized conclusions"
at so early a stage in the development of the post-Iqbal case law, the
study observed: "The case law to date does not appear to indicate
that Iqbal has dramatically changed the aplication of the standards
used to determine pleading sufficiency. 1 Instead, "the appellate
courts are taking a subtle and context-specific approach to applying
Twombly and Iqbal and are instructing the district courts to be
careful in determining whether to dismiss a complaint."' 72 The study
commented further that the review of the developing case law "may
suggest that Twombly and Iqbal are providing a new framework in
which to analyze familiar pleading concepts, rather than an entirely
new pleading standard." 73
In summarizing the decision law through this period, the study
offered several observations on patterns and similarities in some of
the studied opinions:
* Some courts reaffirm that the federal "notice" pleading
regime "remains intact";
* Other courts commented that Twombly and Iqbal "have
raised the bar for defeating a motion to dismiss based on
cases that survived under notice pleading only because judges felt helpless to
dismiss, no matter how manifestly implausible the claim might be."
Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal on the
Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 3 (May 17, 2010) [hereinafter
Kravitz Memo], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV05-2010.pdf.
169. Kuperman Memo, supra note 156. Ms. Kuperman is the Rules Law
Clerk for the Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure. Id. at 1 n. 1.
170. The study remains dynamic; Ms. Kuperman continues to update it
regularly. She has noted that the focus of the updates has been "largely on
appellate cases because as the number of cases applying Iqbal has grown, it has
seemed appropriate to focus on appellate cases, which will guide district courts
as to how to apply Iqbal in different contexts." Id. at I n.2. The late-July version
was the most current as this Article went to press.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2-3.
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failure to state a claim" (with one court suggesting that
future plaintiffs may seek to avoid a federal forum);
* Some courts have dismissed pleadings after noting that the
result would have been the same even before Twombly
(although other courts have stated or implied the opposite);
* Many courts of appeals decisions focus on the "context-
specific" nature of the Iqbal analysis, which, surmised the
study's author, "may give courts some flexibility to apply
the analysis more leniently in cases where pleading with
more detail may be difficult."' 7 4
Highlighting a recurring challenge present in any post-Iqbal
analysis, the study noted:
While it seems likely that Twombly and Iqbal have resulted
in screening out some claims that might have survived
before those cases, it is difficult to determine from the case
law whether meritorious claims are being screened under
the Iqbal framework or whether the new framework is
effectively working to sift out only those claims that lack
merit earlier in the proceedings.' 75
C Professor Hatamyar's October 2009 Empirical Study
One early empirical effort at assessing Iqbal's impact is the
study by Professor Patricia W. Hatamyar, who conducted an
analysis of a randomized sampling of case opinions across the
entire federal judiciary.176 Professor Hatamyar endeavored to
discern whether, as an empirical matter, there was a statistically
significant change in the profile of federal motion to dismiss
practice in the period before Twombly, during Twombly, and after
Iqbal. She began with searches of the Westlaw database of
electronically accessible case opinions, which yielded 6,010 cases
applying Conley during the two-year period immediately before
the Twombly decision was released, 6,319 cases applying Twombly
during the two years after it was released, and 914 cases applying
Iqbal during the three-and-a-half-month period between its release
and her August 31, 2009 closing date selected for her article. 77 By
randomized selection,' 7 8 she next chose a sampling of 1,200 of these
174. Id.
175. Id at 3.
176. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010).
177. See id at 584 n.200 (describing Westlaw search terms).
178. See id at 584-85 (describing use of online random number generator).
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13,243 opinions (500 from the 6,010-case Conley set, 500 from the
6,319-case Twombly set, and 200 from the 914-case Iqbal set).17 9
From this sampling, Professor Hatamyar noted a sizable pre-
existing, pre-Twombly dismissal rate, which then increased
modestly after Twombly but seemed to grow meaningfully after






Conley 40% 6% 28%
Cases (177) (28) (123)
Twombly 39% 9% 30%
Cases (165) (37) (125)
Iqbal 37% 19% 25%
Cases (64) (33) (44)
In summarizing the results of her multinomial logistic
regression, Professor Hatamyar found that, "holding all other
variables constant," in the period after Twombly but before Iqbal,
"the odds that a 12(b)(6) motion would be granted with leave to
amend, rather than denied, were 1.81 times greater" than before
Twombly, and that in the period after Iqbal, "the odds that a
12(b)(6) motion would be granted with leave to amend, rather than
denied, were over four times greater" than before Twombly.182
179. See id. at 584-85 (describing case gathering process). Professor
Hatamyar later culled 161 cases from her originally gathered data set for various
reasons, leaving her with 444 Conley cases, 422 Twombly cases, and 173 Iqbal
cases. Id. at 585-87.
180. See id. at 598.
181. Id. at 598 tbl.1. Note, for ease of illustration, a sub-total column has
been added to this summary chart, adding together dismissals granted with and
without prejudice. The discussion here represents only the broadest summary of
Professor Hatamyar's impressive work, and the reader is directed to her article
for the full content of her contributions. Any misattribution of the data here is
the responsibility of the author, of course, and not Professor Hatamyar.
182. Id at 556; see also id at 598-99. As to dismissals granted without leave
to amend, Professor Hatamyar's study found that the incidence fell from before
Twombly to after Twombly (from 40% to 39%) and from before Iqbal to after
Iqbal (from 39% to 37%). Id at 599. One especially noteworthy additional
conclusion is her assessment that "Twombly and Iqbal are poised to have their
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With so early a study, Professor Hatamyar warned her readers
that "[b]ecause the Iqbal cases span only three months and are
fewer in number than the Conley or Twombly cases, caution should
be used in drawing inferences from the Iqbal data."l 83 This is, of
course, no weakness of Professor Hatamyar's impressive
methodology but merely a product of the limitations borne of the
recency and thin volumes of the then-available data. Her study was
able to gather a 24-month set of Conley cases (from which she
chose an 8.3% sampling (later diminished to 7.4%)); a 24-month
set of Twombly cases (from which she chose a 7.9% sampling
(later diminished to 6.7%)); but only a three-and-a-half-month set
of Iqbal cases (from which she chose a 21% sampling (later
diminished to 19%)). As a result of her time window, her Iqbal
sampling reflected a sampling-to-gathered total representation that
was almost three-times higher than the Conley and Twombly
percentages, with the Iqbal sampling already bearing the
disadvantage of spanning only about one-seventh of the calendar
length that the Conley and Twombly gathered cases had spanned.
Moreover, Professor Hatamyar further cautioned that any
statistically significant conclusion drawn from this sampling was
dependent on the inclusion of the Iqbal numbers. If those numbers
were disregarded (for example, in preference for waiting for a
more fulsome Iqbal dataset that mirrored the 24-month spans of
the Conley and Twombly datasets), the differences prove to be "not
large enough to reject the null hypothesis that Twombly alone had
no effect on courts' rulings on 12(b)(6) motions."l8 Her
cautionary advice notwithstanding, Professor Hatamyar's study
remains a formidable contribution to understanding Iqbal's effect.
D. The Lee and Willging Federal Judicial Center Studies
The Federal Judicial Center has released two papers
summarizing surveys with practicing attorneys who were asked to
comment on Iqbal, Twombly, and the "plausibility" standard.
In the first paper, Senior Federal Judicial Center Researchers
Emery G. Lee, III and Thomas E. Willging summarized the
greatest impact on civil rights cases, simply because those cases are by far the
most likely type of case to be attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion." Id. at 624.
183. Id. at 585; see also id. at 556 ("[T]he short time span and smaller
number of Iqbal cases counsel caution in interpreting the data.").
184. Id. at 600. Professor Hatamyar explained: "If the distribution of rulings
includes only those cases decided under Conley and Twombly (without including
the cases under Iqbal), there is an unacceptably high probability (35.9%) that the
differences could have occurred by chance." Id.
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comments received during a survey conducted by the National
Employment Lawyers Association, which sought to assess the
impact of "plausibility" pleading on the law practices of
employment attorneys.n5 More than 70% of those responding
agreed that Iqbal and/or Twombly had "affected how [they
structure complaints in employment discrimination cases."
When asked about the nature of that effect, the responders replied
that they "include more factual allegations in the complaint than
... prior to Twombly/Iqbal" (94.2% agreeing) and that they "have
to respond to motions to dismiss that might not have been filed
prior to Twombly/Iqbal' (74.6%).117 Fewer than 15% of responders
agreed that they "conduct more factual investigation" after
Twombly/Iqbal, that they "screen cases more carefully" after
Twombly/Iqbal, or that they "raise different claims" after
Twombly/Iqbal.188 Of those who had actually filed an employment
discrimination case since the Twombly decision was released, only
7.2% agreed that a case had been dismissed "for failure to state a
claim under the standard announced in Twombly/Iqbal."l 89
In the second paper, Willging and Lee reported on individual
telephone interviews with 35 attorneys concerning their personal
federal litigation experiences.190 The interviewees were comprised
of 16 who primarily represented plaintiffs, 12 who primarily
represented defendants, and 7 who represented both about
equally.191 Most agreed they had not "seen any impact" and
185. EMERY G. LEE, III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
11-12 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id
=1606885. The authors offered three caveats in assessing these responses. First,
they noted that survey response rates "were relatively low." Id. at 4. Second,
they noted that the Association, due to its internal policies, did not share email
addresses with the researchers, thus preventing the researchers from constructing
their "own sampling design." Id. Third, they noted that, as a consequence of
both limitations, the survey responses "should only be taken as the views of the
members who voluntarily took the time to respond." Id.




190. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE, III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN
THEIR OWN WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1-2 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1606866. The authors had sent email invitations to
75 attorneys (based on participation during an earlier Federal Judicial Center
survey), of whom 35 participated in telephone interviews lasting between 20 and
30 minutes. Id.
191. Id. at 2.
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"reported no effect" from Twombly/Iqbal in their practices, and
"none of the attorneys identified an increase in the likelihood that
[a Rule 12(b)(6)] motion would be granted." 92 Many interviewees
did, however, note an increase in litigation costs occasioned by
"the increased frequency of litigating 12(b)(6) motions."' 93 Most
interviewees reported that "notice" pleading was already "rare"
and often intentionally so based on "longstanding personal practice
of pleading specific facts." 94 Among the quoted comments were:
"My complaints are detailed, for tactical reasons. . .. I want the
reader, including the judge or more likely his clerk, to say to
himself 'Well, if he can prove this, he wins"'; "it is a good idea to
put as much detail as possible into a complaint so as to make a
good first impression on the judge"; "always included more than is
necessary for notice pleadings, and we are generally very specific
about the facts"; "never did notice pleading, always much more";
"I plead to influence the court"; and "I have a tendency to do fact
pleading."' 95
E. The Utility of General Federal Data and Experience in
Assessing the Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Experience
Opinions may differ on how accurately these four sources
capture the actual post-Iqbal effect across the full spectrum of
federal cases. However one chooses to credit those sources, two
observations counsel special reserve in blindly extrapolating from
these four studies (or any study broadly assessing Iqbal against all
federal cases) into the pharmaceutical and medical device arena.
First, pharmaceutical and medical device cases may just prove to
be resistant to a reliable extension of uncontextualized data; this
area of litigation involves a great many threshold legal challenges
(often unique to this dispute type) that create case vulnerabilities
that transcend many of the details behind the broad facts.196
192. Id. at 25. One interviewee who represented both plaintiffs and
defendants commented: "More motions to dismiss are being filed, but there are
not more dismissals." Id. at 26.
193. Id. at 25.
194. Id. at 27-28.
195. Id. at 28-29. Not all interviewees agreed with these sentiments,
however, but their stories were the distinct minority: "Only two attorneys said
that they routinely used notice pleading." Id. at 29.
196. Federal preemption is one such threshold legal defense. See infra note
330 and accompanying text. But other threshold legal defenses abound in this
sector. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)
(state law fraud-on-the-FDA claims are impliedly preempted under federal law);
Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1984) (holding
that under Alabama substantive law, prescription drug manufacturer's duty to
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Although pharmaceutical and medical device cases are unlikely the
only category of litigation with this sort of uniqueness, it certainly
distinguishes this sector from other less intricate and less
regulatorily nuanced trial work. Second, the sector itself continues
to change on its own, with the advent of new context-specific
rulings (such as those probing the outer reaches of federal
preemption theory).' 97 For each of these reasons, the litigation
realities in pharmaceutical and medical device disputes may, over
time, come to reveal a different profile from that which is
projectable nationally by extrapolating from the full volume of
federal case statistics.
For this reason, a tailored study, examining pharmaceutical and
medical device litigation uniquely, offers the best hope for
correctly assessing Iqbal's effect in this context. When complete,
the results from that contextualized inspection may be susceptible
to a measure of further collaboration from these four broad,
general studies, but it will be the tailored analysis that drives the
conclusions.
VI. IQBAL IN CONTEXT: IMPACT IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL
DEVICE LITIGATION
Any doubts that the "plausibility" rule might not apply in civil
litigation involving pharmaceutical and medical device disputes
were dispelled by the Supreme Court in Iqbal.19 8 In the time since
Iqbal was released, a steady volume of pharmaceutical and medical
warn is limited to obligations to inform the prescribing physician); McDarby v.
Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (holding that
under New Jersey substantive law, a statutory claim under the state consumer
fraud act cannot be maintained by prescription drug plaintiffs alleging product
liability harm); White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding
that under Pennsylvania substantive law, some warning duties are imposed only
on final manufacturers, not bulk suppliers of pharmaceutical chemicals);
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (holding that under Utah
substantive law, all prescription drugs are declared unavoidably unsafe, and
manufacturers of such drugs are not amenable to design defect claims).
197. See infra note 330 and accompanying text; see also Wyeth v. Levine,
129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (ruling that state law failure-to-warn claims are not
preempted under federal law).
198. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (clarifying that the
Twombly ruling "expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,"' and
rejecting suggestion that it should be limited only to antitrust claims as "not




devices cases have cited the decision.' 99 Fervent voices have
argued why Iqbal portends a seismic change in the course of
federal litigation; equally fervent voices insist just the opposite is
true. In the pharmaceutical and medical device universe, who has
been proven right?
Barely a year-and-a-half distant from the release of the Iqbal
opinion, one must approach with great hesitation the task of
extrapolating from so small and early a data set. Any such
conclusions are vulnerable to the risk that the population of cases
under examination may still be too small and the litigant/judicial
responses still too evolving to avoid over-highlighting as
"patterns" what fade significantly-or reconfigure entirely-as
mere anomalies as a larger decisional population emerges.
Nevertheless, limited by what the courts have generated to date,
and mindful of the admonition against declaring early conclusions
to be stonily reliable ones, certain observations can still be made.
A. This Article's Methodology
The numerical data and analytical conclusions of this Article
were derived from studying the cohort of 264 federal decisions that
had resolved a post-Iqbal dispositive pleading motion involving
the pharmaceutical or medical device industries. This cohort was
gathered electronically, using the Westlaw Allfeds database.2oo The
199. The mere fact of citation is unlikely to be a sound barometer for much.
Because nearly all judicial opinions begin their analysis with a statement of the
controlling legal standards, and because the United States Supreme Court has now,
twice, offered recent statements concerning that standard, it is hardly surprising
that nearly every federal disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will cite
to Iqbal or Twombly, or both. Indeed, according to an Administrative Office of the
United States Courts study, as of May 25, 2010, the Iqbal decision had been cited
in approximately 11,000 cases. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text;
see also Kuperman Memo, supra note 156, at I n.2.
200. A research query was run weekly in the Westlaw Allfeds database, using
this terms-and-connectors formulation: "(ASHCROFT /4 IQB*L) &
(PHARMACEUTICAL (PRESCRIPTION /4 DRUG) (MEDICAL /3 DEVICE)
F.D.A. (FOOD /3 DRUG /3 ADMINISTRATION) F.D.C.A. (FOOD /3 DRUG /5
COSMETIC)) & date(aft 5/18/2009)". This query was designed to ensure that
every pharmaceutical and medical device decision, available in this database, that
cited Iqbal was collected. Because Iqbal confirmed that the "plausibility"
standard-as announced in Twombly-applied in all civil cases, see Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1953, a second research query was run to gather all Twombly-citing, post-
Iqbal decisions in the pharmaceutical and medical device context that, though
applying the "plausibility" test, chose to cite only to Twombly and not to Iqbal.
That research query, also run weekly in the Westlaw Allfeds database, used this
terms-and-connectors formulation: "date (aft 5/18/2009) & TWOMBLY &
(PHARMACEUTICAL (PRESCRIPTION /4 DRUG) (MEDICAL /3 DEVICE)
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search pursued citations only to decisions entered after the date of
the Iqbal opinion (May 18, 2009). Although sound arguments can
be made that even before Iqbal, it was quickly becoming settled
that the Twombly "plausibility" standard applied to all civil cases
(beyond narrowly limited categories like antitrust and especially
complex or costly litigations), it was not until the Igbal decision
that the issue was squarely, incontestably made clear. 2 The search
continued to gather cases through August 31, 2010. The total study
period, therefore, spanned just under 15-and-a-half months.2 02
F.D.A. (FOOD /3 DRUG /3 ADMINISTRATION) F.D.C.A. (FOOD /3 DRUG /5
COSMETIC)) % (ASHCROFT /4 IQB*L)".
201. See discussion supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. Well,
perhaps "incontestably" and "clear" overshoot the mark a tiny bit. Barely three
months after Iqbal was decided, Judge Posner (for a unanimous panel of the
Seventh Circuit) affirmed a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, but in
closing the opinion, offered a few intriguing, passing observations. See Smith v.
Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.). The Twombly
opinion, wrote the Judge, had been decided "in complex litigation," and Iqbal
had been decided in an official immunity context, neither of which was
implicated in Smith. Id. Moreover, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Iqbal
had embraced the "plausibility" test by rejecting the curative prospects of
specially-tailored discovery as "especially cold comfort in this pleading context,
where we are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity
for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the
vigorous performance of their duties." Id. at 340 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1954) (internal quotation marks omitted). Attentive to Justice Kennedy's artful
use of the word "this," Judge Posner mused in his opinion's final paragraph: "So
maybe neither Bell Atlantic [v. Twombly] nor Iqbal governs here." Id.; see also
Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.) (noting that
Iqbal teaches that "the height of the pleading requirement is relative to
circumstances," and that "[t]his case is not a complex litigation, and the two
remaining defendants do not claim any immunity"; nevertheless, a "high
standard of plausibility" was demanded because the case involved "a bitter
custody fight" that alleged "a vast, encompassing conspiracy"); Brace v.
Massachusetts, 673 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D. Mass. 2009) (commenting that "[t]he
heightened 'plausibility' pleading standard first articulated in Twombly and then
re-stated in Iqbal might not be as universal as [some] . .. seem[] to contend");
City of Springfield v. Comcast Cable Commc'n, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 100, 108
n.7 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing Judge Posner's Smith opinion and observing that
"Twombly's 'plausibility' test may not govern here," though deciding on other
grounds). But see Boroff v. Alza Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 704, 707 (N.D.
Ohio 2010) ("Judge Posner's proposed (narrow) reading of Iqbal and Twombly
holds obvious appeal to lawyers and judges familiar with the venerable Conley
pleading standard. But it cannot be reconciled with the clear statement in Iqbal
that the Twombly standard applies to 'all civil actions."').
202. More precisely, the study period extended from May 19, 2009 through
and including August 31, 2010. To ensure an ample opportunity for courts and
Westlaw to post all of the late August 2010 opinions, this research continued for
three weeks into September 2010.
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This final cohort total was achieved by a careful culling of the
raw electronic search results. Decisions where the search terms
appeared in a plainly off-topic manner were culled.203 Also culled
were pharmaceutical and medical device decisions resolving
motions seeking relief for something other than a deficient
pleading such as discovery contests or summary judgment
battles. Although motions seeking relief under Rule 12(b)(6)
accounted for the overwhelming majority of the final cohort, a few
other types of motions were nevertheless included in this study if
they squarely assessed the Rule 8 adequacy of a pleading against
the "plausibility" standard. Such motions included Rule 12(c)
motions for judgent on the pleadings, 2 05 Rule 15 motions seeking
leave to amend, 6 and motions to remand that asserted the absence
207
of a viable claim upon which federal jurisdiction was premised.
203. This culling eliminated only obviously inapplicable case decisions,
where the query search terms appeared in ways that were not at all germane to
this study, such as where the search terms (such as "pharmaceutical" or
"medical device") appeared simply in the titles of precedents the case was citing
for other purposes, or where the terms appeared in background facts or other
irrelevant contexts (such as where a litigant's use of a "prescription drug" was
recounted for other purposes or where an expert witness's credentials as a
former "FDA" employee were assessed). The frequent, but off-topic, case law
citations to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), are classic "cases" in point.
204. The courts' citations to Iqbal in resolving motions for summary
judgment are intriguing, but beyond the scope of this Article given the
difference in evidentiary focus commanded by Rule 56 motions. See, e.g., Am.
Med. Sys., Inc. v. Laser Peripherals, LLC, No. 08-4798 (JNE/FLN), 2010 WL
1957479, at *17 (D. Minn. May 13, 2010) (granting summary judgment on
willful infringement claim for pleader's failure to properly plead it under
Twombly); Williams v. Allergan USA, Inc., No. CV-09-1160-PHX-GMS, 2009
WL 3294873, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2009) (granting summary judgment on
preemption grounds, citing plaintiffs failure to plead sufficient facts under
Twombly to defeat it); Williams v. Cyberonics, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 301, 308
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (granting summary judgment on breach of express warranty
claims, citing pleader's failure under Iqbal to plead them).
205. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., Nos. 01-Civ.-9351, M-21-
81 (BSJ), MDL No. 1291, 2010 WL 2541180, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010)
(noting that the Rule 12(c) test is the same as Rule 12(b)(6)); Pettit v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:09-cv-00602, 2010 WL 1463479, at *1-2
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010) (noting that Rule 12(c) motions apply the Rule
12(b)(6) standard and Iqbal); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., No. C 05-
03740 WHA, 2010 WL 1038464, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (Rule 12(b)(6)
and Rule 12(c) standards are the same); Sheet Metal Workers Local 441 Health
& Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 263 F.R.D. 205, 209 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(noting that Rule 12(c) motions employ the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6),
including Twombly).
206. See, e.g., Cent. Reg'1 Emps. Benefit Fund v. Cephalon, Inc., Civ. No.
09-3418 (MLC), 2010 WL 1257790 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2010) (denying proposed
[Vol. 71586
IQBAL "PLAUSIBILITY"
Finally, cases were also culled if they involved contests
regarding the soundness of healthcare treatment and cases
involving food products. These latter two culled categories-cases
involving the service-side of medicine (e.g., professional
healthcare delivery, healthcare facilities, healthcare insurance and
managed care, healthcare regulation, healthcare administration,
and pharmacy practices) and cases involving food and food
products-are indisputably nationally-critical industry sectors
worthy of careful post-Iqbal study, but they were beyond the scope
of this Article. The focus of this Article's examination remained
exclusively on the product side of the pharmaceutical and medical
device industry.
Expectedly, given the nature of the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries, the resulting case population is dominated by
products liability disputes, followed by antitrust contests, consumer
fraud and securities claims, intellectual property disputes, contract
claims, False Claims Act disputes, employment and ERISA claims,
statutory and common law unfair trade practices claims, and a
smattering of other litigation types. The precise categorical division







False Claims (Qui Tan) 10
Employment 8
ERISA 6
Unfair Trade Practices 6
Regulatory Disputes 3
amendment for its failure to satisfy "plausibility" test); Johnson & Johnson v.
Guidant Corp., No. 06 Civ. 7685 (RJS), 2010 WL 571814 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2010) (same).
207. See, e.g., In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL Nos. 4:03-CV-01507-
WRW, 4:10-CV-00409-WRW, 2010 WL 2884887 (E.D. Ark. July 20, 2010)
(granting motion to remand, ruling that plaintiff had pleaded a cognizable claim
against non-defense defendant); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 3: 1O-CV-20095-
DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100, 2010 WL 1963202, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 14, 2010)
(denying motion to remand, ruling that diverse party had been fraudulently joined
because plaintiff failed to plead plausible claim against that party).
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With this case population assembled, the essential remaining
task was to determine whether the emergence of the Iqbal
dismissal test made a decisional difference in each case. To
accomplish that assessment, five categorizing rules were adopted.
First, if the party resisting the dispositive pleading motion
prevailed (that is, the court denied the motion), the case was
recorded in a "no-difference" category. Plainly, that grouping
judgment is accurate only as to the motion disposition outcome
itself and, obviously, only for the case population examined; it is
only to those extents that the grouping judgment is claimed. One
might certainly argue that even in those cases where the dispositive
motion was successfully resisted, the Iqbal "plausibility" standard
could have meaningfully impacted the case nevertheless, by, for
example, imposing on the pleader the costs of defending a motion
that might never have been attempted before Iqbal, by ratcheting
up the costs of that motion battle, or by forcing the pleader to incur
additional expense in pretrial investigation and claim drafting.2 08
Likewise, one might argue that the grouping exercise itself may
bear the flaw of an unrepairably understated denominator because
it fails to capture those cases that attorneys refused to litigate out of
concern for Iqbal.209 Neither of those potential weaknesses is
208. Anecdotal attorney survey solicitations tend to validate the existence of
these sorts of added Iqbal costs in a general way (not focused peculiarly on
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation). See, e.g., LEE & WILLGING, supra
note 185, at 12 (reporting that 70.1% of respondents answered that Twombly
and/or Iqbal had "affected their practices"; 94.2% of respondents answered that
they "include more factual allegations in the complaint than I did prior to
Twombly/Iqbal"; and 74.6% of respondents answered that they "have to respond
to motions to dismiss that might not have been filed prior to Twombly/Iqbal").
209. Anecdotal validation for this criticism exists as well. See, for example,
Jeff Jeffrey, Assessing the Changing World of Civil Procedure Post-'Twombly,'
'Iqbal,' NAT'L L.J. (June 21, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1202462842283, which quotes leading plaintiffs lawyer Elizabeth Cabraser as
stating that "[t]he plausibility requirement has forced her to reject some cases
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readily, practically assessable, unfortunately. Nonetheless, at its
broadest level, assessing whether a post-Iqbal dispositive motion
was defeated or not still represents a valuable tool of measurement;
if a claimant was successful in resisting the motion under the Iqbal
"plausibility" regime, than at least one can conclude that the most
decisive post-Iqbal effect (the dismissal of the case) was avoided
in that instance. This sub-category was labeled "no-difference
(defeated)."
Second, if the contested pleading was dismissed on grounds
that plainly did not hinge on the adoption of the Iqbal
"plausibility" test, that case was recorded in a second "no-
difference" category. This analysis was conducted cautiously, and
restricted to two types of decisions-where the testing paradigm
applied by the court was not Rule 8(a) and where the dispositive
legal principles used by the court emanated from non-Iqbal
pleading standards or otherwise erected impenetrable legal bars to
recovery. For example, motions that challenged fraud claims, or
claims in the nature of fraud, were all grouped within this category
if they applied the fraud-based pleading enhancement standard. For
those sorts of fraud-based claims, enhanced particularity in
pleading was required not by operation of Rule 8(a), which Iqbal
and Twombly had construed, but by the longstanding, preexisting
mandate of Rule 9(b).2 10 This is similarly true where an enhanced
obligation was imposed by another federal law, such as securities
fraud claims governed by the heightened pleading standards
that she might have taken on prior to [Twombly and Iqbal] because 'often the
truth is implausible on its face"' and that "[tlhe cases that are never brought can
be the cases that would be most important." Curiously, however, one attorney
survey solicitation suggests that this understatement-if indeed it exists-might
be very modest. See, e.g., LEE & WILLGING, supra note 185, at 12 (noting that
fewer than 15% of respondents answered that, post-Iqbal, they conduct more
pre-filing factual investigation than before, they screen cases more carefully
with motions to dismiss in mind than before, or they raise different claims than
before).
210. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (substantively requiring, since adoption in
1937, that a party alleging fraud "must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting the fraud or mistake"); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1954 (2009) (drawing a distinction between the "elevated pleading standard" of
"particularity" required for fraud and mistake under Rule 9(b) and "the less
rigid-though still operative-strictures of Rule 8" in all other instances);
United States ex rel. Stephens v. Tissue Sci. Labs., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1310,
1315 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting that when fraud claims are alleged, "a higher
pleading standard" than Twombly applies). This Rule 9(b) enhancement may,
itself, be further enhanced in certain contexts. See United States ex rel. Laucirica
v. Stryker Corp., No 1:09-CV-63, 2010 WL 1798321, at *4 (W.D. Mich. May 3,
2010) ("The Rule 9(b) requirements for a qui tam action are demanding. . . .").
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imposed by the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 2 11
or shareholders' derivative act claims governed by the pleading
requirements of Rule 23.1.212 Whether one agrees with or disagrees
with a particular court's dismissal under Rule 9(b) or another
statutorily enhanced pleading standard, one must concede that the
inquiry being conducted is not an Iqbal Rule 8(a) one.213 Likewise,
motions that were granted in reliance upon non-pleading standards
or other non-Iqbal legal bars to recovery were recorded in the "no-
difference" category. 14 For example, within this category fell
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006) (amended 2010); see In re Cutera Sec.
Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (outlining "heightened pleading
standard" for securities fraud claims imposed by the federal Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act); In re Nuvelo, Inc. Sec. Litig., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1217,
1225 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same). See generally Pub. Pension Fund Grp. v. KV
Pharm. Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (noting that the
"special heightened pleading rules" of the Act "[are] intended to eliminate
abusive securities litigation and put an end to the practice of pleading 'fraud by
hindsight"').
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3) (obligating pleaders to "state with
particularity" their efforts in pursuing (or reasons for failing to pursue)
compliant action from a board of directors); see King v. Baldino, 648 F. Supp.
2d 609, 616 (D. Del. 2009) (describing demand futility pleading obligations
demanded by Rule 23.1); see also In re Pfizer Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 09
Civ. 7822 (JSR), 2010 WL 2747447, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) (noting that
"the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) is less stringent than that under Rule 23.1").
213. This is not to say that Rule 8(a) and Rule 9(b) are separated hermetically
one from the other, at least as respects the "plausibility" inquiry. The emerging
case law on the point confirms that such fixed lines of compartmentalization do
not exist. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1291-
93 (11 th Cir. 2010) (ruling that pleading "does not plausibly, under Twombly, or
particularly, under Rule 9(b)," meet pleader's obligations); SEC v. Tambone,
597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (Rule 9(b) represents "an additional hurdle"
beyond pleader's plausibility requirements); Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,
576 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that "[i]n addition" to plausibility, a
pleader alleging fraud must satisfy Rule 9(b)). Nevertheless, the Rule 9(b)
component of this equation remains a particularity-in-pleading one. See, e.g.,
Shandong Yinguang Chem. Indus. Joint Stock Co. v. Potter, 607 F.3d 1029,
1034 (5th Cir. 2010) (commenting that Rule 9(b) imposes the "additional
burden" on a pleader alleging fraud to "lay out 'the who, what, when, where,
and how' of the fraud); Mitec Partners, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 605
F.3d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 2010) (same). A pleader who fails that independent
claim-particularization obligation is already subject to dismissal, regardless of
what a further "plausibility" inquiry would produce.
214. See, for example, Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc., 607 F.3d
250, 252-53 (1st Cir. 2010), which dismissed an implied warranty of
merchantability claim because there was no actual injury from the claimed
misconduct (required under applicable law), and dismissed a Massachusetts
Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim because the claimant suffered no economic
injury (also required under applicable law). The opinion noted: "Although
judges have some room to dispatch at this stage claims that are highly
[Vol. 71590
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motions in products cases that sought to dismiss state common law
counts that had been abrogated by exclusive statutory remedies,215
motions to dismiss counts that required special pre-filing notice
that had not been given,216 and motions to dismiss counts that were
otherwise barred by definition under the elements of the pleaded
cause of action.2 17 Again, whether one agrees with or disagrees
with a particular court's interpretation of these laws or legal
implausible or pled only in conclusory terms, that wrinkle is not of importance
in this case." Id. at 252 (citation omitted); see also Waguespack v. Plivia USA,
Inc., Civ. No. 10-692, 2010 WL 2086882, at *3 (E.D. La. May 24, 2010)
(dismissing claims brought outside Louisiana's exclusive statutory products
liability law); Mascetti v. Zozulin, No. 3:09-cv-963 (PCD), 2010 WL 1644572,
at *5 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2010) (dismissing claims as not cognizable against
private (non-state) actors and as lacking a private right of action); Fellner v. Tri-
Union Seafoods, LLC, No. 06-CV-0688 (DMC), 2010 WL 1490927 (D.N.J.
Apr. 13, 2010) (dismissing certain state law claims as having been subsumed by
the state's omnibus Products Liability Act); Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., Civ. No. 09-5421 (GEB), 2010 WL 446132 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2010)
(dismissing state unfair competition law claims as not cognizable under pre-
Iqbal state case authorities).
215. See, e.g., Lewis v. Pfizer Pharm. Co., Civ. No. 09-0283, 2010 WL
2545195, at *12 (W.D. La. June 18, 2010) (dismissing common law claims
abolished by Louisiana's products liability statute); Redinger v. Stryker Corp.,
No. 5:10 CV 104, 2010 WL 908675, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2010) (same,
Ohio's statute); Washington v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-01343, 2010 WL
450351, at *2 (W.D. La. Feb. 8, 2010) (same, Louisiana's statute); Gainer v.
Mylan Bertek Pharms., Inc., Civ. No. 09-690 (JNE/JSM), 2010 WL 154233, at
*2 (D. Minn. Jan. 11, 2010) (same, Ohio's statute).
216. See, e.g., Mattson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Civ. No. 07-908 (FLW),
2009 WL 5216966, at *5-8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (dismissing California
Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim for failure to provide mandatory statutory
notice).
217. See, e.g., Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., Civ. No. 09-4935 (SRC),
2010 WL 2326254, at *3-7 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010) (dismissing antitrust claim as
barred under prior law, as contradicted by exhibits attached to complaint, and as
defeated by concessions of counsel); Nelson v. Xacta 3000, Inc., Civ. No. 08-
5426 (MLC), 2010 WL 1931251, at *9 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010) (dismissing
unjust enrichment count because New Jersey does not recognize such a claim as
an independent cause of action); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1017-23 (S.D. Ill.
2010) (dismissing strict liability, negligence, and warning claims for absence of
enforceable duty under Illinois law and as barred by state law warning theory
and the learned intermediary doctrine, and dismissing warranty claim as lacking
"transaction of goods" element essential under Illinois law); Cent. Reg'1 Emps.
Benefit Fund v. Cephalon, Inc., Civ. No. 09-3418 (MLC), 2009 WL 3245485, at
*2-3 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2009) (dismissing New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claims
filed by third-party payors because they lacked "consumer" status necessary to
relief under the statute).
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principles, such dismissals are not Iqbal-reliant ones. This sub-
category was labeled "no-difference (legal bar)."
Third, if a case straddled these first two categories-that is, the
court denied a portion of the motion to dismiss and granted another
portion in reliance on a non-Iqbal standard or legal bar-the case
was grouped into the "no-difference (combined)" sub-category.218
Fourth, unless a case fell within these first three categories (i.e.,
the dismissal motion was denied, was granted in reliance on a non-
Iqbal pleading standard or legal bar, or both), the case was grouped
into one of three final categories: "possible-difference," "yes-
difference," or "mixed-difference." In those cases, the dispositive
effect of Iqbal on the decision was expressed directly or
inferentially by the deciding court, or an Iqbal effect could not, for
other reasons, be confidently ruled out. To reduce the level of
subjectivity inherent in the classification choice between "possible-
difference" and "yes-difference," the analysis was an equally
cautious one. The "yes-difference" category was reserved for only
those cases where the court's dismissal depended unmistakably on
what it expressly or impliedly described as a change in pleading
obligations under the Iqbal "plausibility" test.219
Fifth, a "possible-difference" category was used where the
court's dismissal could not be confidently placed into either the
218. See, e.g., Tethys Bioscience, Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky
& Popeo, P.C., No. C 09-5155 CW, 2010 WL 2287474, at *1-8 (N.D. Cal. June
4, 2010) (denying dismissal of fiduciary breach claim because it was properly
pleaded, but dismissing conversion count and certain categories of claimed
damages as barred under California law); In re Hydroxycut Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., No. 09 MD-2087 BTM (AJB), 2010 WL 1734948, at *1-5
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) (denying dismissal of warranty count because it was
properly pleaded, but dismissing New York General Business Law count for
failure of essential element of transaction occurring within New York State); In
re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 692 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (denying
dismissal of 10 of 17 counts, but dismissing remaining counts under prior law,
lack of private right of action, and failure to send mandatory demand letter).
219. See, for example, Gonzalez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Civ. No. 3:07-
cv-00902 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216984 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009), which dismissed a
state law negligent misrepresentation claim because, beyond conclusorily
alleging detrimental reliance, the plaintiff failed to plead any facts by which it
could be inferred: "It is not enough for Plaintiff to set forth a formulaic
recitation of the element without any factual support. Plaintiffs allegation is
clearly insufficient under the standard set forth in Iqbal." Id. at *8. As framed
and explained, the Iqbal opinion was essential to the district court's dismissal
decision in Gonzalez. Notwithstanding how the court described this effect, it
might well be that another trial judge (or this same trial judge) would have
reached an identical outcome without the "plausibility" test, but that conclusion
cannot be fairly supported by the manner in which the case was decided.




"no-difference" or "yes-difference" category, and good (yet
arguable) reasons existed both for and against a more definitive
classification. 220
Sixth, the final category, "mixed-difference," was used where a
portion of the court's ruling fell within a "no-difference" category
but another portion of the court's ruling fell within the "possible-
difference" or "yes-difference" categories. 221
Before embarking on a review of this Article's results, a few
comments on the reliability of performing this study on the basis of
computer-retrievable opinions are in order. Thoughtful criticisms
have been offered of studies premised on such material.222 Without
220. See, for example, Anthony v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-cv-2343, 2010
WL 1387790 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010), which relied on Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), to dismiss on preemption grounds where the pleader
failed to establish that the state claims were "parallel" to federal violations. The
pleader failed to mention the FDA or its regulations, to plead a basis that linked
the medical device at issue with the origin of the recalled manufacturing error,
or to plead how the claimed injuries were caused by the alleged wrongful act. A
case like Anthony fell in the "possible-difference" category because of the
enormity of the pleading failure the district court had identified, and the
likelihood that even without the "plausibility" test, the trial judge, upon
confronting such pleading omissions, would have granted a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal. But that possibility, however likely it might be, remains just a
possibility. For this reason, grouping in the "no-difference" category was
foreclosed, and a "possible-difference" selection was made instead for Anthony
and decisions like it.
221. See, for example, Bayer Schera Pharma AG v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 08-
Civ-03710 (PGG), 08-Civ-08112 (PGG), 2010 WL 1222012 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2010), which dismissed an antitrust claim on market definition pleading failure
based on prior precedent and dismissed a state unfair competition claim based
on a state law interpretation that bad faith litigation does not qualify as unfair
competition. But the case also dismissed a tortious interference claim: "Prior to
Iqbal, New York district courts disagreed as to whether a plaintiff was required
to identify specific business relationships in order to make out a claim for
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. After Iqbal, it is
clear that a claim such as this-which merely 'offers "labels and conclusions"
[and] "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action"'-will not
survive a motion to dismiss." Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). Because a portion of
the Bayer Schera Pharma AG decision would fall within the "no-difference"
category and another portion would fall within the "yes-difference" category,
the opinion (and those like it) was grouped in the "mixed-difference" category.
222. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A
Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1558-60 (2008) (noting
that "[i]n many situations, empirical research limited to published opinions is
dangerous," because they "represent only the very tip of the mass of
grievances," because "a rather small percentage of judicial decisions appear as
published opinions," and because the discretionary choice to publish or not
results in "a skewed sample of judicial decisions"); Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or
Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District
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denigrating those perspectives, this Article's opinion-based focus
is an appropriate and reliable foundation for this inquiry here, into
the effect that Iqbal had on pharmaceutical and medical device
litigation, for several reasons. First, as a cursory inspection of the
footnotes in this Part VI confirms, a substantial number of the
opinions within the studied cohort are technically "unpublished"
and are likely to remain that way.223 Consequently, the degree to
which the studied cohort here is under-representing the full data set
is likely far less than a study limited to only Reporter-published
decisions. Second, statistical analyses of the Iqbal effect may not
represent a superior mode of assessment; indeed, that methodology
has engendered its own critics, who decry such studies as
functionally unreliable in their own right.224 Third, raw statistical
formulations will often be unable to isolate out disposition details
that, left unculled, would incorrectly skew the study results.225
Fourth, in any event, non-opinion based examinations have been
conducted generally, across the full volume of federal cases, and
they are already available for review. 226 Moreover, a non-opinion
based study of pharmaceutical and medical device litigation is
probably untenable, because the federal case inventory is
electronically coded in only broad groupings and not by precise
227industry type. Fifth, pharmaceutical and medical device
litigation may prove to be dispositionally unique, and therefore not
reflective of broader studies across the entire federal judiciary.228
Courts, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 107, 121 ("[W]hen researchers studying the
administration of the federal courts make conclusions based only on published
opinions, those conclusions are based on incomplete, and biased, data."
(footnote omitted)).
223. See Lizotte, supra note 222, at 120 (commenting that "[t]he term
'unpublished' is itself a bit of a misnomer" in the "age of the Internet" where
"'unpublished' rarely means 'unavailable').
224. See Kravitz Memo, supra note 168, at 4 (noting protests from a May
2010 Duke Law School conference "that mere statistics counting dismissal rates
cannot count the things that truly count: the number of cases that, if not
dismissed, would have survived to victory on the merits; the cases that are not
filed; the diminution in private enforcement of essential public policies").
225. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., supra Part V.
227. See AO DATA COLLECTION, supra note 165 (coding cases in sweepingly
broad categories, such as "Personal Injury," "Antitrust," "Patent," "Labor
Laws," "Contracts," and the like). Consequently, to perform a non-opinion
based study would require a personal examination of actual case files, which
would not only be practically and economically prohibitive but also vulnerable
to the same type of subjectivity in assessment that haunts all decision-based
studies.
228. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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Sixth, though limited by the shortcomings of a potentially
incomplete data set, it cannot convincingly be argued that decision-
based studies are entirely bereft of insights. Case decisions
constitute the working field for much of legal scholarship230 and
are the engines often driving behavior and change.231 So it is into
those decisions that this Article now turns.
B. The Study Results
Of the 264 cases examined, only 11 were court of appeals
rulings, and just two were bankruptcy court rulings.23 The
remaining 251 cases were district court decisions. Most of the
decisions resolved Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss a plaintiffs
complaint, filed by and opposed by represented parties-but not
all. This Article's study confirmed Iqbal's application to
229. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1542 n.59 (2004) ("Although published opinions are not
necessarily representative of the universe of all cases, however, they can lead to
important insights."); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,
1195 (1991) ("Although we acknowledge that published opinions ... may not
be representative of all underlying case findings, this does not mean that one
must abandon hope of obtaining useful insights about an area of law from
them.").
230. See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 229, at 1195 (commenting that
published opinions "for most scholars are the full population" and are what
"most of us ever work from").
231. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 222, at 1560 ("Published
opinions are the decisions that move the law."); Theodore Eisenberg & James A.
Henderson, Jr., Products Liability Cases on Appeal: An Empirical Study, 16
JUST. SYS. J. 117, 118 (1993) ("Studying published opinions remains valuable
for both practical and theoretical reasons. Each litigant who is unsatisfied with
the trial court's disposition of a products liability case faces a decision whether
to appeal. That decision is informed by an attorney's assessment of the state of
the law. Hence, published opinions heavily influence the decision of whether to
file an appeal. Products liability law as developed in published opinions also
guides corporate law departments and plaintiffs' attorneys in deciding whether
to bring, defend, or settle claims." (footnote omitted)).
232. Those courts of appeals decisions are discussed below. See infra notes
236-38 and accompanying text. The two bankruptcy court decisions fell into
"no-difference" categories. See In re Aphton Corp., 423 B.R. 76 (Bankr. D. Del.
Jan. 27, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss in part, having found "plausibility"
test satisfied; denying in part because Rule 9(b) is satisfied as to certain claims;
granting in part because other claims fail to satisfy Rule 9(b); granting in part
because other claims are contradicted by exhibits attached to complaint); In re
Qualia Clinical Serv., Inc., No. BK-09-80629TJM, Adv. No. A09-8041-TJM,
2009 WL 2868220 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 1, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss,
finding pleading sufficient under Iqbal).
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pharmaceutical and medical device pleadings that were prepared
by pro se litigants, 233 that asserted counterclaims, 234 and that were
resolved on motions for judgments on the pleadings (with the
courts noting that Rule 12(c) borrows the Rule 12(b)(6)
standards).235
For ease of analysis, the cases were grouped into five 3-month
intervals (although the first interval included the additional 13
post-Iqbal days from the month of May 2009). Thus, the first
interval encompassed the last days of May 2009, along with June,
July, and August 2009; the second interval encompassed
September, October, and November 2009; the third interval
encompassed December 2009 and January and February 2010; the
fourth interval encompassed March, April, and May 2010; and the
fifth and final interval encompassed June, July, and August 2010.
233. See Sorrentino v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 5:09-CV-0591 (GTS/RFT), 2010
WL 2026135, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010) ("[T]he clarified plausibility
standard that was articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly governs all
claims, including claims brought by pro se litigants (although the plausibility of
those claims is to be assessed generously, in light of the special solicitude
normally afforded pro se litigants)."); Taylor v. Squibb Pharms., Civ. No. 09-4196
(FLW), 2010 WL 1133447, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2010) ("The Court need not,
however, credit a pro se plaintiffs 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions."'); see
also Tyler v. Bristol-Meyer Squibb, No. 8:1 OCV 107, 2010 WL 1664967 (D. Neb.
Apr. 23, 2010); Campbell v. Sebelius, No. C09-1515JLR, 2010 WL 1576696
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2010); Coleman v. State Sup. Ct., 697 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Porter v. Fnu Thadani, No. 10-cv-056-PB, 2010 WL 1052214
(D.N.H. Mar. 15, 2010); Lewis v. Abbott Labs., No. 08-Civ-7480 (SCR/GAY),
2009 WL 2231701 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2009).
234. See Pfizer v. Apotex Inc., Nos. 08-cv-7231, 09-cv-6053, 2010 WL
2649841, at *4, *14-15 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010); AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs.
Inc., Nos. 00-Civ-6749, 03-Civ-6057, M-21-81 (B&J), MDL No. 1291, 2010 WL
2079722 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010); Everett Labs. Inc. v. River's Edge Pharm.,
LLC, Civ. No. 09-3458, 2010 WL 1424017, at *4-6 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2010); Elan
Pharma Int'l Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., Civ. No. 09-1008 (JAG), 2010 WL 1372316
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010); Bayer Schera Pharma AG v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 08-Civ-
03710 (PGG), 08-Civ-08112 (PGG), 2010 WL 1222012 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2010); In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346 (D.N.J. Aug. 27,
2009).
235. See McCoy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-496, 2010 WL 3365284, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2010); AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., Nos. 01-Civ-9351,
M-21-81 (BSJ), MDL No. 1291, 2010 WL 2541180, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
2010); Pettit v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:09-cv-00602, 2010 WL
1463479, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio. Apr. 13, 2010); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra
USA, Inc., No. C-05-03740-WHA, 2010 WL 1038464, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 2010); Sheet Metal Workers Local 441 Health & Welfare Plan v.
GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 263 F.R.D. 205, 209 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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By category, the groupings (by interval periods) of this cohort
of 264 pharmaceutical and medical device cases totaled as follows
(with the numbers in parenthesis representing the percentage that
each total represented for the designated interval):
qbal May- Sep- Mar- un- Totals
Grouping Jun-July- Oc- 2009 Apr- Jul- (All
(All Cases) Aug Nov Jan- May Aug intervals)
2009 W2009 Feb 2010 2010
2010
No- 8 7 15 17 18 65
Difference (17.4%) (25.9/.) (24.6%) (23.3%) (31.6%) (24.6%)
(defeated)
No- 20 10 20 30 15 95
Difference (43.5%) (37.0%) (32.8%) (41.1%) (26.3%) (36.0%)
(legal bar)
No- 9 6 9 10 14 48
Difference (19.6%) (22.2%) (14.8%) (13.7%) (24.6%) (18.2%)
(combined)
Possible- 2 1 8 6 4 21
Difference (4.3%) (3.7%) (13.1%) (8.2%) (7.0%) (8.0%)
Yes- 1 1 2 0 0 4
Difference (2.2%) (3.7%) (3.3%) (0%) (0%) (1.5%)
Mixed- 6 2 7 10 6 31
Difference (13.0%) (7.4%) (11.5%) (13.7%) (10.5%) (11.7%)




For a more accessible view of these results, the data can be
conflated down into a natural pairing. When the three "no-
difference" categories are folded together and the three remaining
"possible-difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"






(85.2%) (2.1%) (78.1%) 4'(82.5%) (U8(78.8%)
Potential- 9 4 17 16 10 56
Difference (19.6%) (14.8%) (27.9%) (21.9%) (17.5%) (21.2%)
(all eategores) _ _ _ 
__
TUtals 146 2.7 0 I J7 264 1
(a~llaegories) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Readers will draw their own conclusions from these raw
results; ample room for many different opinions on this data exists.
Two conclusions seem defensible, or at least facially so. The
notion that Iqbal is ushering in a veritable torrent of new
dismissals in pharmaceutical and medical device litigation is an
untenable conclusion to draw on the basis of this Article's study.
Almost 79% of the time, Iqbal simply did not affect dispositive
pleading motions in this cohort of cases. But equally unconvincing
seems to be the conclusion that Iqbal's effect on pharmaceutical
and medical device cases is so negligible as to be inconsequential.
In about 21% of the cases studied, Iqbal was-based on language
used in the opinions by the deciding courts-possibly impactful to
all or part of the court's disposition of a pending motion to dismiss.
It hardly seems credible to discount as inconsequential anything
that happens about 21% of the time.
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This frequency is reasonably mirrored by the court of appeals
data set, although that set suffers from the limitations of a much
smaller sampling total. Nonetheless, of the 11 court of appeals
decisions encompassed within this study, eight (72.7%) fell within
the "no-difference" categories and only three (27.3%) fell within the
remaining categories. The only "yes-difference" court of appeals
opinion is also the second-earliest such decision, released on July
14, 2009, less than two months after Iqbal.236 The only "possible-
difference" court of appeals opinion is a very brief affirmance of the
dismissal of a claim that seems to have failed to even offer a
formulaic recitation of elements.2 37  And the only "mixed-
difference" court of appeals opinion was a two-judge "summary
order" affirmance of an antitrust complaint that, in part, failed for
the same conscious parallelism reason that had defeated Twombly.238
The raw court of appeals detail follows:
236. Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2009). The opinion also
represents the most cursory treatment of Iqbal among the 11 court of appeals
cases. The lion's share of the Harris opinion is devoted to reviewing (and
reversing) the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs in this ERISA dispute
lacked standing. Id. at 732-36. The remaining portion of the opinion reviews
(and reverses) the district court's denial of leave to amend. Id. at 736-37. In that
second portion, in a footnote, the court of appeals noted that the trial judge had
also found "that the Complaint made insufficient factual allegations." Id. at 736
n.6. The court's one-sentence treatment of that issue follows, preceding citations
to both Twombly and Iqbal: "We agree with the district court that the Complaint
does not contain factual allegations against the individual defendants sufficient
'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."' Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009)).
237. Myers-Armstrong v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, No. 09-16055, 2010 WL
2232652 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010). In this short, nine-paragraph decision, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the complaint failed to allege many of the
elements essential to the various claims. Id. at *1-2. Although under the
"plausibility" paradigm, "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action" does not suffice, it appears that the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff in
Myers-Armstrong to have failed to meet even that level of pleading. Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
238. RxUSA Wholesale Inc. v. Alcon Labs., No. 09-4406-CV, 2010 WL
3393737 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2010). In another unusual and short (four-paragraph)
opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an antitrust dismissal that
was "entirely conclusory" and that failed to "place its allegations of parallel
conduct in a context that suggests a prior agreement." Id. at *1. Not only is the
opinion unpublished and labeled a "Summary Order," it was also a two-judge















2 0 0 1 1 4
(66.7%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (25%) (36.4%)
0 0 0 0 1 1
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (9.1%)
0 0 0 0 1 1
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (25%) (9.1%)
1 0 0 0 0 1













The volume of the "no-difference" cases is informing, but it is
the substance of the remaining cases that merits a deeper, more
searching inspection. What do the cases comprising the three
potential-difference categories teach? Those three categories-
"possible-difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"-
total 56 cases, representing 21.2% of the total pharmaceutical and
medical device cohort of cases. As a group, they bear additional
attributes that may enhance this Article's assessment.
1. The "Diference" Cases-Timing
The fluctuation of this group of "possible-difference," "yes-
difference," and "mixed-difference" cases over the five time
intervals studied is noteworthy. In the interval immediately
following the release of the Iqbal decision, 19.6% of the cases
examined show a possible Iqbal effect. That percentage drops
noticeably during the second interval to 14.8%, nearly doubles
during the third interval to 27.9%, then diminishes during the
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fourth interval to 21.9%, and fades again during the fifth interval to
17.5%-a level more than two points lower from where it had
started. What might explain this rate of movement? Perhaps it is
mere coincidence, portending nothing.
Or perhaps a clue to explain this fluctuation might lie in a
recent study of federal court civil processing statistics performed
by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System at the University of Denver. 239 This study of almost 8,000
federal district court cases that had closed over one 12-month
period revealed a mean disposition time for Rule 12 dispositive
motions of 129.78 days-in other words, on average, more than
four months elapses between the date such a motion is filed and the
date it is ruled upon.240 If that average were applied to this
pharmaceutical and medical device case cohort, the motions that
comprise the third interval period (the one revealing the dramatic
jump in potential-dismissal cases) would have begun to be filed, on
average, in late July 2009, just a few months after the Iqbal
decision was released on May 18, 2009.241
Mindful of that mean disposition time, the interval data
fluctuations in pharmaceutical and medical device cases could be
explained this way: a period of early quiescence during which
litigants studied the Iqbal decision and busied themselves
preparing new Iqbal motions, followed by a period marked by that
higher number of such motions being filed, followed by, in due
course, rulings by the district courts on those motions that reveal
an initially sharpened use of Rule 8(a), with that sharpness now
dulling back over time.
Whether this surmise proves accurate, only time will tell. But
such a path would align with impressions from some of those
attending a recent conference on federal practice: "Some
thoughtful voices suggested that just one year after the Iqbal
decision, practice is already settling down in patterns that reflect
very little change in pleading standards. The increased flurry of
239. INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT OF AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING
IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS (2009)
[hereinafter IAALS STUDY], available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/
pubs/PACER%20FINAL%201-21-09.pdf. This study examined civil cases that
closed during the pre-Twombly/pre-Iqbal period from October 1, 2005 through
September 30, 2006 in the district courts of eight federal districts. Id. at 20-26
(noting data collection methodology from the districts of Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, and Oregon, and from the Eastern District of Missouri, the
Eastern District of Virginia, and the Western District of Wisconsin).
240. Id. at 48. The data reflect the mean disposition period for motions filed
under Rules 12(b), 12(c), and 12(f).
241. The third interval begins with December 1, 2009. See id. at 40. July 24,
2000 is 130 days before December 1, 2009.
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motions that tested the standards may well abate once this lesson is
learned." 242 Perhaps Seventh Circuit Judge Diane S. Sykes was
also prescient, at least in the long-run, when she predicted that
"most judges" would be "cautious in applying these standards."243
Several recent appellate decisions seem to agree.244 This Article's
pharmaceutical and medical device case findings are, at the very
least, not inconsistent with those impressions and the pattern they
imagine.
In fact, the civil processing data actually dovetail with those
impressions. The Institute for the Advancement of the American
Legal System's study found that, even in the pre-Iqbal and pre-
Twombly period of October 2005 through September 2006,
"[s]lightly less than 30% of all Rule 12 motions were denied in
their entirety." 245 This Article's study of pharmaceutical and
medical device cases is roughly consistent with that finding during
242. See Kravitz Memo, supra note 168, at 4. The conference also heard
competing views, which believed that access to the federal courts had been
limited: "They protested that mere statistics counting dismissal rates cannot
count the things that truly count: the number of cases that, if not dismissed,
would have survived to victory on the merits; the cases that are not filed; the
diminution in private enforcement of essential public policies." Id.
243. See Jeffrey, supra note 209, which quoted Judge Sykes's remarks at the
American Constitution Society's annual conference held in mid-June 2010,
where she commented that "she could understand the 'alarm' of plaintiffs
attorneys who may feel their clients face a higher threshold before they can file a
complaint. But she went on to say that 'eventually a body of case law will be
developed to tell courts how heavy handed this standard needs to be.' In the
meantime she said, 'I expect most judges to be cautious in applying these
standards."'
244. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 319 n.17 (3d
Cir. 2010) (noting that, although originally believing the plausibility standard
"repudiated" earlier Supreme Court precedent, the court is now "not so sure");
Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the
Twombly opinion itself "belied" the notion that a heightened pleading standard
is required); Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
2009) ("Our system operates on a notice pleading standard; Twombly and its
progeny do not change this fact."). But see al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949,
977 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted in part, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. 2010) ("Post-
Twombly plaintiffs face a higher burden of pleading facts, and courts face
greater uncertainty in evaluating complaints.").
245. See IAALS STUDY, supra note 239, at 47-48 ("It is important to note
that these statistics on Rule 12 motions reflect motions filed and decided prior to
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, which
many scholars and practitioners believe may dramatically affect filing rates of
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. However, contrary to some post-Twombly
pronouncements that Rule 12(b)(6) had been in a sleepy state of relative disuse
before the Supreme Court's ruling, the data here suggest that motions to dismiss
were in fact well-used by attorneys, and frequently granted by the district courts,
in the pre-Twombly era." (footnotes omitted)).
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the second interval (25.9%), third interval (24.6%), fourth interval
(23.6%), and fifth interval (31.6%).246 In short, during the first 15-
and-a-half months after Iqbal, claimants were having roughly
about the same rate of success in completely fending off pleading
motions in pharmaceutical and medical device cases as all federal
pleaders had before Iqbal (and, indeed, before Twombly).
The choice of syntax used by the courts in resolving dispositive
pleadings motions in pharmaceutical and medical device cases
suggests that many judges are interpreting Iqbal as not especially
consequential. Some courts have described the "plausibility" test
as merely "clarifying" existing dismissal standards, 247 emphasizing
that the obligations on federal pleaders remain "liberal" ones2
that have not been "heightened" 249 or "changed," 2 50 and that the
246. See supra Part VI.B. During the first interval, the one encompassing the
first three-and-a-half months after Iqbal, the rate of complete pleader victories
ebbed to its lowest point, 17.4%, but then rebounded dramatically in the
intervals that followed. See supra Part VI.B. This statistic is consistent with the
notion that the courts originally may have given Iqbal an aggressive application
in pharmaceutical and medical device cases and then quickly began retrenching
from that inclination.
247. See In re Schering-Plough ERISA Litig., No. 08-CV-1432 (DMC), 2010
WL 2667414, at *3 (D.N.J. June 29, 2010); Sepracor Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., No. 09-cv-01302 (DMC) (MF), 2010 WL 2326262, at *4 (D.N.J. June 7,
2010); CIBA Vision Corp. v. De Spirito, No. 1:09-cv-01343-JOF, 2010 WL
553233, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2010); see also Koch v. I-Flow Corp., 715 F.
Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D.R.I. 2010) (commenting that Iqbal does "not mark a
radical change in federal pleading standards, but rather a fine tuning of sorts").
248. See Pittsburgh Standard Spine Co. v. Lanx, Inc., No. 09-cv-01062-REB-
MJW, 2010 WL 2604985, at *1 (D. Colo. June 28, 2010); Crisp v. Stryker
Corp., No. 5:09-cv-02212, 2010 WL 2076796, at *2 (N.D. Ohio. May 21, 2010).
249. See Turner v. Mylan, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-1816-TIA, 2010 WL 1608852
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2010). The Turner decision is illustrative of judicial
persistence with a very gentle approach to pleadings-testing, notwithstanding
"plausibility." In Turner, the court rejected the argument that the pleading failed
Iqbal because it lacked specific allegations regarding the nature of the product's
failure:
[I]t would be rare for a plaintiff at the time of the filing of a complaint
to have more factual information than ... that the defendants designed,
manufactured and marketed the specific product; that the decedent used
the product properly for its intended use on a date certain; and that the
product directly and proximately caused her death.
Id. at *2 (quoting Houston v. Mylan, Inc., No. 8:09CV306 (D. Neb. Nov. 20,
2009)).
250. See Elan Pharma Int'l Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., Civ. No. 09-1008 (JAG), 2010
WL 1372316, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010) (citing McZeal v. Sprint Nextel
Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (commenting that "the Federal
Circuit considered whether the Supreme Court's decision in Twombly changed
the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) in patent infringement actions, and
concluded that it did not").
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obligation remains notice-pleading. 251 The "plausibility" inquiry,
explained one court, erects "two easy-to-clear hurdles." 252 A few
courts even remarked that motions to dismiss are still viewed with
"disfavor" and are "rarely granted." 2 53 Moving parties have been
admonished that, notwithstanding the "plausibility" test, pleaders
are still "not required to prove the merits of [their] claim at the
pleading stage, but only to ive fair notice," with detail-seeking to
follow during discovery.2 "[P]recise detailed allegations" are
still not required, insisted one court.25Y A pleading that "lack[ed]
detailed factual allegations" survived, explained another judge,
because under the "plausibility" test, all those allegations are
"treated as entirely accurate, however true or misguided a fact finder
might ultimately find them to be."256 Courts have refused to dismiss
some pleadings even after characterizing them as "[c]ursory," 257
"minimal," 2 5 8 and "primarily . . . formulaic recitations." 2 5 9 Other
251. See On-Site Screening, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-C-6084, 2010 WL
3025039, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2010) ("Our system operates on a notice
pleading standard; Twombly and its progeny did not change this fact.");
Genzyme Corp. v. Disc. Drugs Wis., Inc., No. 08-C-5151, 2010 WL 744275, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010) ("[T]he notice pleading standard remains [intact].");
In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
(citing Twombly and Iqbal, but noting that "[g]enerally, notice pleading is all
that is required for a valid complaint").
252. Warsco v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 1:08-CV-5-TS, 2009 WL
1874375, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 30, 2009).
253. See Whitener v. Pliva, Inc., Civ. No. 10-1552, 2010 WL 3021866, at *2
(E.D. La. July 29, 2010) (citing 1997 and 1982 precedent, "viewed with disfavor
and rarely granted"); Jacobson v. Celgene Corp., Civ. No. 09-4329 (FSH) (PS),
2010 WL 1492869, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2010) (citing 1995 precedent, "district
courts generally disfavor Rule 12(b)(6) motions"); Brennon v. Pfizer, Inc., Civ.
No. 09-1093, 2009 WL 2525180, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2009) (quoting 1982
precedent, "viewed with disfavor" and "rarely granted"). Some courts even
persist in incanting the "no-set-of-facts" mantra from Conley that the Supreme
Court "retired" in Twombly. See, e.g., Ervin v. Guidant Corp., Civ. No. 08-
03783, 2010 WL 3081306, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2010).
254. Waguespack v. Plivia USA, Inc., Civ. No. 10-692, 2010 WL 2086882,
at *3 (E.D. La. May 24, 2010); see also Woodcock v. Mylan, Inc., 661 F. Supp.
2d 602, 612 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (denying a dismissal, explaining that to rule
otherwise "would be to impose a heightened pleading standard that would
require the plaintiff to produce evidence before discovery has commenced").
255. Ivory v. Pfizer, Inc., Civ. No. 09-0072, 2009 WL 3230611, at *5 (W.D.
La. Sept. 30, 2009).
256. In re Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:08-md-01968, 2009 WL
2433468, at *8-9 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 3, 2009).
257. See In re Bayer Corp. Combination Aspirin Prods. Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., 701 F. Supp. 2d 356, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
258. See Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-0688 (DMC),
2010 WL 1490927, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2010).
604 [Vol. 71
IQBAL "PLAUSIBILITY"
courts have rejected dismissal motions with a tint of exasperation,
deriding that the contested allegations were "as specific as
possible" 260 or musing that it was "not clear how much more
specific the complaint could be." 261 One judge discounted a
movant's contention that a pleading ought to be dismissed as
"'conclusory' and implausible," by explaining that such an
argument represented "a premature attack on the factual merits."26 2
Yet another court rejected a defendant's statute of limitations
challenge, premised on the fact that the only conduct alleged
against that defendant had occurred too long ago for the claim to
still be ripe, by reasoning that it was nevertheless "plausible" that
the pleaded conduct might have persisted long enough to preserve
the timeliness of the claim. 263 These sorts of analyses certainly
seem to dovetail with the "cautious" application of Iqbal that Judge
Sykes foresaw.
Nevertheless, although it is certainly true that courts, incanting
the "plausibility" lingo, have found pharmaceutical and medical
device leadings to be sufficient to withstand the Iqbal dismissal
inquiry, 64 it is also true that courts have incanted the same
259. See Mohr v. Targeted Genetics, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (C.D. Ill.
2010).
260. Cruz v. Mylan, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-1106-TI7-EAJ, 2010 WL 598688, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2010).
261. Boroffv. Alza Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 704, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
262. Merix Pharm. Corp. v. EMS Acquisition Corp., No. 09-C-5871, 2010
WL 481247, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2010) ("A complaint need only allege
damages; its failure to 'establish' them is no basis for dismissal. And neither is a
defendant's self-serving and ex ante conclusion that the plaintiff will be unable
to prove damages when the burden of doing so arrives in due course.").
263. See Sales Bd. v. Pfizer, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134-35 (D. Minn.
2009) ("Pfizer asserts that Sales Board's claims are barred because the only act
alleged in the Complaint attributable to Pfizer is the use of the 'Strategic Selling
Guide Featuring Action Selling' at the first national sales training meeting in
2002. [The court had earlier noted that 'the cut-off date for the statute of
limitations is March 11, 2003.'] ... In the Court's experience, and as a matter of
common sense, it is plausible that a selling guide 'implemented' at a large
corporation's national sale training meeting in 2002 would still be in use as of
March 11, 2003." (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), and
the Supreme Court's admonition that the "plausibility" inquiry is "a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense")).
264. See, e.g., Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1180
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)) (finding allegations were sufficient "to 'nudge[] [Appellants'] claim[s]
across the line from conceivable to plausible"'), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3411
(2010); Meijer, Inc. v. Ferring B.V., 585 F.3d 677, 693 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
allegations "sufficient to plausibly support a finding" of fraud, because the
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265language in dismissing pleadings. Other courts have
acknowledged that Iqbal "modified" 266 or "transformed" 267 the
dismissal standards, though they differ in assessing the degree of
the change. Some see the change as modest, 268 others as significant
"pleadings could plausibly lead to additional findings . . . which is all that is
required at this stage of the litigation"); Pettit v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
No. 2:09-cv-00602, 2010 WL 1463479, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010) (finding
allegations were "sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief'); Ivory v. Pfizer,
Inc., Civ. No. 09-0072, 2009 WL 3230611, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 30, 2009)
(finding allegations "are more than sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level"'); In re Actiq Sales & Mktg. Practices Litig., Nos. 07-4492,
09-431, 2009 WL 2581717, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2009) (finding complaint
"sufficient to nudge the allegations over the line from that which is merely
'speculative' and 'conceivable,' to that which states 'a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face"'). In a curious discussion of the "plausibility" standard, the
Ninth Circuit in Siracusano seemed to find that the existence of a pleading
equipoise was proper cause for finding a challenged pleading sufficient. See
Siracusano, 585 F.3d at 1183 ("[T]he inference that Appellees withheld the
information regarding Zicam and anosmia intentionally or with deliberate
recklessness is at least as compelling as any plausible nonculpable
explanation."). In both Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court seemed to
embrace precisely the opposite conclusion: that the existence of a pleading
equipoise-where the pleading is just as consistent with culpable conduct as
with nonculpable conduct-should doom the complaint. Cf Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1951-52 (ruling that pleading fails where factual allegations are consistent with
two different inferences, one of lawful conduct and one of unlawful conduct,
and the latter inference cannot be plausibly drawn); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
(ruling that pleading fails where allegations are "merely consistent with"
unlawful conduct, rather than "plausibly suggesting" unlawful conduct).
265. See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class
Action, No. 2:06-cv-5774 (SRC), 2010 WL 2464746, at *8 (D.N.J. June 9,
2010) (dismissing claims as "[fjar from plausible" and "based purely on
speculation and suspicion"); Peterson v. Breg, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-2044 JWS,
2010 WL 2044248, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (dismissing claims that lack
factual allegations "plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling [them] to relief');
Burks v. Abbott Labs., Civ. No. 08-3414 (JRT/JSM), 2010 WL 1576779, at *3
(D. Minn. Apr. 20, 2010) (dismissing allegations that are "a formulaic
recitation" of elements and "legal conclusions"); Adams v. I-Flow Corp., No.
CVO9-09550 R(SSx), 2010 WL 1339948, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010)
(dismissing claims that "plead nothing more than the sheer possibility" of a
claim); In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent
Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (D. Del. 2010) (dismissing claims that do not
rise "above the speculative level").
266. See In re Qualia Clinical Serv., Inc., No. BK-09-80629TJM, Adv. No.
A09-8041-TJM, 2009 WL 2868220, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 1, 2009).
267. Geesey v. Stryker Corp., Civ. No. 09-2988, 2010 WL 3069630, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2010).
268. See United States ex rel. Laucirica v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-CV-63,
2010 WL 1798321, at *3 (W.D. Mich. May 3, 2010) (noting that the
"plausibility" test "does not change the notice-pleading standards" but does
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in imposing a "more stringent"269 or "heightened" standard, 270 and
others as representing "a radical change in the long-thought to have
been settled pleading requirements derived from Conley v.
Gibson."27 1
The explanation offered for the timing trend identified here
may prove, over time, to have been mistaken. But this much is
certain: claimants who face dispositive pleadings attacks in
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation are having a greater
rate of success in completely defeating those motions today than
federal pleaders had in the year before the "plausibility" test
arrived with Twombly, and they are losing such motions today at
the lowest rate since Iqbal was decided.
2. The "Difference" Cases-Geographic Concentrations
When examined geographically, the concentrations of these 56
"possible-difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"
cases are unsurprising, with New Jersey and Pennsylvania as
possible exceptions. The table below identifies the sources of these
56 cases by originating district and lists those districts' respective
percentages of the total volume of all federal civil cases pending as
of September 30, 2009.272
"take[] a step away from the long-standing 'no-set-of-facts' standard established
by Conley"); see also In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371,
1381 (N.D. Ga. 2010) ("In the post-Twombly world, the complaint is judged as it
is and not on whether a set of facts could be imagined that would support the
claim.").
269. See Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-CV-1935-DMS (JMA), 2010 WL
2573493, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2010) (noting the "more stringent" standard,
but finding the pleading sufficient).
270. See Albergo v. Immunosyn Corp., No. 09-CV-2653-DMS (AJB), 2010
WL 3339398, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (noting that in Iqbal and
Twombly, "the Supreme Court established a more stringent standard of review
for 12(b)(6) motions"), amended, 2010 WL 3895364 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010);
Kester v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00523, 2010 WL 2696467, at *4
(W.D. Pa. June 16, 2010) (noting that the standard "seemingly shifted from
simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading"); Mohr v.
Targeted Genetics, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 711, 715, 718 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (noting
"heightened" standard, but finding pleading sufficient).
271. Pa. Emp. Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, 710 F. Supp. 2d 458, 479 (D.
Del. 2010).
272. According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
total number of pending civil cases as of September 30, 2009 was 306,816. See
ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES




Jurisdiction Jurisdiction's Possible Source Details
% of Federal /Yes/
Civil Cases Mixed
Cases
U.S. Courts of Appeals n/a 3 9th Cir.=2 (origin=
N.D. Cal.=2)
2d Cir.=1 (origin =
E.D.N.Y.=1)
New Jersey (all) 1.95% 12 D.N.J.=12
California (ND, CD, ED) 8.09% 8 N.D.Cal.=4;
E.D.Cal.=2;
C.D.Cal.=2
New York (SD) 7.52% 6 S.D.N.Y.=6
Ohio (ND, SD) 2.70% 4 N.D.Ohio=3;
S.D.Ohio=1
Illinois (ND, CD) 3.01% 3 C.D.Ill.=2; N.D.Ill.=1
Arizona (all) 0.98% 2 D.Az.=2
Georgia (ND) 1.06% 2 N.D.Ga.=2
Minnesota (all) 1.17% 2 D.Minn.=2
Pennsylvania (WD, ED) 21.6% 2 W.D.Pa.=1; E.D.Pa.=1
Texas (ND) 1.08% 2 N.D.Tex.=2
Wisconsin (WD) 0.14% 2 W.D.Wis.=2
Alabama (MD) 0.32% 1 M.D.Ala.=1
Colorado (all) 0.75% 1 D.Colo.=1
Delaware (all) 0.43% 1 D.Del.=1
Court of Int'l Claims n/a 1 C.I.T.=1
(all)
Missouri (ED) 0.73% 1 E.D.Mo.=1
North Carolina (MD) 0.27% 1 M.D.N.C.=1
Vermont (all) 0.10% 1 D.Vt.=1
Washington (WD) 0.69% 1 W.D.Wash.=1
With the exception of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the
concentrations of the "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases relate rationally to the volume levels of
civil cases each jurisdiction processes. For example, with the
exceptions of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the two highest
sources of these "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases-California and New York (eight cases
and six cases, respectively)-also accounted for the highest
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/C01SepO9.pdf. The
individual jurisdiction source data is drawn from this report. See id.
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percentage of the Nation's federal civil case inventory as of
September 30, 2009, with each state's implicated districts
accounting for more than 7.5% of the total inventory. 27 3 As that
share of the federal judiciary inventory fell, so, too, did the number
of "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"
cases. The next two largest inventory shares, Ohio and Illinois
(each with between 2.5% and 3%), also have the next highest total
of these cases (four and three, respectively).274 Three of the next
four largest inventory shares, Arizona, Georgia, and Minnesota
(with approximately 1% each), also have the next highest total of
these cases (two each).275 Finally, most jurisdictions having less
than 1% of the federal civil case inventory each had one case in the
"possible-difference,". "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"
276set.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania remain obvious outliers in this
trend. New Jersey has a disproportionately high number of
"possible-difference,". "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"
cases (12) in relation to its percentage of the federal inventory
(1.95%).2 But New Jersey also had a unique distinction within
273. See id. (California (N.D., C.D., E.D.): 24,811 / 306,816 = 8.09%; New
York (S.D.): 23,073 / 306,816 = 7.52%). Although not truly decisions with a
"source" in California, the two court of appeals decisions in this set are both
Ninth Circuit opinions that originated in California district courts. See Myers-
Armstrong v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, No. C 08-04741 WHA, 2009 WL 1082026
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009), affd, 382 F. App'x 545 (9th Cir. 2010) (originating
from the Northern District of California); Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728
(9th Cir. 2009) (originating from the Central District of California).
274. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 272, at 138 tbl.C-1
(Ohio (N.D., S.D.): 8,286 / 306,816 = 2.70%; Illinois (N.D., C.D.): 9,240 cases /
306,816 = 3.01%).
275. See id. (Arizona: 3,014 / 306,816 = 0.98%; Georgia (N.D.): 3,250 cases
/ 306,816 = 1.06%; Minnesota: 3,593 cases / 306,816 = 1.17%). The fourth
jurisdiction-the Western District of Wisconsin-had two cases but one of the
smallest shares of the federal civil case inventory (0.14%). Id. (430 cases /
306,816 = 0.14%). Because the Wisconsin case volume is so small (two cases)
and the outlying nature so modest (between a more-than-1% jurisdiction (having
two cases) and a less-than-1% jurisdiction (having one case)), this anomaly does
not materially undermine this trend.
276. See id. (Alabama (M.D.): 989 / 306,816 = 0.32%; Colorado: 2,305 /
306,816 = 0.75%; Delaware: 1,330 / 306,816 = 0.43%; Missouri (E.D.): 2,248 /
306,816 = 0.73%; North Carolina (M.D.): 843 / 306,816 = 0.27%; Vermont: 292
/ 306,816 = 0.10%; Washington (W.D.): 2,121 / 306,816 = 0.69%). The only
outlier in this group, the Northern District of Texas, was just over the 1% mark,
at 1.08%. See id. (Texas (N.D.): 3,303 / 306,816 = 1.08%). As with Wisconsin,
this modest, one-group-removed anomaly does not materially undermine the
trend.
277. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 272, at 138 tbl.C-1
(New Jersey: 5,968 / 306,816 = 1.95%).
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the entire pharmaceutical and medical device cohort-on
December 30, 2009, the District of New Jersey released 16
separate Plavix products liability opinions, of which seven were
"possible-difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"
cases. This temporally concentrated release of qualifying opinions
was not detected in any other judicial district or state, nor did it
occur again in New Jersey either before or after December 30,
2009. Efforts to further explain that New Jersey anomaly (by
examining the nature of the Plavix claims, the manner in which
they were pleaded, or otherwise) have been unavailing.278
Conversely, the Western and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania
have a disproportionately low number of "possible-difference,"
"yes-difference," and "mixed-difference" cases (2) in relation to
their percentage of the federal inventory (21.6%).279 Efforts to
further explain the Pennsylvania anomaly were equally unavailing.
Beyond observing that the "possible-difference," "yes-
difference," and "mixed-difference" categories seem generally to
concentrate in higher proportion in those jurisdictions handling
larger volumes of federal civil cases (New Jersey and Pennsylvania
excepted), no further conclusions from this geographic spread
seem obvious.
3. The "Difference" Cases-Amendment Possibility
Although the "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases all (obviously) involved full or partial
dismissals, the pleaders were not expressly foreclosed from re-
pleading in the substantial majority of them. In 29 of these 56
cases, the dismissing court either confirmed that the dismissal was
without prejudice or granted the pleader explicit leave to amend. In
another 13 of these cases, the dismissing court did not directly rule
whether future amendments would be permitted or future motions
for leave considered (thus, the opportunity for a re-pleading in
those cases could not be discounted). In the 14 remaining cases,
the court's dismissal was expressly with prejudice. The incidence
278. But one final New Jersey observation can be offered. If this single-day
December 30, 2009 anomaly in New Jersey were discounted, and only the
"routine" volume of cases were examined, the state would have had five
"possible-difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference" cases. Given the
state's volume of the federal civil inventory (1.95%), that total is still a bit
higher than the 2-3% experienced in Ohio and Illinois (four and three cases,
respectively), but the difference obviously becomes far less pronounced. See id.
(New Jersey: 5,968 / 306,816 = 1.95%).
279. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 272, at 138 tbl.C-1
(Pennsylvania (W.D., E.D.): 66,268 / 306,816 = 21.6%).
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of this type of result, a with-prejudice dismissal in a "difference"
case, was small-it occurred in only 5.3% of the 264 cases in the
pharmaceutical and medical device cohort. But the severity can
hardly be overstated; these types of with-prejudice dismissals
undoubtedly represent the most aggressive Iqbal outcome
possible-the loss of a claim, based on a pleading failure, without
an ability to try again. For this reason, these 14 cases warrant
further examination.
In three of these 14 cases, the with-prejudice dismissals were
ordered only as to those portions of the products liability cases that
the district courts found to be inarguably barred by controlling
law;28o as to all other dismissed claims in the cases, the courts'
dismissals were without prejudice.281 In another case, the district
court dismissed with prejudice an ERISA fiduciary duty dispute,
largely by rejecting the plaintiffs' posited legal theory: the court
found implausible allegations that a pharmaceutical company
retirement plan committee had breached fiduciary duties owed to
employee-investors, because, under existing law, neither a
committee member's personal decision to sell shares of that stock
nor the company's conduct in submitting stock reports would state282 ec
cognizable ERISA claims. As to each of these first four cases,
280. See Redden v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1380-L, 2010 WL
2944598, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) (dismissing fiduciary duty claim with
prejudice because, under Texas law, cognizable claim requires that fiduciary
status pre-exist agreement at issue, and the plaintiffs admit it did not); Adams v.
I-Flow Corp., No. CVO9-09550 R(SSx), 2010 WL 1339948, at *4, *6-7 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 30, 2010) (dismissing breach of warranty claims with prejudice
because California law denies privity (an essential element in California for
warranty claims) in prescription pharmaceutical and medical device cases
because "the transaction is between the manufacturer and the physician, not the
patient"; also granting motion to strike, with prejudice, design defect claims,
failure to warn public or FDA claims, constructive trust claims, and injunction
claims as all barred under state law); Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769,
789-90 (D. Minn. 2009) (dismissing claims with prejudice as "obviously
preempted" on their face).
281. See Redden, 2010 WL 2944598, at *6 (dismissing contract and
defamation claims without prejudice); Adams, 2010 WL 1339948, at *6-7
(dismissing defect theories, time-barred claims, fraud and misrepresentation
claims, and consumer fraud act claims without prejudice); Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d
at 780-90 (dismissing manufacturing defect, failure to warn, fraud, express
warranty, and loss of consortium claims without prejudice).
282. Herrera v. Wyeth, No. 08 Civ. 4688 (RJS), 2010 WL 1028163
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010). The court did invite the plaintiffs' counsel to explain
how the complaint might be amended to cure its deficiencies and, after listening
to counsel, the court concluded that most of the proffered amendments would be
futile and the one that could be meaningful might be entertained, upon a fuller
explanation to the court. Id. at *8.
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the severity of the with-prejudice dismissals may be muted by the
legally untenable nature of the proposed claims.
In another four of the cases, the with-prejudice dismissal was
premised (at least in part) on the pleaders' repeated failures to cure
the perceived deficiencies.283 Notwithstanding the with-prejudice
culling, there were surviving claims in three of these four cases
that would proceed to discovery.284 Here, too, the severity of these
dismissals may be understood by the court simply tiring of
repeated pleading revisions and by a desire to bring seriatim re-
volleying to a final close.285
In two other cases, the with-prejudice dismissals were based in
part on the pleaders' failure to request leave to amend.286
283. See Burks v. Abbott Labs., Civ. No. 08-3414 (JRT/JSM), 2010 WL
1576779, at *3-9 (D. Minn. Apr. 20, 2010) (dismissing with prejudice both the
manufacturing defect and design defect claims after the fifth try, and dismissing
with prejudice the express warranty claim as barred under state law); CIBA
Vision Corp. v. De Spirito, No. 1:09-cv-01343-JOF, 2010 WL 553233, at *9-10
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2010) (dismissing claim without granting pleader a fourth
try); Schultz v. TomoTherapy Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 780, 794 (W.D. Wis. 2009)
(dismissing the still-deficient re-pleaded portion of a formerly dismissed claim,
this time with prejudice, where claim theory remained unsupported by the
factual allegations in the complaint); Frey v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 642 F.
Supp. 2d 787, 789-96 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (denying leave to file second amended
complaint, and dismissing manufacturing defect, design defect, and supplier
liability counts).
284. See Burks, 2010 WL 1576779, at *2-9 (dismissing with prejudice
manufacturing defect, design defect, and express warranty claims, but
preserving failure to warn claim); Schultz, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 784-94
(dismissing certain '33 Act and '34 Act securities fraud claims, but preserving
other '33 Act and '34 Act claims); Frey, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 789-96 (dismissing
manufacturing defect, design defect, and supplier liability counts, but preserving
failure to warn and express warranty claims). In the fourth case, dismissed in its
entirety, the court faulted the pleader for scarcely trying. See CIBA Vision Corp.,
2010 WL 553233, at *9-10, which faults the claimant for having "not made any
effort to bring his counterclaims up to the standards articulated in Twombly and
Iqbal," and notes, as an example, that the pleader's opposition brief "contains
only two legal citations." "There simply has been no effort by Defendant to
explain to Plaintiff or the court why the vague and conclusory allegations raised
in his counterclaims are sufficient .. . ." Id.
285. This notion, although unjust from the perspective of those who are
dismissed, is not wholly foreign in the law. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931) (refusing to permit collateral attack
on personal jurisdiction loss, reasoning that "[p]ublic policy dictates that there
be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by
the result of the contest").
286. See RxUSA Wholesale Inc. v. Alcon Labs., No. 09-4406-CV, 2010 WL
3393737, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2010) (refusing leave to amend because
pleader did not seek it and because amendment found to be futile); In re Pfizer
Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 09 Civ. 7822 (JSR), 2010 WL 2747447, at
*8-11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) (refusing leave to amend because pleaders did
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In two further cases, the pleaders actually acknowledged that
the defendants moving for a with-prejudice dismissal in anesthetic
products cases had not, in fact, manufactured the particular
anesthetic product allegedly used by the patient-plaintiff.287
Nevertheless, both pleaders opposed dismissal, arguing that the
medical records might possibly have been filled out inaccurately
and that the brand name on the forms might be a sort of healthcare-
shorthand for any anesthetic of this type. That these claims were
dismissed may not be surprising; that the claims were dismissed
with prejudice and without some modest period of post-filing
discovery could be denounced as stark.289 One could certainly
imagine a highly industrious plaintiff finding the brand-name
notation on a medical record, learning about the possible
healthcare-shorthand use of that name, and still needing discovery
to ferret out the healthcare provider's purchasing records to
confirm which manufacturer's product was at issue. Indeed, other
courts, confronting nearly identical motions to dismiss involvin
similar products, granted dismissal without prejudice.2
not seek it and because the court read pleaders' allegations of federal securities
non-disclosure, fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment claims to be self-
defeating).
287. See Timmons v. Linvatec Corp., 263 F.R.D. 582 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(where the pleader alleges injury from an unnamed anesthetic, agrees that
medical records reveal that "Marcaine" was used, and does not dispute that the
moving defendant did not distribute, manufacture, or sell it); Combs v. Stryker
Corp., No. 2:09-cv-02018-JAM-GGH, 2009 WL 4929110, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
14, 2009) (where the pleader alleges injury from "Marcaine" anesthetic, but
concedes that the moving defendant did not distribute or sell it).
288. See Timmons, 263 F.R.D. at 583 (noting the plaintiffs' argument that
"they sued the eight anesthetic manufacturer defendants in this case on the
ground that one of them may have manufactured the [anesthetic] administered to
[the plaintiff]"); Combs, 2009 WL 4929110, at *2 (noting plaintiffs' argument
that "one cannot trust the brand name that is written in the medical records" and
that the plaintiff "could have been given any one of a number of anesthetic
drugs").
289. In both cases, the pleaders urged the court to forebear (or at least to
forebear a with-prejudice dismissal) until after discovery. See Timmons, 263
F.R.D. at 585 ("Plaintiffs request discovery in order to identify the anesthetic
used, arguing that discovery may reveal which one of the eight anesthetic
manufacturer defendants they sued, if any, manufactured the anesthetic Mrs.
Timmons received."); Combs, 2009 WL 4929110, at *2 ("They ask the Court
not to dismiss their claims against Defendants at this time, or to do so without
prejudice so that claims may be re-filed, should discovery reveal that the drug
given to Julie was actually not Marcaine but rather another drug . .. which was
distributed and sold by Defendants during the relevant time period.").
290. See Kester v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00523, 2010 WL
2696467, at *16-17 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2010) (also a Marcaine case; granting
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Nonetheless, one of the courts noted that familiar pleading
procedures may permit a plaintiff, when confronting a situation
such as this, to use fictitious-name practice to preserve the
pleading but in a manner that avoids imposing unwarranted costs
on that g oup of named defendants who will bear no liability to the
plaintiff. 91 This procedural opportunity, the manner of the
pleading, and the claimants' inability to convince their courts that
they had made diligent pre-filing efforts in attempting to unearth
accurate product information may all explain the courts' use of
with-prejudice dismissals in these cases.29
Finally, in the last two cases, the court dismissed with
prejudice products claims as federally preempted, finding that the
pleaders had failed to allege why the allegations survived under the
"parallel claims" preemption exception recently embraced by the
Supreme Court.29 This use of a with-prejudice dismissal, prior to
limited discovery, also seems aggressive. In one of the two cases,
the court did, however, examine individually each of the factual
allegations offered by plaintiff in support of his theory, and noted
three-week leave-to-amend period); Peterson v. Breg, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-2044
JWS, 2010 WL 2044248, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (anesthetic and pain
pump case; granting 30-day leave-to-amend period); Adams v. I-Flow Corp.,
No. CVO9-09550 R(SSx), 2010 WL 1339948, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010)
(anesthetic and pain pump case; granting leave to amend); Haskins v. Zimmer
Holdings Inc., No. 1:09-CV-236, 2010 WL 342552, at *2 (D. Vt. Jan. 29, 2010)
(anesthetic and pain pump case; granting three-week leave-to-amend period).
291. See Timmons, 263 F.R.D. at 585 n.1 ("If Plaintiffs were uncertain, as
they admit they are, about the identity of the entity who manufactured the
anesthetic administered to Mrs. Timmons, yet concerned about the running of
the statute of limitations, they should have proceeded against fictitious 'Doe'
defendants, as permitted under California law."). Pursuing informal discovery
from the healthcare providers or seeking pre-filing discovery under Rule 27 may
be other resources as well. See FED. R. CIv. P. 27(a) (allowing petitions to
perpetuate testimony before federal lawsuit is filed).
292. But cf Peterson, 2010 WL 2044248, at *3 (granting leave-to-amend
notwithstanding that pleaders "fail to suggest what steps, if any, they would take
to identify the appropriate defendant that they have not taken since the
complaint was filed, and the court is not persuaded that additional time would
assist plaintiffs in identifying the appropriate defendants").
293. See Franklin v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-cv-02301-REB-KMT, 2010 WL
2543579, at *4-11 (D. Colo. May 12, 2010) (magistrate judge's
recommendation), adopted, 2010 WL 2543570 (D. Colo. June 22, 2010)
(finding allegations insufficient to permit a plausible "parallel claim" analysis
that would avoid federal preemption, as required under Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321-22 (2008)); Anthony v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-cv-
2343, 2010 WL 1387790, at *2-4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010) (same finding).
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why each could not rescue his claim.294 The second of the two
cases, a with-prejudice dismissal of a pro se plaintiff on nuanced
federal preemption grounds, is less easily understood.295
Whatever judgment one may pass on these with-prejudice
dismissals-an unfavorable one (because the claimant was
defeated without discovery) or a favorable one (because the
defendant and the judiciary were saved further expense on a claim
lacking an evident factual basis)-the incidence of these with-
prejudice dismissals is small. There remains a pronounced
tendency among Iqbal-dismissing courts in the pharmaceutical and
medical device cohort to not foreclose a pleader's opportunity-at
least once-to conform to the "plausibility" standard.
4. The "Difference" Cases-Information Asymmetry
Although prevalent, this re-pleading opportunity would prove
hollow if the Iqbal-producing dismissals result from what is now
being called an "information asymmetry"-where the factual detail
necessary to produce a "plausible" claim is either outside the
informal reach of the pleader, or worse still, only in the possession
of the adverse party for which the formal discovery rules may
prove the only lawful path to access.296 Cases bearing evidence of
this sort of "information asymmetry" predicament might be present
among these 51 "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases. But, if it exists, the incidence of this
predicament appears in the minority of cases.
In about half of "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases (27 out of 56), the detail that the courts
held to be missing from the challenged pleading related to
information well within the pleaders' apparent reach (and,
sometimes, exclusively within the pleaders' reach). In seven cases,
294. The plaintiff in Anthony had pointed to the fact that the defendant had
received two warning letters concerning certain of its products from the FDA,
but the court found this allegation insufficient because the plaintiff had not
alleged a link between his particular product and the conduct for which the
defendant was warned. Anthony, 2010 WL 1387790, at *4 ("Without more
detailed factual allegations, Anthony's complaint does not cross the critical
threshold that distinguishes the speculative from the plausible.").
295. See Franklin, 2010 WL 2543579, at *3 (noting the plaintiffs current
pro se status, although also noting that the pleading at issue was prepared by
counsel during a period when the plaintiff was represented).
296. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV.
431, 459 & n.153 (2008) (defining "information asymmetry"); Howard M.
Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14




the pleaders' counts for product misrepresentation were dismissed
for failing to allege what the actual claimed misrepresentation was,
and what the pleader actually did in reliance.297 Likewise, a
tortious interference claim was dismissed when the pleader failed
to identify the business relationships that were purportedly
interfered with;298 a defamation and breach of contract claim was
dismissed when the pleaders failed to identify the defaming
content or the contractual damages they had lost; an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed when the
pleader failed to describe the details of the psychically-injuring
event; 30 0 warranty and warning claims were dismissed when the
pleader failed to identify the warranty and omitted warnings;3 0 1 a
contract claim was dismissed when the pleader failed to set out the
contract;302 a trade dress claim was dismissed when the pleader
297. See Money v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 3:07-cv-1100 (FLW),
2009 WL 5216987, at *9-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009); Gonzalez v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., No. 3:07-cv-00902 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216984, at *7-8 (D.N.J.
Dec. 30, 2009); Smith v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 3:06-cv-6053 (FLW),
2009 WL 5216982, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009); Bunting v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., No. 3:06-cv-6052 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216981, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec.
30, 2009); Mayberry v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Nos. 07-942 (FLW), 07-1099
(FLW), 2009 WL 5216968, at *11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009); Barge v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., No. 03:07-cv-00783 (FLW), 2009 WL 5206127, at *11
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009); Robinson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 3:07-cv-267
(FLW), 2009 WL 5206126, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009).
298. See Bayer Schera Pharma AG v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 08 Civ. 03710
(PGG), 08 Civ. 08112 (PGG), 2010 WL 1222012, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2010). In fact, the court noted that the fatally missing detail may have been
intentionally withheld by the pleader, a strategy the court faulted as an error in
judgment:
Sandoz argues that it could not identify specific business relationships
because of "the strict confidentiality ascribed to contracts for the supply
of API [active pharmaceutical ingredients] in the pharmaceutical
industry." Protection of trade secrets or other proprietary information
can, of course, be accomplished through entry of a protective order
and/or a sealing order. In any event, confidentiality concerns do not
excuse a failure to plead the elements of a cause of action.
Id. at *8 n. 13 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
299. See Redden v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1380-L, 2010 WL
2944598, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010).
300. See Earl v. H.D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co., No. 08-3224, 2009 WL
1871929, at *3 (C.D. 111. June 23, 2009) (ruling that, because the nature of the
psychologically-injuring event must be examined, the omission of the details
"dooms her claim").
301. See Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 09-04124 CW, 2010 WL
271423, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010).
302. See Genzyme Corp. v. Disc. Drugs Wis., Inc., No. 08 C 5151, 2010 WL
744275, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010) ("Under Iqbal, it is not enough for the
complaint merely to state, 'Defendant and Plaintiff formed a new contract,'
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failed to describe the contents of the claimed trade dress; 303 a
patent-based antitrust claim was dismissed when the pleader failed
to allege which patents it alleged to be improperly listed and why
they were invalid; 304 a securities law and fiduciary duty claim was
dismissed when the pleader failed to identify the wrongful
omissions from proxies and other financial reports;30 5 an unfair
competition claim was dismissed for failing to specify the
allegedly wrongful acts;306 a tariff claim by the federal government
was dismissed for failing to describe what tariff wrongdoings each
defendant was accused of committing;30 7 and a claim that a product
was "worthless" was dismissed when the pleader failed to explain
why. 308 A curious claim that a "bank-based transactional corporate
conspiracy" was afoot to impose "bioweaponized HIN1 influenza
vaccinations" was also dismissed for the pleader's failure to
describe her own specific resulting injury. 309 In six other cases, the
pleaders expressly or impliedly acknowledged access to the details
the court declared missing3o or were granted a brief additional
'Defendant breached the new contract it had with Plaintiff,' or 'Plaintiff and
Defendant modified their original contract.' The complaint must provide factual
grounds sufficient to make the formation of a new or modified contract plausible
on its face.").
303. See Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, No. 09-04200 CW, 2010 WL
1881770, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (also dismissing a copyright
infringement claim for failing to plead the prerequisite of preregistration or
registration).
304. See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Labs. Inc., Nos. 00 Civ. 6749, 03 Civ.
6057, M-21-81 (BSJ), MDL No. 1291, 2010 WL 2079722, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
May 19, 2010).
305. See In re Pfizer Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 09 Civ. 7822 (JSR),
2010 WL 2747447, at *8-11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010). The court also dismissed
the pleaders' unjust enrichment count because the only alleged enrichment
(executive salaries, benefits, and bonuses) would not qualify under that equity
claim, absent some further allegation of improper purpose. Id. at * 11.
306. See Myers-Armstrong v. Actavis Totowa, LLC, No. 09-16055, 2010
WL 2232652, at *1 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010).
307. See United States v. Scotia Pharm. Ltd., 2009 WL 1410437, at *6 (Ct.
Int'l Trade May 20, 2009).
308. See Nelson v. Xacta 3000 Inc., No. 08-5426 (MLC), 2009 WL 4119176,
at *6-7 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2009).
309. See Campbell v. Sebelius, No. C09-1515JLR, 2010 WL 1576696, at *2-
4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2010) (pressing claim under the Declaration of
Independence and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution).
310. See Adams v. I-Flow Corp., No. CVO9-09550 R(SSx), 2010 WL
1339948, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010) (pleader acknowledges access to
certain information omitted from original pleading); Haskins v. Zimmer
Holdings Inc., No. 1:09-CV-236, 2010 WL 342552, at *1 (D. Vt. Jan. 29, 2010)
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period to go discover the missing information. 311 In two cases, the
court faulted the pleaders for simply inattentive or mistaken
drafting." 2 In each of these cases, it would appear that the
deficient pleaders had ready, easy access to the Iqbal antidote.
None of these cases appears to implicate an information
asymmetry situation.
In six of the remaining "possible-difference," "yes-difference,"
and "mixed-difference" cases, the fatally missing factual detail
seems to be classically accessible through pre-filing expert
investigation and analysis. For example, in several antitrust,
Lanham Act, and unfair competition cases, the pleaders were
faulted for failin to specify the allegedly unlawful resulting
market impacts. In a products case, the pleader was faulted for
(pleader acknowledges access to missing data from recently-received operative
note); Gilmore v. DJO Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 856, 862 (D. Ariz. Oct. 15, 2009)
(pleader obtained missing information from newly-acquired medical records);
see also In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent
Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (D. Del. 2010) (pleader demonstrated ability to
plead proper inducement to infringement claim as to one patent, but failed to do
so for second patent); Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 09-04124 CW,
2010 WL 2465456, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) (in amendment, pleader
demonstrates ability to plead in detail against one defendant, and now must do
the same as to other defendants).
311. See Peterson v. Breg, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-2044 JWS, 2010 WL 2044248,
at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (granted another 30 days).
312. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 1412 (JFK), 2010
WL 1654156, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010) (finding what appears to be a
simple cut-and-paste problem, the court notes the pleader's omission of any
factual allegations against the moving defendants, "as if she clumsily copied
these factual allegations from one of the many complaints in this multi-district
litigation that asserts claims solely against" another defendant); see also Harris
v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009) (expressing belief that the
pleader can cure detail and misidentification pleading problems).
313. See Everett Labs. Inc. v. River's Edge Pharm., LLC, Civ. No. 09-3458
(JLL), 2010 WL 1424017, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2010) (in Lanham Act / unfair
competition claim, faulting pleader for failing to specify why contested conduct
would be unfairly uncompetitive or confusing to consumers); In re Androgel
Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376-79 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (in
antitrust claim, faulting pleader for failing to support unreasonable restraint of
trade theory); CIBA Vision Corp. v. De Spirito, No. 1:09-cv-01343-JOF, 2010
WL 553233, at *5-10 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2010) (in antitrust case, faulting
pleader for failing to explain why alleged competitive behavior was improper);
Golden Gate Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-09-3854 MMC, 2009
WL 4723739, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009) (in antitrust case involving public
companies, faulting pleader for failing to list the competitors and their sales
volumes within the relevant industry market to show the possibility of a market
dominance); Synergetics USA, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 3669
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failing to specify how the alleged product defect was factually
linked to the alleged injury. 3 14 Again, in each of these cases, the
specificity held to be missing was likely already in the pleader's
pre-filing investigative and case-assessment file (or probably
should have been). Consequently, none of these cases appear to
implicate the information asymmetry predicament.
In another of the "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases, a state law personal injury products
claim was initially dismissed because the pleader had alleged
indecisively that the plaintiff s decedent, a clinical trial patient, had
died either because of exposure to defendant Abbott Laboratories'
drug, exposure to another experimental product, or exposure to a
combination of both.3 15 Upon re-pleading, the defendant again
moved to dismiss for, among other reasons, a continued failure to
meet the Iqbal "plausibility" standard. This time, the district court
denied the motion. 316 In arguing for another dismissal, the
defendant aimed the court's attention squarely on the absence of
pleaded facts as to both the prescribing physician's and the
manufacturing defendant's state of knowledge-an obvious
"information asymmetry" situation. 3 17 Notwithstanding Iqbal, the
court was unpersuaded:
As Abbott contends, because the case involves prescription
drugs, the critical causation element is what Ms. Mohr's
[the plaintiffs decedent] physician, not Ms. Mohr, would
have done differently with a different warning. It is difficult
to know, prior to discovery, whether Ms. Mohr's physician
would have prescribed [the challenged drug] if there were
additional warnings.3 1 8
(DLC), 2009 WL 1564113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2009) (same, failing to
allege the defendant's power or dominance in market).
314. See In re Heparin, No. 3:09HC60137, 2010 WL 547322, at *2-3 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 9, 2010) (pleader claimed that manufacturer produced kinked dialysis
tubing, but failed to factually connect that defect to the decedent's actual cause
of death).
315. Mohr v. Targeted Genetics, Inc., No. 09-3170, 2009 WL 4021153, at *3
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2009) (finding allegations "do not meet the Iqbal standard"
because they amount to "little more than the 'magic words' which are typically
used to support a product liability claim" and lack "specific facts which establish
tortious conduct"). Again, in Mohr, the claim's weakness that seemed to trouble
the court was the pleader's inability to link the defendant's drug with the alleged
injury, an omission that might also have been corrected by an expert's review.
316. Mohr v. Targeted Genetics, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 711, 721 n.6 (C.D. Ill.
2010).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
2011]1 619
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
[As to Abbott's state of knowledge:] Although this is a very
close issue, the Court at this stage of the litigation is unable
to conclude that . .. [dismissal is warranted.] It is not yet
apparent when Abbott learned of the information that
prompted the FDA to require additional warnings . . . . It
may be that the package insert . .. was sufficient based on
the information Abbott had at the time and dismissal is thus
appropriate. . . . When the complaint's allegations are
accepted as true, however, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
alleged enough facts to assert a plausible claim.
Presumably, the discovery process will yield information
319
Citing Iqbal, Abbott suggests that Plaintiff has not asserted
enough facts to be entitled to discovery. However, a
plaintiff cannot be expected to allege facts of which-
through no fault of its own-it is not yet aware. Moreover,
the Court must still draw all reasonable inferences in the
Plaintiff s favor. 320
In sum, in testing the re-pleaded claim, the trial court not only
noted the spectre of "information asymmetry," but relied, in part,
on that very disability to explain denying the motion to dismiss-
all the while citing Iqbal and discussing the "plausibility" pleading
standard.321
This leaves 22 "possible-difference," "yes-difference," and
"mixed-difference" cases (8.3% of the pharmaceutical and medical
device cohort) that seem to present the information asymmetry
predicament in cases where the "plausibility" test appears material
to the disposition.
In eight of those cases, the factual detail that the courts
declared missing might be obtained through discovery from an
adversary. Two failure-to-warn products claims were dismissed
because the pleader failed to include sufficient factual allegations
concerning the defendants' state of knowledge of the claimed
risk322 and their actual promotion behavior.323 Two versions of the
319. Id. at 721.
320. Id. at 721 n.6 (citations omitted).
321. This court was not alone in focusing on an "information asymmetry" to
deny an Iqbal challenge. See, e.g., In re Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:08-
md-01968, 2009 WL 2433468, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 3, 2009) ("The exact
relationship between the defendants, their knowledge of material events, the
timing of their receipt of that knowledge, and the impact those fact intensive
questions may have on the application of the unsettled, governing law all
counsel in favor of allowing the challenged Counts to proceed to discovery.").
322. See Redinger v. Stryker Corp., No. 5:10 CV 104, 2010 WL 1995829, at
*3 (N.D. Ohio May 19, 2010) ("Plaintiff has alleged no factual particulars
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same securities fraud complaint were dismissed because the
pleaders failed to explain why public offering statements
concerning order backlogs were misleading, a lack of detail that
might well have been remediable only through discovery from the
defendant.324 Three ERISA breach of fiduciary duty cases were
dismissed because the pleaders failed to detail how the defendants
assumed fiduciary-level status or how they misbehaved as
fiduciaries, or both.325 One employment discrimination claim was
supporting a plausible conclusion that there was inadequate warning or
instruction under [Ohio statutory law]."). Here, again, reasonable minds can
differ on the point. Under the controlling law, the Ohio Product Liability Act, a
warning or instruction is considered "defective" if the defending manufacturer
"knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known" about an
unwarned-against risk. Id. at *2 (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2307.76(A)(1)(a), (2)(a) (West 2004)). Although actual knowledge certainly
may present an "information asymmetry" dilemma, the alternative "should have
known" analysis might well have been supplied by a consulted industry expert.
323. See Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 784-85 (D. Minn. 2009)
(finding allegations capable of escaping federal preemption only if the defendant
was promoting in a certain off-label manner, knew of the relevant risks to the
plaintiff, and failed to properly warn of those, and faulting pleader for failing to
allege those facts). The court in Riley also dismissed an express warranty claim
that allegedly had occurred after the fact, reasoning that the pleader would have to
explain how such a claimed warranty could have formed the basis for the bargain
(a required showing under the controlling law). Id. at 788.
324. See Schultz v. TomoTherapy Inc., Nos. 08-cv-314-slc, 08-cv-342-slc,
2009 WL 2032372, at *14 (W.D. Wis. July 9, 2009) (dismissing portion of '33
Act claim in first amended complaint, but granting leave to amend
notwithstanding judge's belief that "[ilt seems unlikely that plaintiffs could
revivify this claim (they would have to uncover many more multi-unit orders in
the backlog to establish that it was misleading)"); Schultz v. TomoTherapy Inc.,
676 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (dismissing of same portion of '33
Act claim in second amended complaint, noting that "[r]egardless whether
plaintiffs might be able to unearth additional delayed orders if they were able to
perform discovery, nothing about the allegations in the complaint suggests that
additional discovery could be expected to lead to those results").
325. See Crocker v. KV Pharm. Co., No. 4:09-CV-198 (CEJ), 2010 WL
1257671, at *16, *25 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2010) (dismissing fiduciary claim that
company directors had become retirement plan fiduciaries based on lack of
detail about degree of control they exercised over plan's investments, and
dismissing fiduciary claim against other defendants for lack of allegations of
actual conduct that breached fiduciary duties); Precision CPAP, Inc. v. Jackson
Hosp., No. 2:05 cv 1096-MHT, 2010 WL 797170, at *6-14 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 8,
2010) (dismissing on similar grounds); Herrera v. Wyeth, No. 08 Civ. 4688
(RJS), 2010 WL 1028163, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010) (dismissing
fiduciary claims based on absence of allegations as to how individual members
of company retirement committee behaved with their own personal shares of
stock).
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dismissed when the pleader failed to better allege the unlawful
motivation behind her termination. 326
In five other cases, the detail declared to be lacking would
seem to be of a nature accessible largely through discovery of non-
parties. Three of the anesthetic cases discussed earlier fall into this
category, where the pleaders sued numerous potential defendants,
justifying their over-pleading on an uncertainty as to the identity of
the actual anesthetic they received due to healthcare-shorthand use
of the brand name; the confirming details that allow for a positive
product identification likely could be learned from discovery of the
specific healthcare providers who implanted the anesthetic
devices. 327 In two other cases, consumer fraud claims were
dismissed because the pleaders had not sufficiently alleged the link
between the claimed misrepresentations and the plaintiffs' injuries,
a detail that might only be learned from the prescribing physicians
who would be in the position to explain whether those
misrepresentations had actually influenced the prescribing
decision. 32 8
Finally, in the remaining nine cases, the missing detail might
be supplied through discovery from a combination of adversaries
and non-parties. In seven of these cases, the pleaders were faulted
for failing to allege enough about the manufacturing process or
design of a pharmaceutical or medical device. Thus, in two of the
cases, product defect claims were dismissed because the pleaders
lacked depth in their allegations about the nature of the precise
defect in manufacturing or the nature of the precise defect in
product design. 329 Similarly, in the other five cases, the court found
326. See Taylor v. Squibb Pharm., Civ. No. 09-4196 (FLW), 2010 WL
1133447, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2010) (dismissing claim because, among other
failures, pleader failed to explain how she was discharged due to her race and
that her replacement was not a member of her same protected class).
327. See Kester v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00523, 2010 WL
2696467, at *16-17 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2010); Timmons v. Linvatec Corp., 263
F.R.D. 582, 583-85 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Combs v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:09-cv-
02018-JAM-GGH, 2009 WL 4929110, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2009). For a
further discussion of these and other similar cases, see generally supra notes
288-93 and accompanying text.
328. See In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class
Action, No. 2:06-cv-5774 (SRC), 2010 WL 2464746, at *6-8 (D.N.J. June 9,
2010); In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action,
No. 2:06-cv-5774 (SRC), 2010 WL 2346624, at *8-14 (D.N.J. June 9, 2010).
329. See Burks v. Abbott Labs., Civ. No. 08-3414 (JRT/JSM), 2010 WL
1576779, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 20, 2010) (faulting pleader for, inter alia, not
alleging "any facts describing or identifying defendants' manufacturing
specifications or standards" and, therefore, pleader failed "to allege facts
describing how defendants' products deviated from such specifications or
standards"); Frey v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 787, 795 (S.D.
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that the pleaders had failed to defeat federal preemption of their
claims because they had not adequately alleged what specific
federal law the particular product's manufacturing, design, or sale
had violated.330 (In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that certain state
law claims against medical device manufacturers may be barred
under federal preemption theory unless the claims in the case are
doing nothing more than imposing a state law duty that is
"parallel" to duties the manufacturers already have to meet under
existing federal law.)33 1 In both sets of cases, the missing details
might have been sought through discovery from the product
manufacturers, product designers, and the healthcare providers.
The final two cases in this group were antitrust claims that the
Ohio 2009) (faulting pleaders for, inter alia, "a formulaic recitation of the
elements" and failing to allege "any facts that would permit the Court to
conclude that there was a defect in the design or formulation of [the medicine]
and that the defect was the proximate cause of [the plaintiff s] alleged injuries").
330. See Bass v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:09-CV-632-Y, 2010 WL 3431637, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010) ("Plaintiff has not specifically alleged how
Defendants have failed to meet [federal device-approval] specifications or that
such a failure has even occurred."); Franklin v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-cv-
02301-REB-KMT, 2010 WL 2543579, at *8 (D. Colo. May 12, 2010)
(magistrate judge's recommendation), adopted, 2010 WL 2543570 (D. Colo.
June 22, 2010) ("Plaintiff 'cannot simply incant the magic words "[defendant]
violated FDA regulations" in order to avoid preemption.' . . . Merely alleging
that Defendant generally failed to comply with federal requirements is
insufficient to overcome the preemptive reach [of federal law] without some
factual detail as to why Defendant violated federal regulations." (quoting In re
Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (D. Minn.
2009))); Anthony v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:09-cv-2343, 2010 WL 1387790, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010) ("Although Anthony did allege Stryker's deviation
from 'manufacturing performance standards' in the complaint, Anthony did not
specifically mention either the FDA or its regulations" nor did plaintiff "plead
any facts that would lead this court to plausibly infer that Stryker's
noncompliance with FDA regulations led to his injury."); Covert v. Stryker
Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *15 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009)
("[The plaintiff] has not alleged any particular non-conclusory link between that
alleged wrongdoing and his particular injuries, let alone a causal one, as he
would ultimately be required to do before he is entitled to recover anything from
[defendant]. Thus, at this point, the Court is left with nothing more than a mere
'suspicion' that Plaintiff may have a legally cognizable claim, which . . . is
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss."); Prudhel v. Endologix, Inc., Civ.
No. S-09-0661 LKK/KJM, 2009 WL 2045559, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009)
("Although plaintiffs[] generally allege that many violations of federal
requirements occur, to state a parallel claim, a federal violation must be a
predicate to the theory of liability.").
331. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 329 (2008) (construing
preemption language in the Medical Device Amendments to the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
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courts faulted for failing to supply either the context necessary to
suggest an agreement in restraint of trade332 or anything more than
a conclusory allegation of co-conspirator status.33 3
Do these last 22 cases bear the hallmarks of a genuine
information asymmetry? That may depend on whom you ask.
A lawyer hoping to prosecute such a case on a client's behalf
might answer with a resounding "yes," that the information the
courts are now demanding under the mantra of Iqbal
unquestionably necessitates the discovery process to pry it loose
from the sources where it naturally lies hidden. To demand an
Iqbal level of specificity before discovery, that lawyer would
argue, is to relegate plaintiffs to fighting blind, with both hands
bound, in an unfamiliar dark room. And it will be the clients who
suffer, as tall procedural hurdles allow the wealthy, insidious
334
wrongdoers to scamper away.
The lawyer asked to defend against such a case might answer
with an equally resounding "no," that these are not meritorious
cases where the key evidence is being squirreled away, but rather
332. RxUSA Wholesale Inc. v. Alcon Labs., No. 09-4406-CV, 2010 WL
3393737, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2010) (finding pleading to be "entirely
conclusory" and failing to "place its allegations of parallel conduct in a context
that suggests a prior agreement").
333. In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 09-2081, 2010 WL
3364218, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2010). Interestingly, the antitrust pleading in
Blood Reagents was sufficient to repel dismissal motions filed by two of the
three alleged co-conspirators, even when measured expressly against the
lausibility" standard. See id. at *8 ("Twombly increased the burden antitrust
plaintiffs must bear in order to satisfy Rule 8(a). However, it does not require
'heightened fact pleading of specifics' and expressly disclaimed an approach
focusing on the probability that a complaint's allegations will ultimately be
vindicated. Whether plaintiffs are able to actually prove their allegations or not,
the Complaint's charge of a conspiracy between Immucor and Ortho-Clinical is
set within a context that renders it plausible." (citation omitted)). The co-
conspiracy claim against the third defendant, Johnson & Johnson Health Care
Systems, failed because the sole allegation against it was a single paragraph
describing its business services; no allegations of its role in the conspiracy were
offered. Id.
334. This view of Iqbal is vindicated by forgiving interpretations and
applications of Iqbal's tenets. See, e.g., Waguespack v. Plivia USA, Inc., Civ.
No. 10-692, 2010 WL 2086882, at *3 (E.D. La. May 24, 2010). In Waguespack,
the defendant objected to a products liability claim as implausible because it had
failed to allege when and why the plaintiff was prescribed the challenged drug,
the dosage used, the length of use, the identity of the manufacturer, and the
details of the claimed deviation from manufacturer standards. Id at *2. The
court was wholly unimpressed-details aside, the defendants had received all
they were entitled to receive, just "notice." The pleading adequately informed
them "that defendants manufactured a drug which plaintiff took that caused him
harm because there was something wrong with the drug about which doctors and
patients were not warned." Id. at *3.
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are rank litigation "guesses" in search of basic confirmation during
an increasingly expensive discovery process. That lawyer would
argue that in cases such as these, the claimants have no real idea
whether their claims have any merit or not, and the proposed
litigation process is just a journey where the plaintiffs, the
defendants, and the courts adventure along together on a quest to
see whether any facts exist to support empty hunches. To this
view, a non-Iqbal litigation paradigm is an only modestly more
expensive Powerball ticket-simply buying a chance for a possible
payday.335
Partisans' advocacy aside, this Article's examination of the
"possible-difference,". "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference"
cases reveals that the instances of arguable "information
asymmetry" are infrequent; they appeared in only 8.3% of the
cases in the cohort. Moreover, at least in the context of the
pharmaceutical and medical device cohort, the phrase "information
asymmetry" proved to be a bit of an incomplete gloss itself. In the
22 cases discussed above, probable sources of important factual
information certainly included the litigants' adversaries and non-
parties. It may even be true that adversaries and non-parties
represented the primary sources of the core evidentiary material.
But it must also be true that other sources of that same information
(or suggestive of that same information) existed to have justified
the decision to file in the first place. 33 So, properly understood
within this cohort, Iqbal does not present a true "information
asymmetry" predicament (even in the worst of situations) as much
335. This view of Iqbal is vindicated by a stem interpretation and exacting
application of Iqbal's tenets. See, e.g., Timmons v. Linvatec Corp., 263 F.R.D.
582, 585 (C.D. Cal. 2010). In Timmons, one of the anesthetic cases discussed
supra in notes 288-93 and accompanying text, the pleaders entreated the court
for post-filing discovery, so as to enable them to determine which of the many
defendants they had sued was actually the one responsible for their claimed
injury. The court was wholly unimpressed:
[A] plaintiff who fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 is
not entitled to conduct discovery with the hope that it might then permit
her to state a claim. Further, allowing plaintiffs to file first and
investigate later, as Plaintiffs here have done, would be contrary to
Rule 11(b), which mandates an "inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances" into the evidentiary support for all factual contentions
prior to filing a pleading.
Id. (citations to Iqbal and Twombly omitted).
336. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(b)(3) ("By presenting to the court a pleading ...
an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances . . . the factual circumstances have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery. . . .").
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as an enhanced obligation on pleaders to explain more lucidly and
convincingly what caused them to believe that their pleadings
comported with Rule 11 at the time they were filed. In any
event, the polarity of this concept is not as reliable as one might
think. Contrary to popular belief, incanting "information
asymmetry" is not a privilege reserved just to plaintiffs;
defendants, too, have invoked the notion (albeit in an opposing
formulation) to incite a dismissal where the pleaders clearly
possessed access to essential details but omitted including them in
their claims.338
337. This construction of Iqbal also finds support in the pharmaceutical and
medical device case law. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 693 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Ferring B.V. v.
Meijer, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3505 (2010) ("[T]he plaintiffs' pleadings could plausibly
lead to additional findings that would satisfy [the implicated legal standard],
which is all that is required at this stage of the litigation."); Mohr v. Targeted
Genetics, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 711, 721 n.6 (C.D. Ill. 2010) ("Citing Iqbal,
Abbott suggests that Plaintiff has not asserted enough facts to be entitled to
discovery. . . . However, a plaintiff cannot be expected to allege facts of
which-through no fault of its own-it is not yet aware. Moreover, the Court
must still draw all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs favor. Based on the
number of deaths . . . , it may be reasonable to infer that stronger warnings
should have been incorporated into Humira's label before the FDA ordered such
warnings in September 2008." (citation omitted)); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust
Litig., 260 F.R.D. 143, 167 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("[T]he Court recognizes that the
amended complaint is short on specifics .... However, the Court finds that the
amended complaint contains facts that raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence" to support the allegations.); cf Schultz v.
TomoTherapy Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786 (W.D. Wis. 2009) ("Regardless
whether plaintiffs might be able to unearth additional [supporting facts] if they
were able to perform discovery, nothing about the allegations in the complaint
suggests that additional discovery could be expected to lead to those results.").
In fact, this seems to have been one of the animating messages of the whole
"plausibility" concept. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007) ("Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach
the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably founded hope that
the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support [the pleaded
claim]." (first alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 347 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
338. See Kester v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00523, 2010 WL
2696467, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2010) (dismissing negligence claims, noting
that "Plaintiff is the only party who has access to the various medical and
insurance records that would allow her to properly identify what drug was
administered"); In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., No. C 08-02376 MHP, 2009 WL
3740648, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009) ("The facts needed to adequately state
claims under these statutory and common law provisions have always been
within plaintiffs' and their treating physicians' knowledge. The court provided
plaintiffs with an opportunity to gather and allege the requisite facts. Their
failure to do so justifies dismissing the claims with prejudice.").
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5. The "Difference" Cases-Was There an Iqbal Difference?
This Article now comes, at last, to its central question. Had
Iqbal never been decided, would the outcomes in these "possible-
difference," "yes-difference," and "mixed-difference" cases have
been substantively different under the prevailing local, pre-Iqbal
circuit-level approaches to assessing dispositive pleading motions?
The question is at once pivotal to gauging the importance of Iqbal
to this cohort of cases, yet also largely unanswerable. Be that as it
may, there is no doubt that the uncertainty points in both
directions.
The real answer may lie back with the lower federal judiciary's
longstanding migration away from one implied Conley principle
and its oft-recounted embrace of that principle's antithesis-that a
pleader's bald announcement of elements can survive dismissal.33 9
Indeed, throughout this pharmaceutical and medical device cohort
of cases has appeared the recurring, frequently dispositive criticism
of the conclusory nature of the rejected pleadings.340 Setting aside
for a moment the puzzling notion of claim "plausibility," the
vulnerability of federal cases pleaded in conclusory fashion had,
long before Iqbal, been recognized by every circuit in the federal
judiciary. 341 This settled practice of discounting legally conclusory
339. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., RxUSA Wholesale Inc. v. Alcon Labs., No. 09-4406-CV,
2010 WL 3393737, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2010) ("entirely conclusory");
Redinger v. Stryker Corp., No. 5:10 CV 104, 2010 WL 1995829, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio May 19, 2010) ("completely bereft of any factual allegation"); Bayer
Schera Pharma AG v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 08 Civ. 03710 (PGG), 08 Civ. 08112
(PGG), 2010 WL 1222012, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) ("'a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action' will not survive a motion to
dismiss" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Money v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb
Co., No. 3:07-cv-1 10 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216987, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009)
("amount to nothing more than conclusory allegations"); Gonzalez v. Bristol-
Meyers Squibb Co., No. 3:07-cv-00902 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216984, at *8
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) ("not enough ... to set forth a formulaic recitation of the
element without any factual support"); Smith v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No.
3:06-cv-6053 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216982, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009)
("[plantiffl failed to plead anything other than bald conclusory allegations").
341. See, e.g., Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 421
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The fact that notice pleading governs at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage does not save the plaintiffs' conclusory allegation. . . . Even
within the generous confines of notice pleading, courts must continue to 'eschew
... reliance on bald assertions [and] unsupportable conclusions."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1987)));
Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 2006)
("[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to [defeat] a motion to dismiss." (second alteration
in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Evancho v. Fisher,
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allegations also does not seem like some naked, intemperate
(though nationally uniform) remolding of the federal pleading
paradigm; to the contrary, lofty support for such an approach both
pre-dates and post-dates the Conley decision. 34 2 Indeed, perhaps
even Judge Clark himself can be counted among the supporters.3
423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[A] court need not credit either 'bald
assertions' or 'legal conclusions' in a complaint when deciding a motion to
dismiss."); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002) ("The
pleader may not evade [Rule 12(b)(6)] requirements by merely alleging a bare
legal conclusion . . . ." (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006)
("[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th
Cir. 2005) ("[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss."); Cnty. of
McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the W., 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the court "'will not invent legal arguments for litigants,' and is 'not obliged to
accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions of fact' (citations
omitted)); Ashley v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 408 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2005)
("[W]e need not accept as true their legal conclusions even if they are 'cast in
the form of factual allegations . . . ."' (citations omitted)); Sprewell v. Golden
State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th
Cir. 2004) ("Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are
merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences."); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006) ("A motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 'admits all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as distinguished from conclusory allegations."' (citation omitted));
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) ("To
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal
conclusions; they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those
conclusions or face dismissal of their claims."); Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d
235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[W]e accept neither 'inferences drawn by plaintiffs
if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint,' nor
'legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations."' (citation omitted));
Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Allegations of
legal conclusions are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.").
342. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) ("Although for
the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in
the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation."); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. Schauffler, 303 U.S. 54, 57 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) ("The company insists that,
since the case was heard on motion to dismiss the bill which alleges that the
company is not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and its relations to its
employees do not affect such commerce, these allegations must be accepted as
true. The motion admits as facts allegations describing the manner in which the
business is carried on, but not legal conclusions from those facts. The allegations
that interstate or foreign commerce is not involved are conclusions of law.").
Indeed, in October 1955, the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure
wrote to the Supreme Court to explain its decision not to amend Rule 8(a) so as
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If the mortal error in most of the "possible-difference," "yes-
difference," and "mixed-difference" cases was a conclusorily
pleaded claim, one must confront the possibility (if not the
probability) that existing, pre-Iqbal federal precedent could have
fairly guided these same courts to reach the very same results. 3 " If
there were any doubts about the reasonableness of such a
suggestion, the actual language of many of the pharmaceutical and
medical device cases dispels it. In case after case within this
cohort, the deciding judges recounted the "conclusions-do-not-
to more plainly verify that federal pleaders are obligated to include factual detail
in their federal pleadings; the Committee refused because the Rule as written,
they believed, already enjoyed that clarity. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR
CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1955), reprinted in 12A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 654-55
(4th ed. 2010) ("That Rule 8(a) envisages the statement of circumstances,
occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented is clearly indicated,"
and "as it stands, the rule . . . requires the pleader to disclose adequate
information as the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare
averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it."). It is equally true that the
boundary between factual allegations and legal conclusions is not, in all cases,
well marked out or easily deciphered. See Miller, supra note 59, at 24 ("The
fact-legal conclusion dichotomy presented by Twombly's first step is shadowy
at best. Worse, the categories are likely to generate motion practice unrelated to
the merits.").
343. See CLARK, supra note 9, at 157 ("No rule of thumb is possible, but in
general it may be said that the pleader should not content himself with alleging
merely the final and ultimate conclusion which the court is to make in deciding
the case for him. He should go at least one step further back and allege the
circumstances from which this conclusion directly followed."); see also WHITE
PAPER, supra note 141, at 6. It has been reported that Judge Clark "did not
believe in a total abandonment of the requirement of allegations of specific fact
in pleadings." Id. (quoting RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH 133 (4th ed. 2005)). In fact, he "insisted that there were
limits to the generality of pleading allowed under the Federal Rules. A bare
allegation that the defendant had injured the plaintiff through negligence, he
said, would not suffice." WHITE PAPER, supra note 141, at 6 (quoting Michael E.
Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 917-18 (1976)). Interestingly, the 1955 Civil Rules Advisory
Committee seemed entirely unimpressed by those critics who were then
characterizing Judge Clark's opinion in Dioguardi as a validation of fact-free
pleading in federal courts. That decision, schooled the Committee, "was not
based on any holding that a pleader is not required to supply information
disclosing a ground for relief. The complaint in that case stated a plethora of
facts and the court so construed them as to sustain the validity of the pleading."
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 342, at 655.
344. See generally Kuperman Memo, supra note 156, at 2 (noting that "some
of the post-Iqbal cases dismissing complaints note that those complaints would
have been deficient even before Twombly and Iqbal").
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count" principle, and did so, time after time, by quoting or citing
pre-Iqbal and pre-Twombly case precedent from within their own
circuits.345
345. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P.,
579 F.3d 13, 28 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 1987 precedent (and Iqbal) for the
proposition that "we are under no obligation to credit [the pleader's] conclusory
allegations, which simply parrot the elements of the statute"); Bass v. Stryker
Corp., No. 4:09-CV-632-Y, 2010 WL 3431637, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010)
(citing 1992 and 1982 precedent for the proposition that plaintiffs must "plead
specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal" and "[t]he
court must accept as true all well-pleaded, non-conclusory allegations"); Ferring
Pharm., Inc. v. River's Edge Pharm., LLC, Civ. No. AW-09-02601, 2010 WL
3087419, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2010) (citing Papasan, and precedent from 1999
and 1979, for the proposition that courts "need not . .. accept unsupported legal
allegations, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, or conclusory
factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events" (citations omitted));
In re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig., Civ. Nos. 07-MD-1836 (JMR/FLN), 10-485
(JMR/FLN), 10-486 (JMR/FLN), 2010 WL 3385251, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 4,
2010) (citing 1998 precedent for the proposition that "[t]o avoid dismissal, a
complaint must allege facts sufficient to state a claim as a matter of law and may
not merely state legal conclusions"); Redden v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., Civ. No.
3:09-CV-1380-L, 2010 WL 2944598, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) (citing
2005 precedent for the proposition that "a court is not to strain to find inferences
favorable to the plaintiff and is not to accept conclusory allegations,
unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions"); Zafarana v. Pfizer Inc., Civ. No.
09-cv-4026, 2010 WL 2854170, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (citing Papasan
as precedent for the proposition that courts are "not required to blindly accept 'a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"'); Pittsburgh Standard Spine
Co. v. Lanx, Inc., No. 09-cv-01062-RED-MJM, 2010 WL 2604985, at *1 (D.
Colo. June 28, 2010) (citing 1993 and 2002 precedent for the proposition that
"conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss"); In re Mirapex
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-MD-1836 (JMR/FLN), Civ. No. 09-807 (JMR/FLN),
2010 WL 2520567, at *1 (D. Minn. May 28, 2010) (citing 1998 precedent for
the proposition that "a complaint must allege facts sufficient to state a claim as a
matter of law and may not merely state legal conclusions"); In re Budeprion XL
Mktg. & Sales Litig., MDL No. 2107, No. 09-md-2107, 2010 WL 2135625, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2010) (citing 1997 precedent (and Iqbal) for the
proposition that courts need not "credit 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions'
when deciding a motion to dismiss"); Crisp v. Stryker Corp., No. 5:09-cv-
02212, 2010 WL 2076796, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 21, 2010) (citing 2006
precedent for the proposition that "more than the bare assertion of legal
conclusions" is required, and instead "the complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery
under some viable legal theory"); Pettit v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No.
2:09-cv-00602, 2010 WL 1463479, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010) (citing 1993
precedent for the proposition that "[a]lthough liberal, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard
requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions to survive a motion to
dismiss"); Taylor v. Squibb Pharm., Civ. No. 09-4196 (FLW), 2010 WL
1133447, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2010) (citing 1997 precedent for the proposition
that courts need not "credit a pro se plaintiffs 'bald assertions' or 'legal
conclusions'); Gallien v. Proctor & Gamble Pharm., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6903
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So, in the end, Iqbal does seem to have made a difference in
about 21% of the cases studied in this pharmaceutical and medical
device cohort because the deciding courts wrote or implied that it
did. Left unaddressed by those deciding courts was the companion
question of whether the outcome would have been any different
had then-prevailing circuit precedent, rather than Iqbal, been
applied to test the pleading. For this cohort of studied cases, the
(JFK), 2010 WL 768937, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010) (citing the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Papasan for the proposition that courts need not
"accept as true conclusory allegations or 'a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.'); Wyeth v. Sun Pharm. Indus., No. 09-11726, 2010 WL 746394, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2010) (citing 1999 precedent for the proposition that
although "this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more than the bare
assertion of legal conclusions"); Mitchell v. Proctor & Gamble, No. 2:09-CV-
426, 2010 WL 728222, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2010) (citing 1993 precedent
for the proposition that "[a]lthough liberal, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires
more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions to survive a motion to
dismiss"); Krywokulski v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-980-T-30MAP, 2010 WL
326166, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2010) (citing 2003 precedent for the
proposition that "'conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or
legal conclusions masquerading as facts' will subject a complaint to dismissal");
Redden v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1380-L, 2010 WL 184428, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2010) (citing 2005 precedent for the proposition that "a court
is not to strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff and is not to accept
conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions");
Williams v. Bausch & Lomb Co., No. 2:08-cv-910, 2009 WL 2983080, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2009) (citing both 1971 precedent and Twombly for the
proposition that "[a]lthough the court must apply a liberal construction of the
complaint in favor of the party opposing the motion to dismiss, a court will not
accept conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences of fact cast in the form of
factual allegations"); Somerville v. Stryker Orthopaedics, No. C 08-02443 JSW,
2009 WL 2901591, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) (citing 1988 precedent for
the proposition that "[c]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to
defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted"); William Beaumont Hosp. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-CV-l 1941, 2009
WL 2849546, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing 1996 precedent (and
Iqbal) for the proposition that the dismissal standard of review, "[t]hough
decidedly generous, . . . does require more than the bare assertion of legal
conclusions"); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1479, Master File No.
02-1390, Civ. Nos. 02-1830 (FSH), 02-2731 (FSH), 02-5583 (FSH), 2009 WL
2751029, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009) (citing 1989 and 1997 precedent (and
Twombly) for the proposition that "a court does not need to credit a complaint's
'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions'); Prudhel v. Endologix, Inc., No. Civ.
S-09-0661 LKKIKJM, 2009 WL 2045559, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (citing
1981 precedent for the proposition that "the court does not accept as true
unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of
factual allegations"); In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 96, 107 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing 1984 and 1991 precedent
for the proposition that "conclusory allegations are not sufficient").
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lower federal judiciary's universal adoption of the "conclusions-
do-not-count" principle suggests that the answer to that
unaddressed question is "no."
6. A Sampling of Iqbal 's Use in Pharmaceutical and Medical
Device Cases
No opinion-level study of the Iqbal effect would be complete
without examining how the courts are using Iqbal in
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation. Comprehensively
cataloguing all of Iqbal's uses within this cohort of cases would
tax even the most intrigued reader's patience. But a sampling of
some of those applications is revealing and illustrates just how
creatively Iqbal is being invoked. The short synopses that follow
discuss a few of the more noteworthy uses of the Iqbal standard in
this case cohort.
a. Products Liability-Alternatively Pleading Causation
As discussed earlier, the Iqbal decision was cited as authority
for dismissing strict liability and wrongful death claims against the
manufacturer of a prescription drug administered to a clinical trial
patient. 346 In the original Mohr v. Targeted Genetics, Inc.
opinion,347 the court surveyed "the proverbial 'laundry list' of
elements of a product-liability case" alleged against the defendant,
and ruled that "they do not meet the Iqbal standard."3 48 The
plaintiff had alleged harm caused by the defendant's drug, or by
the experimental gene therapy drug that was the subject of the
clinical trial, or by a combination of the two.349 Such a pleading
failed the Iqbal inquiry, ruled the court, because it "alleged no
specific facts which establish tortious conduct" by the
defendant. 350
346. See supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
347. No. 09-3170, 2009 WL 4021153 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2009). As explained
earlier, the pleader survived an Iqbal dismissal motion on repleading. See Mohr
v. Targeted Genetics, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 711, 721 n.6 (C.D. Ill. 2010).
348. Mohr, 2009 WL 4021153, at *3.
349. Id.
350. Id. As a matter of proof the court surely was correct. See DAVID G.
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 766 (2d ed. 2008) ("In every products
liability case, the plaintiff must establish the central element of causation-that
the plaintiff's harm resulted, at least in part, from some defect in a product that
the defendant manufactured or sold."). The operative question in Mohr was
whether that proof must be previewed definitively in the pleadings in an
alternatively liable, multiple defendant setting.
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This Mohr opinion raises the intriguing question of how far, if
at all, the Supreme Court might envision the incursion of its
"plausibility" equipoise concept into the alternative pleading
principle. A key failing the Court detected in both the Twombly
and Iqbal pleadings seems to be their inability to discount the
possibility of a non-liability-producing explanation for their
potentially-liability-producing accusations. 35 1 Read narrowly, the
same failing will necessarily appear in many alternatively pleaded
causation allegations like Mohr-either the drug manufacturer is
cuigable or, if not, then the experimental gene therapy producer
is. 2 The very existence of each alternatively pleaded factual
scenario competes against, and thereby presumably undermines,
the "plausibility" of the other by creating an equipoise between
liability and non-liability for each of the alternatively-pleaded
causation sources. The Mohr court's reasoning implies that, in
such a situation, the Iqbal "plausibility" standard could be assigned
a role in testing the alternative pleadings and, so assigned, would
likely be expected to defeat the pleading. 353 That result, an
351. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009) ("As between
th[e] 'obvious alternative explanation' for the arrests [of Muslims, namely the
expected 'disparate, incidental impact' on that ethnic group during the post-9/1 1
investigation] . . . and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks
us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion."); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007) ("[A] natural explanation for the
noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sponsored monopolists
were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.").
352. The principle of alternative pleading has long been recognized in federal
pleading practice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) ("A party may set out 2 or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively .... If a party makes alternative
statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.").
353. The Mohr court is not alone. See Kester v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No.
2:10-cv-00523, 2010 WL 2696467, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2010) (rejecting
pleader's contention, in an unknown-anesthetic-supplier case, that "Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d) permits her to plead in the alternative, as she is unable to identify the
exact [anesthetic] manufacturer"). But nor has the Mohr analysis been embraced
everywhere. The District of Rhode Island, for example, ruled that "plausibility"
does not undermine a pleader's entitlement under Rule 8(d) to assert alternative
or hypothetical claims, and the familiar product liability litigation practice of
joining all potentially liable defendants survives Iqbal. Koch v. I-Flow Corp.,
No. 09-441 S, 2010 WL 2265670, at *3-4 (D.R.I. June 7, 2010) (noting that the
need for alternative pleadings "typically arises when the substance of plaintiff's
claim indicates that plaintiff is entitled to relief from someone, but the plaintiff
does not know which of two or more defendants is liable," that "Twombly and
Iqbal do not mark a radical change in federal pleadings standards," and that
although the pleader "will ultimately be required to identify" the culpable
manufacturer, "at this stage of the litigation . . . [the plaintiff] has made out
facially plausible claims against each Defendant, alternatively" (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL Nos. 4:03-CV-01507-WRW, 4:10-CV-00409-WRW, 2010 WL 2884887,
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extension of the "plausibility" standard, may cause very little
disruption in existing alternative-pleading Eractice when the
pleader is privy to the underlying facts, but a far more
meaningful adjustment when the underlying facts are honestly
unknown (and alternative pleading would have been otherwise
proper).355
b. Products Liability-Alternatively Pleading Product
Identification
The "unknown-anesthetic-supplier" cases discussed earlier are
emblematic of Iqbal's use by some courts in dismissing
pharmaceutical products liability complaints for failure to allege a
factually plausible product identification against the named
defendants. 35 For example, in Dittman v. DJO, LLC, 357 the court
tested a complaint alleging injury from negligent warning and
at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 20, 2010) (finding alternative claim properly pleaded,
commenting that "the real question is not whether Plaintiffs presented
inconsistent theories, it is whether the allegations presented are adequately
pleaded").
354. See In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 407
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[The alternative pleading rule does not] grant[] plaintiffs
license to plead inconsistent assertions offacts within the allegations that serve
as the factual predicates for an independent, unitary claim. Internally conflicting
factual assertions that constitute integral components of a claim must be
distinguished from a permissible alternative statement embodying a theory of a
whole sufficient claim. . . . [The Rule] could not coherently contemplate that
plaintiffs pressing a claim of fraud would be allowed to make a factual assertion
in one paragraph of the complaint declaring that they were not aware of some
material information, and in another part of the same claim concede that they
relied detrimentally upon that same factual representation as the basis for
recovery. Under these circumstances, such conflicting allegations would be
deemed admissions that undermine plaintiffs' statement of the elements of a
sufficient claim." (citations omitted)).
355. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1285, at 741 ("A party ...
should not set forth inconsistent, or alternative, or hypothetical statements in the
pleadings unless, after a reasonable inquiry, the pleader legitimately is in doubt
about the factual background or legal theories supporting the claims or defenses
or is otherwise justified in pleading in this fashion and the pleader can represent
that he is not doing so for an improper purpose. However, the obligations
imposed by Rule 11 should not be construed to force a party to choose any
single factual or legal theory in the pleadings to the exclusion of all others when
that party is honestly uncertain as to what might be produced in the discovery
process and what the evidence will show." (footnotes omitted)).
356. See also supra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.




testing (among other claims) of an anesthetic-loaded, implanted
pain pump. Although the plaintiff had named two anesthetic
manufacturers, the complaint did "not identify which specific
medication was allegedly used during his procedure or directly
allege that any of these defendants were the actual manufacturer of
the drug that caused his injury." 358 Quoting Iqbal, the court
described the plausibility standard as "ask[ing] for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."359
Pleading facts that are "merely consistent with" liability fail this
test.360 Because the plausibility threshold had not been crossed,
reasoned the court, the pleading must be dismissed:
Plaintiff has no facts, only speculation, on which to base his
claim that defendants' products caused or contributed to his
injury. This mere possibility, i.e., that the medicine used
could have been made by these defendants, rather than by
any number of other manufacturers of anesthesia drugs, is
not adequate to state a claim under the prevailing standards
as set forth by Twombly and Iqbal.361
This sort of Iqbal application, however, is not universally received;
other courts that have considered it have rejected it.362
Like alternatively pleaded causation, the injection of Iqbal to
justify the pre-discovery dismissal of a products liability lawsuit on
alternatively-pleaded product identification grounds may signal,
for several jurisdictions a substantial departure from prior
dismissal motion practice.
358. Id. at *1.
359. Id. at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
360. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
361. Id. at *3. As noted above, other courts have reached the same results.
See supra notes 287-92, 327 and accompanying text. Again, as a matter of
proof the court's conclusion is beyond reproach. See OWEN, supra note 350, at
768 ("[I]f a plaintiff cannot prove that the accident product was more likely
produced or sold by the defendant, a jury will not be permitted to speculate on
this crucial issue of identification, and the plaintiff's case will usually fail.").
362. See, e.g., In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL Nos. 4:03-CV-01507-
WRW, 4:10-CV-00409-WRW, 2010 WL 2884887, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 20,
2010) ("[T]he real question is not whether Plaintiffs presented inconsistent
theories, it is whether the allegations presented are adequately pleaded.").
363. See, e.g., Garcia v. Pfizer, Inc., 268 Fed. App'x 270, 271 (5th Cir. 2008)
(describing process of post-complaint product identification discovery, leading
to amended complaint and, later, to post-discovery summary judgment
challenge); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 844 (2d
Cir. 1992) (noting dismissal, at trial, of defendant for lack of product
identification); Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (10th Cir.
1988) (noting that product identification defense was resolved at trial by jury).
But see In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217,
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c. Products Liability-Selecting a "Defect" Theory
The Iqbal decision was cited as authority in testing whether a
plaintiff is now obligated to choose among, and then plead, a
specific theory of defect in a product liability lawsuit. In
r 364Krywokulski v. Ethicon, Inc., a surgical patient sued the
manufacturer of a surgical mesh hernia patch for strict liability and
negligence when the product failed. The defendants claimed that
Iqbal (and Twombly) "placed a higher pleading burden upon
plaintiffs to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) . . . dismissal., 3 6 5 More
precisely, the defendants argued that Iqbal changed Florida state
law that, formerly, had not required a strict liability pleader to
choose the theory of defect (e.g., manufacturing defect, design
defect, or warning defect) or to articulate the facts supporting the
claimed defect. 36 Although citing liberally from both Iqbal and
Twombly, the court rejected the defendants' position. Florida's
pleading law had not been altered by Iqbal; pleaders in the state
still were not obligated to elect their strict liability defect theory at
the pleading stage, and an enhanced pleading obligation to settle
on a precise defect theory in drug and device cases did not exist.367
Nevertheless, the court did rule that in pleading a negligence claim,
a mere incantation that defendants had, and breached, some
unspecified duty of care did not suffice; additional factual
definition of that claim was required.368
The Krywokulski decision illustrates how litigants are pressing
Iqbal as a source for greater product defect particularization at the
pleading stage, and meeting limited, but some, success in doing so.
Ultimately, the court in Krywokulski was able to harmonize Iqbal
with existing pleading practice. 369 How other courts will respond to
1225 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing dismissal process for multidistrict litigation
claimants unable to plead specific product identification).
364. No. 8:09-CV-980-T-30MAP, 2010 WL 326166 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21,
2010).
365. Id. at *2.
366. Id. at *2-3.
367. Id. at *3.
368. Id. at *3-4. Even here, however, the court based its dismissal of the
negligence count on preexisting state substantive law that had long pre-dated
Iqbal. Id. at *4 (quoting Jennings v. BIC Corp., 181 F.3d 1250, 1256-57 (11th
Cir. 1999)).
369. The court in Krywokulski is not alone in this regard. In a multidistrict
litigation pretrial resolution of an attack on a Master Consolidated Complaint in
a cardiac drug products liability litigation, the court in In re Digitek Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2:08-md-O 1968, 2009 WL 2433468 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 3, 2009),
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similar pleading invitations will clarify whether Iqbal represents a
true change in defect-particularization standards.
d. Products Liability-Conclusory Pleading of "Defect"
The Iqbal decision was cited as authority for dismissing
products liability claims that alleged the nature of a product's
defect but did so only in an element-recounting, factually
conclusory fashion. In Frey v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,
a patient sued the manufacturer of an anticonvulsant medication
for manufacturing, design, and warning defects that caused her
injury. Her manufacturing defect claim pleaded that the company
had "failed to design, manufacture, test, and control the quality of
[the drug] such that when it left the control of the Defendant, it
deviated in a material way from the design specifications, formula
or performance standards of the manufacturer, or from otherwise
identical units manufactured to the same design specifications,
formula or performance standards."37' Similarly, her design claim
contended that "the risks created by [the drug] exceeded its
benefits and that a practical and technically feasible alternative
design was available which would have prevented the harm alleged
without substantiall impairing the product's usefulness or
intended purpose."37 Finally, her warning claim alleged an
inadequate warning or instruction at the time of marketing
and post-marketing because defendants knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about a risk
associated with the product that caused the harm alleged,
and defendants failed to provide the warning or instruction
that a manufacturer exercising reasonable care would have
provided concerning that risk.
likewise found that allegations of failure to warn, manufacturing and design
defect, and negligence per se survived an Iqbal inquiry.
370. 642 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
371. Id. at 790. This language tracked, effectively verbatim, the language of
the applicable statutory law, the Ohio Product Liability Act. See id. at 792-93
(quoting statutorily approved manufacturing defect elements, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.74 (West 2004)).
372. Id. at 790 (paraphrasing pleaded allegations); see also id. at 793
(quoting statutorily approved design defect elements, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.75 (West Supp. 2008)).
373. Id. at 790 (paraphrasing pleaded allegations); see also id at 793




The company moved to dismiss only the manufacturing and desigp
counts and did not challenge the adequacy of the warning count.
In very brief discussions, the court granted the dismissals.
Plaintiffs' allegations, wrote the court, "fail[ed] to state a plausible
claim for relief' and "fall far short of the sufficiency standard set
forth in Twombly" because they do "nothing more than provide a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim under the
statute."375
That this sort of element-only pleading would have survived
under the pre-"plausibility" pleading regime might be doubtful, but
it is also uncontestable that Iqbal has added to the arsenal
defendants are using-sometimes successfully-to explain why
such conclusory allegations are insufficient and must be
376dismissed.
e. Products Liability-Escaping Federal Preemption
Also as discussed earlier, the Iqbal decision has been cited in
cases as authority for dismissing medical device complaints that
failed to supply the factual allegations to support a "parallel" claim
that might escape federal Medical Device Amendment
preemption. 37 7 For example, in Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc.,378 the
plaintiff claimed an injury from an implanted medical pump, and
alleged that the defendant failed to manufacture the product in
compliance with federally prescribed Current Good Manufacturing
Practices. However, because the plaintiffs pleading did "nothing
more than recite unsupported violations of general regulations, and
fail[ed] to tie such allegations to the injuries alleged, the complaint
[wa]s properly dismissed."379 Other courts have applied Iqbal to
374. Id. at 791. This strategy is curious, and given the summary dismissal
and associated reasoning from the court, the defendant might, in retrospect, have
sought to prevail on all three theories.
375. Id. at 795.
376. The Frey court is not alone. See Burks v. Abbott Labs., Civ. No. 08-
3414 (JRT/JSM), 2010 WL 1576779, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 20, 2010) (faulting
pleader for, among other things, not alleging "any facts describing or identifying
defendants' manufacturing specifications or standards" and, therefore, pleader
failed "to allege facts describing how defendants' products deviated from such
specifications or standards").
377. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
378. 677 F. Supp. 2d 582 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009).
379. Id. at 588. The Court quoted Twombly for the proposition that federal
pleading requirements "require dismissal of complaints that do nothing more
than engage in a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."' Id.
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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380find preemption under similar reasoning. In doing so, one court
expressly questioned whether the practice of pleading "upon
information and belief" survived in the wake of the "plausibility"
standard, at least in the preemption context.38 1
Whether Iqbal has wrought a meaningful change in this
category of medical device litigation hinges at least on the nature
of the dismissal challenge. A claim that is facially preempted under
existing federal authorities would seem to implicate the
paradigmatic Conley situation: "beyond doubt," such a plaintiff
380. See, e.g., Bass v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:09-CV-632-Y, 2010 WL
3431637, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010) ("Plaintiff has not specifically alleged
how Defendants have failed to meet [federal device-approval] specifications or
that such a failure has even occurred."); Franklin v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-cv-
02301-REB-KMT, 2010 WL 2543579, at *8 (D. Colo. May 12, 2010) ("[The
pleader] 'cannot simply incant the magic words "Medtronic violated FDA
regulations" in order to avoid preemption.' . . . Merely alleging that Defendant
generally failed to comply with federal requirements is insufficient to overcome
the preemptive reach of [federal law] without some factual detail as to why
Defendant violated federal regulations." (citation omitted)); Anthony v. Stryker
Corp., No. 1:09-cv-2343, 2010 WL 1387790, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010)
(observing that pleader "did not specifically mention either the FDA or its
regulations" nor "plead any facts that would lead this court to plausibly infer
that Stryker's noncompliance with FDA regulations led to his injury"); Funk v.
Stryker Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that pleader
"provides no facts in support of his conclusory allegations, instead relying on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-a doctrine that would seem to be soundly
refuted by Riegel' and, therefore, granting motion); Covert v. Stryker Corp., No.
1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *15 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (ruling that
because pleader "has not alleged any particular non-conclusory link between
th[e] alleged wrongdoing and his particular injuries," the court was "left with
nothing more than a mere 'suspicion' that Plaintiff may have a legally
cognizable claim, which . . . is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss");
Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(explaining that "[t]he generalized allegations made in plaintiffs complaint call
for . . . amplification here as the relationship between defendants' federal
violations and plaintiffs injury seems implausible"); see also Prudhel v.
Endologix, Inc., No. Civ. S-09-0661-LKK/IKJM, 2009 WL 2045559, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. July 9, 2009) (noting that courts are "divided as to what Twombly requires
of a plaintiff seeking to plead a parallel claim," but finding no need to cast its lot
as between the competing views because, under either approach, certain claims
failed and others survived).
381. See Funk, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 525 ("Whether an allegation based solely
on information and belief is sufficient, after Twombly, to survive a motion to
dismiss is unclear."). Although the court in Funk did not resolutely answer this
question, after mulling over language from Twombly and several Circuit-level
opinions, the court tended toward the conclusion that information-and-belief
pleading was at least newly circumscribed under the "plausibility" regime. See
id. ("Accordingly, this court reviews allegations based upon information and
belief under Twombly's 12(b)(6) formulation requiring sufficient fact pleading
to make a claim plausible.").
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would be unable to marshal any "set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."382 A baldly conclusory
listing of federal standards, coupled with an equally conclusory
pronouncement of an unspecified violation (or series of violations),
is where Iqbal's effect is most likely to be asserted, but even there
such a pleading might well have triggered a dismissal under the
lower federal courts' pre-Iqbal practice of rejecting cursory and
unembellished declarations of liability. 383
f Antitrust-Paradigmatic "Plausibility"
In a return to the litigation origins of the plausibility standard
that hearkened back to the Twombly context, the Iqbal decision
was cited in dismissing an antitrust complaint that challenged the
Pfizer-Wyeth merger. In Golden Gate Pharmacy Services, Inc. v.
Pfizer, Inc.,384 the court faulted the pleading for failing to properly
allege the relevant product market, a prerequisite for antitrust
claims: "Plaintiffs fail to allege . . . even as a conclusion, let alone
the requisite facts to support a finding, that all prescription drugs
are 'reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes."'385 The court's conclusion in Golden Gate Pharmacy
that the pleader had failed to allege a requisite element to support
relief under the chosen antitrust theory could well have resulted in
a functionally identical dismissal without the Iqbal inquiry.386 On
another occasion, the Iqbal decision was cited as authority for
dismissing an antitrust case that lacked factual content. In RxUSA
Wholesale, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 387 the court dismissed
a portion of the antitrust claim, as in Golden Gate Pharmacy, for
382. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
383. See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text (discussing migration
by the courts of appeals away from a literal Conley standard well before Iqbal
and Twombly).
384. No. C-09-3854-MMC, 2009 WL 3320272 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009).
385. Id. at *1 ("An allegation that a product market exists must be, as with
any element of a claim, supported by 'sufficient factual matter' . . . ." (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009))).
386. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1216, at 220-27 (years
before Twombly, noting that federal pleading principles require that "the
complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point
necessary to sustain a recovery on any recognizable legal theory, even though
that they may not be the one suggested or intended by the pleader, or the
pleading must contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn
by the district court that evidence on these material points will be available and
introduced at trial").
387. 661 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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failure to satisfy element foundations, 388 but other portions of the
antitrust claim for failing to supply an adequate factual context to
verify plausibility.389 Other similar antirust examples abound.390
Clearly, "plausibility" is retaining a vibrant presence in the
antitrust context where this concept first began.
g. Consumer Fraud-Showing the Elements
The Iqbal decision was cited as authority for dismissing claims
under state law consumer protection, false advertising, and unfair
competition statutes. In Brownfield v. Bayer Corp., 391 the plaintiffs
filed a putative class action against the manufacturer of a
prescription oral contraceptive that, they claimed, had been
misrepresented in consumer advertising. The court dismissed the
state law claims for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiffs had
failed to plead that they actually viewed the challenged advertising,
that they purchased the product in reliance on the advertising, and
that they were injured as a result.392 Because, citing Iqbal, "[o]nly
388. Id. at 227-28 (dismissing Section 2 refusal to deal claims because the
pleader failed to allege that it was a competitor of the defendants or had ever
engaged in business with them).
389. See, e.g., id. at 231 ("The Complaint contains no allegations as to when
the alleged conspiracy began, where it occurred, or what statements the
Manufacturing Defendants made to one another.... Under Twombly, as well as
controlling Second Circuit precedent, such conclusory allegations are
insufficient to state a claim."); id. at 232 ("Because Plaintiffs allegations are not
'placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, [but]
merely [suggests] parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action,'
Plaintiffs allegations of parallel conduct fail to allege a conspiracy claim under
Section 1." (citation to Twombly omitted)). An interesting artifact of the RxUSA
Wholesale decision is the confirmation that an Iqbal failure on federal antitrust
claims may, for that reason, also defeat a state law antitrust claim. See id. at 234
("Because plaintiffs federal antitrust claims have been dismissed, Plaintiffs
claims under the Donnelly Act [New York General Business Law that declares
as illegal all contracts, agreements, arrangements, or combinations whereby a
monopoly is established] are dismissed as well.").
390. See In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 09-2081, 2010 WL
3364218, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2010) (faulting pleader for failing to allege
any allegations of conspiratorial involvement); In re Androgel Antitrust Litig.,
687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376-79 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2010) (faulting pleader for
failing to support unreasonable restraint of trade theory); CIBA Vision Corp. v.
De Spirito, No. 1:09-cv-01343-JOF, 2010 WL 553233, at *5-10 (N.D. Ga. Feb.
10, 2010) (faulting pleader for failing to explain why alleged competitive
behavior was improper); Synergetics USA, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 08-
CIV-3669 (DLC), 2009 WL 1564113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2009) (faulting
pleader for failing to specify defendant's power or dominance in market).
391. No. 2:09-cv-00444-JAM-GGH, 2009 WL 1953035 (E.D. Cal. July 6,
2009).
392. Id. at *4.
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a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss," the court struck the pleading. 393 This decision
tends to square with prior federal practice. Although the pleading
in Brownfield might have survived a literal Conley inquiry
(because the allegations do not affirmatively deny viewing,
reliance, and injury), the failure to allege the baseline requisites for
a claimed cause of action would probably have doomed the state
law claims well before "plausibility" arrived.394
C. The Study Conclusions
So, who has been proven right? Is Iqbal actually making a
difference in pharmaceutical and medical device litigation?
This Article's study undermines the view that Iqbal's effect is
dramatic throughout pharmaceutical and medical device litigation.
Its effect, however characterized, was not felt in nearly 79% of the
cases in this cohort. But this Article's study also does not confirm
that Iqbal's effect was negligible and wholly inconsequential. In
about 21% of the cases examined, the deciding courts either
expressly or impliedly relied on Iqbal to grant a full or partial
dismissal.
Giving meaning to that 21% has proven to be a bit more
elusive, though some conclusions are fairly drawn. The rates of
grants and denials reveal a trend. Plaintiffs confronting dispositive
pleadings attacks in this litigation context are succeeding in
completely resisting those motions at a greater rate today than
federal pleaders generally in the year before Twombly first
announced the "plausibility" test and are losing such motions today
at the lowest rate since Iqbal was decided. The incidence of a with-
prejudice dismissal in an Iqbal-affected disposition is small, only
5.3% of the 264 cases studied. Most often, dismissed pleaders are
invited to replead (or at least are not expressly precluded from
seeking to replead). In a comparably small percentage of the cases
(8.3%), a potential "information asymmetry" was identified in an
Iqbal-affected disposition, but those pleaders' deficiencies were
often not so much a lack of information as a lack of explanation of
the pre-filing investigative efforts that unearthed the right to sue in
the first place. Those dismissals might well have been identical had
the deciding court used Rule 11 (b)(3), rather than "plausibility," to
explain the results.
In the end, confounding this analysis is the prevailing, pre-
Iqbal recitation by every federal judicial circuit that a pleader's
393. Id.
394. See supra note 386.
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conclusory allegations should not be accepted as true when ruling
on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.3 95 If that pre-existing, pre-
Iqbal principle had been applied, rather than Iqbal itself, the candid
conclusion may well be that nothing has changed at all. If that is
truly the case, then Iqbal did not usher in some new federal
paradigm as regards conclusorily pleaded claims; it simp3
validated a practice long-followed throughout the federal courts.
One apt to criticize Iqbal (at least as it relates to legal conclusions)
might better argue not that the Supreme Court used Iqbal as an
instrument of great change, but that the Court failed to use it as an
instrument of great change by neglecting to overturn the prevailing
federal approach to legal conclusions.
In any event, if one is inclined to see in Iqbal the harbinger of
momentous change in federal pleading, an arrival greeted either
alarmingly (in fear of meritorious cases lost) or warmly (in
appreciation for unmeritorious cases purged), the cause for
either alarm or delight is waning. This Article's study finds that the
prevalence of the courts' use of Iqbal to dismiss cases has tapered
off meaningfully in pharmaceutical and medical device litigation.
The four broad Iqbal studies that predated this Article offer a
modicum of corroboration to the pharmaceutical and medical
device findings noted here. Both this Article and the data
assembled by the Administrative Office of the United States
395. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
396. See Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603-04 (7th Cir.
2009). The court remarked:
Our system operates on a notice pleading standard; Twombly and its
progeny do not change this fact. A defendant is owed "fair notice of
what the . .. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." [Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).] Under Conley, just as under Twombly,
it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of a
claim without factual support. A plaintiff may not escape dismissal on a
contract claim, for example, by stating that he had a contract with the
defendant, gave the defendant consideration, and the defendant
breached the contract. What was the contract? The promises made? The
consideration? The nature of the breach? . . . Allowing [such a] case to
proceed absent factual allegations that match the bare-bones recitation
of the claims' elements would sanction a fishing expedition costing
both parties, and the court, valuable time and resources.
Id. (further citations omitted).
397. And were this view correct, the advent of change would not, in itself,
have likely earned Judge Clark's condemnation. He seemed to recoil from the
notion that even disruptive change was, for that reason alone, to be unwelcomed.
See CLARK, supra note 9, at 31 ("[U]nless pleading rules are subject to constant
examination and revaluation, they petrify and become hindrances, not aids, to
the administration of justice. Many lawyers are disturbed by the idea that the
rules of practice must be changed. There is always strife for that delusive
certainty in the law.").
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Courts tend to show that post-Iqbal motion filings rose
meaningfully, but the rate of motions granted post-Iqbal is not
dramatically higher than before (and, indeed, has seemed to
recede). 9 Both this Article and the Judicial Conference's study
conclude that the case law decided to date does not reveal a
dramatic post-Iqbal change in federal pleading practice among the
lower federal courts.399 Both this Article and Professor Hatamyar's
study found a very substantial rate of post-Iqbal dismissals in the
period immediately after the release of the Iqbal opinion and,
among dismissals, 4a heavy weighting towards those of the without-
prejudice variety. 00 Both this Article and the Federal Judicial
Center studies detected only a modest (if any post-Iqbal impact on
motions to dismiss experience in litigation.
CONCLUSION
Few battles over federal civil procedure have ever drawn out
the vigor as the fight over Iqbal and claim "plausibility." The
language of the tumult is impassioned. Opponents of lqbal decry it
(and Twombly, its predecessor) as "serious mistakes" that are "at
odds with premises underlying the Federal Rules, with precedent,
and with congressional expectations"A02 and that "marks a
continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, private
enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in
398. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text. To be precise,
Professor Hatamyar's study of a sampling of all federal cases found a dismissal
rate (full and partial dismissals, and both with and without prejudice) of 81% in
the three-and-a-half months immediately following Iqbal. See Hatamyar, supra
note 176, at 598 tbl. 1. This Article finds a dismissal rate among pharmaceutical
and medical device cases at an 82.6% rate during the same period. See supra
Part VI.B (noting first interval rate for completely defeated motions at 17.4%).
This Article also finds that this dismissal rate fell off meaningfully as the
distance from Iqbal grew, to the 61.7% rate recorded for the fifth time interval
measured (June, July, and August 2010). Whether Professor Hatamyar's study
would have found a similar pattern across the full spectrum of federal cases in
the 12 additional months following the close of her research is unknown.
401. In the first study, lawyers who filed a post-Twombly employment
discrimination case reported suffering a "plausibility"-based dismissal just 7.2%
of the time. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. In the second study,
most of those interviewed reported that they have not "seen any impact" or have
seen "no impact" in their practices from "plausibility." See supra notes 190-95
and accompanying text.
402. Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 132, at 101, 104, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%2OTestimony.pdf, at 17,
20 (statement of Professor Burbank).
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favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth."403
Proponents of Iqbal applaud it, in pharmaceutical and medical
device products cases at least, for at last policing a more thorough
pre-filing investigation, which "means looking through the medical
records . . . [,] ... interviewing the prescriber . . . [,] engaging an
expert witness, and getting at least a preliminary opinion," all of
which "means significant curtailment of litigation by word
processor"-a result "that's just great.,404
This Article studied the actual effect of Iqbal on the cohort of
more than 264 federal pharmaceutical and medical device cases of
every type, released from the day of the decision in Iqbal through
August 31, 2010. The results of that study of more than 15 months
of case law suggest that Iqbal is not having a dramatic impact on
this cohort, although its impact cannot be conclusively dismissed
as inconsequential either. There have been aggressive applications
of Iqbal on occasion. In the 21.2% of the time when Iqbal appears
facially to be impactful, a closer examination reveals that this
observed effect is, in large measure, decreasing in incidence,
coupled with an ability for correction, and frequently avoidable
through accessible sources of information. Moreover, this Article
cannot rule out that even those perceived effects may be phantoms,
because repeated, longstanding, and frequently cited federal
precedent among the lower federal courts may well have led to
functionally identical results even without Iqbal's emergence.
Nevertheless, validly assessing the true impact of Iqbal on
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation (or, for that matter,
federal litigation generally) remains a risky business. The Iqbal
opinion is still too new, the hard data surrounding its use too thin,
the steadied nature of its application too uncertain, and the
legislative efforts to unwork it too unknown.
The vibrancy of this battle will likely persist for many years to
come. What this Article has found (at least as to the data available
as it was written) is that the drama of the debate does not quite
echo in the pharmaceutical and medical device experience of the
courthouse.
403. Miller, supra note 59, at 10.
404. James M. Beck, Once More into the Breach, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG
(Mar. 18, 2010, 5:47 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2010/03/
once-more-into-breach.html.
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